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INTRODUCTION 
Foreign drug kingpins, rogue dictators; state-sponsored terror-
ists. These "bad guys" are the leading threats to America's na-
tional security, replacing the old Soviet Union and a China that 
is no longer "Red." Conceptually, fighting the new bad guys is 
not as easy as fighting the old threats: "nuking" the Soviet Un-
ion or China always remained an option, however foolish. Over-
whelming military force, however, was not designed to handle 
unconventional threats posed by drug dealers and terrorists and 
may be an inappropriate method of containing or crushing 
some dictators. Increasingly, the United States is turning to a 
new unilateral weapon - international trade measures - re-
gardless of opposition from its allies and trading partners. 
The United States has used this new weapon three times in 
the last decade. To fight foreign drug kingpins, the United 
States enacted the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1986 ("1986 
Narcotics Act").1 To fight Fidel Castro, the United States enact-
- ed the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, formally known as the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton 
Act").2 To fight Iran's mullahs and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, 
the reputed godfathers of international terrorism, the United 
States enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 ("1996 
Sanctions Act"). 3 
' Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 9001, 100 Stat 3207-164 (1986) (codified as amended at 19 
u.s.c. §§ 2491-2495 (1994)). 
• Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A §§ 6021-0091 
(West Supp. 1997)). Guidelines and implementing regulations for the Helms-Burton Act 
have been published. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Indirect Financing in Cuba, 
Civil Penalties, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,385 (1996) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt 515) (bringing 
Cuban asset control regulations into conformity with Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (UBERTAD) Act of 1996); Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996) (implementing provisions of Act 
allowing Secretary of State and Attorney General to deny visas to certain aliens); Summary 
of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) 
Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996) (summarizing portions of Act discussing persons 
who knowingly and intentionally traffic in confiscated properties). 
For a fascinating consideration of the Helms-Burton Act in relation to the major ten-
ets of liberal international relations theory - namely, promoting economic interdepen-
dence, international law, international institutions, and democracy - see generally David 
P. Fidler,IJBEJITAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act from Within Liberal Inter-
national Relations Theury, 4 IND. J. GLORAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (1997). 
' Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat 1541 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A § 1701 note 
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The new threats to America's national security and the highly 
controversial legislation the United States has enacted in re-
sponse raise a fundamental problem for international trade 
lawyers who adopt a narrow view of their field. Their field en-
compasses tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and trade remedies such as 
anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and escape clause actions. 
The boundaries of their field are expanding to encompass labor 
and environmental issues. But national security? What is the 
relationship between national security and international trade 
law? 
At first blush, no apparent relationship exists between the 
two. On the one hand, the term "national security" conjures up 
images of the military, intelligence operations, and a shadowy 
world of cloak-and-dagger espionage. On the other hand, the 
term "international trade law" triggers thoughts of a highly tech-
nical and arcane set of rules that involves an ever-increasing 
number of economic sectors and is derived from an internation-
al bureaucracy in Geneva - the World Trade Organization 
("WT0").4 Our senior policy makers embody these stereotypes. 
Few, if any, presidential national security advisors have had 
much experience with, knowledge of, or even interest in the 
world trading system. We do not imagine America's great na-
tional security advisors like Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew 
Brzezinski to be operating in the same arena as our great inter-
national trade negotiators like Carla Hills or Mickey Kantor. 
Stereotypes aside, national security and international trade law 
are closely linked, and the link has existed ever since the birth 
of modern international trade law in 1947. The link is contained 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"}.5 
Article XXI of GATT establishes a broad framework for impos-
ing international trade measures for national security purposes. 
Since 1947, countries have occasionally implemented trade sanc-
tions, sometimes invoking GATT article XXI as a justification.6 
(West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions)). The State Department has published 
guidelines on the implementation of this Act at 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996). 
4 See grnerally RAj BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS (1996) 
(providing comprehensive treatment of international trade law). 
• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.IAS. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in RAj BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW- DOCUMENTS SUPPLE-
MENT 59 (1996) [hereinafter GATT]. 
6 See Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT 
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During the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations, the 
United States has exploited this framework to support the unilat-
eral enactment of highly controversial sanctions legislation. The 
rationale behind this legislation is national security, but virtually 
all U.S. trading partners balk at this rationale. 
This Article critically analyzes GATT article XXI and the three 
key recent national security sanctions statutes: the 1986 Narcotics 
Act, the Helms-Burton Act, and the 1996 Sanctions Act. Part I of 
this Article considers the following question: what constraints, if 
any, does article XXI place on a WfO Member regarding na-
tional security sanctions legislation? Parts II, Ill, and IV review 
the three sanctions statutes, respectively, and ask the following 
questions: How do these statutes operate in practice? Are these 
statutes justified or are the criticisms leveled by our trading 
partners correct? Part V considers the effectiveness of national 
security sanctions. Finally, this Article concludes that America 
should modify or abandon its use of international trade mea-
sures to achieve national security aims. 
Three additional conclusions ·emerge from this Article. First, 
article XXI's provision regarding the enactment of national 
security sanctions is a weak restraint on the behavior of wro 
Members. Second, while some of the criticisms of the 1986 Nar-
cotics Act, Helms-Burton Act, and 1996 Sanctions Act are legiti-
mate, each act also contains meritorious and overlooked quali-
ties. Accordingly, neither critics nor supporters of these laws are 
entirely on target. Third, the weight of empirical evidence sug-
gests that national security sanctions, whatever their merits, are 
ineffectual at best and counterproductive at worst. In the end, a 
pragmatic rather than ideological approach to linking national 
security and international trade law may be prudent, and trade 
policy experts should take a hard look at repealing or revamp-
ing these policies. 
Dispute Settlement Panel and the Arlic/e XXI Defmse in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of Nicara-
gua, 19 LAw & POL 'V INT'L Bus. 603, 614-20 (1987) (chronicling use of article XXI as justi-
fication to implement trade sanctions). 
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I. THE LINK BUILT INTO GATT: ARTICLE XXI 
Article XXI sets forth an exception allowing WfO Members 
to sidestep their GATT obligations for national security reasons.7 
This exception, while rarely invoked explicitly, is highly signifi-
cant. The United States maintains an arsenal of national security 
statutes that authorize unilateral trade action.8 In recent years, 
the United States has added dramatic new statutes to this arse-
nal.9 Without article XXI, inevitable clashes would occur be-
tween unilateral measures adopted under these statutes and 
GATT obligations such as most-favored-nation treatment 
("MFN") (article I), tariff bindings (article II), national treat-
ment (article Ill), and quantitative restrictions (article XI). 
Other GATT articles are unable to manage clashes between 
U.S. statutes and GATT obligations. Article XXXV(1)(b), which 
allows for the imposition of economic measures such as bans or 
boycotts, is ineffective. 10 Article XXXV ( 1) (b) must be invoked 
by a WfO non-Member against a WfO Member at the time the 
non-Member joins the WTO, or by a Member against a non-
Member at the time the non-Member joins the WT0. 11 Nor 
could GATT article XXV(5), which explains how to obtain a 
waiver of GATT obligations in "exceptional circumstances not 
elsewhere provided for in" GATT, manage these clashes.12 To 
obtain a waiver, article XXXV(5) requires a two-thirds majority 
vote involving more than half of the WTO Members.15 No ex-
ception to this waiver requirement exists for unilaterally imposed 
national security measures. In sum, article XXI provides the 
indispensable textual basis in GATT for such economic mea-
sures. 
7 See GAlT art. XXI. 
8 See generally Harold Hongju Koh &: John Choon Yoo, DoUar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: 
The Fabric of Ec01U1T11ics and Natitmal Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 715 (1992) (illustrating stat-
utes and unilateral trade actions justified by national security). 
9 See generally Anne Q. Connaughton, Exporting to special Destinalioru: Terrorist Supporting 
and Embargoed Countries, 748 PRAC. L. INsr. 353 (1996) (chronicling recently enacted stat-
utes that allow unilateral trade sanctions). 
10 See GAlT art. XXXV. 
II See id. 
12 See id. art. XXV(5). 
" See id. art. XXXV. 
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Article XXI states: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be consuued 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any informa-
tion the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its 
essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essen-
tial security interests 
(i) relating to fissionabk materials or the materials 
from which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
impkments of war and to such traffic in other 
goods and materials as is carried on directly or 
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment, 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
in pursuance of its obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.14 
7 
This language, coupled with a review of the limited body of 
GATT jurisprudence on article XXI, reveals four key points. 
First, it is an all-embracing exception to GATT obligations. Sec-
ond, article XXI (b), which allows countries to take any action 
necessary to perfect their essential security interests, is the most 
important and controversial portion of this exception. Third, in 
contrast, some provisions of article XXI such as sections (a), (c), 
and possibly (b)(i) are not, or at least ought not to be, contro-
versial. Fourth, while a non-sanctioning and, in particular, target 
Member can challenge the invocation of article XXI by a sanc-
tioning Member, this right has no practical importance. 
A. An AU-Embracing Exception 
The first feature of article XXI is that it is an all-embracing 
exception to GATT obligations. This point is evident from the 
first word of the article: "nothing." Once a WTO Member relies 
on article XXI to implement a measure against another 
14 /d. an. XXI (emphasis added). For a discussion of U.N. Charter article 86 relating to 
maintenance of international peace and security, see 1 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
GUIDE TO GAlT LAW AND PRACTICE 609-10 (1995). 
8 University of California, Davis [Vol. 31:1 
Member, the sanctioning Member need not adhere to any 
GAIT obligations toward the target Member. This point is 
further reinforced by a 1949 decision of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES15 in a case Czechoslovakia brought against the United 
States under article XXIII of GAIT.16 
In its case before the CONTRACTING PARTIES, Czechoslovakia 
argued that the United States breached its obligations under 
articles I and XIII by administrating export licensing and short-
supply controls.17 Instituted in 1948, these controls discriminat-
ed among destination countries.18 The United States justified 
the controls under article XXI(b) (ii), arguing they were neces-
sary for security purposes and applied only to a narrow group of 
export goods that could be used for military purposes. 19 The 
CONTRACTING PARTIES rejected the Czech claim by a vote of 
seventeen to one, with three abstentions.20 In so doing, "the 
Chairman indicated that Article XXI 'embodied exceptions to 
the general rule contained in Article I. '" 21 While most of the 
other fundamental GAIT obligations were not at issue in this 
case, it is reasonable to infer from this statement that if the 
article I MFN rule is excepted, these other obligations would 
also be excepted. 
B. License to be a Cowboy?: 
The Importance and Controversial Nature of Article XXI(b) 
By far the most important and controversial portion of GAIT 
article XXI is section (b). In the article's text, the word "it" 
refers to the WTO Member invoking sanction measures; the 
Member has sole discretion to determine whether an action 
15 See id. art. XXXII. 
16 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 602, 606 (discussing 
Czechoslovakia's request for decision under article XXIII concerning United States's 
administration of export licensing controls). 
17 See David Buchan, Less Jljgid Approach to Central Planning. FIN. TIMEs, OcL 23, 1985, 
1. 
18 See Michael Gaugh, GAIT Article XXI and U.S. Expqrt Controls: The Invalidity of Non-
essential, Non-proliferation Controls, 8 N.Y. INT'L L REv. 51, 51 (1995) (arguing that export 
controls are discriminatory and, thus, contrary to GAIT article 1). 
19 See id. (stating that national security exception is implicit rationale for U.S. export 
control system). · 
20 See id. at 65. 
21 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 606. 
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conforms to the requirements of article XXI (b). The plain 
meaning of this word indicates that no other Member or group 
of Members and no WI'O panel or other adjudicatory body can 
determine for a sanctioning Member whether a measure satisfies 
the requirements.22 
Because each WI'O Member decides for itself what its "essen- . 
tial security interests" are under article XXI(b), four corollary 
principles may be developed. These corollaries surely put article 
XXI(b) among the GATT provisions that come closest to allow-
ing a Member to be a "cowboy"- an independent actor that is 
able to fend for its own security on the international frontier. 
First, a sanctioning Member need not give any prior notice of 
impending or imposed national security sanctions. 25 Second, 
the sanctioning Member need not justify the sanctions to the 
WI'O or its Members. Third, the sanctioning Member need not 
obtain the prior approval or subsequent ratification of the wro 
or its Members. 
These three implications are manifest in a GATT Council 
discussion about Argentinean import trade restrictions imposed 
by European Economic Community ("EEC") members,24 Cana-
da, and Australia between April and June 1982 during the 
Falkland Islands War. 25 The EEC representative stated that the 
exercise of article XXI rights "required neither notification, 
justification nor approval, a procedure confirmed by thirty-five 
22 See id. at 600 (noting that every country has final decision o·n issues regarding its 
own security), This interpretation is evident, for example, in the confident statement of the 
representative from Ghana concerning Ghana's boycott of Portuguese goods when Portugal 
acceded to GAlT in 1961: "each contracting party was the sole judge of what was necessary 
in its essential security interest [and] [t]here could therefore be no objection to Ghana 
regarding the boycott of goods as justified by security interests." /d . 
., See id. at 605. It was, for example, Cuba, not the United States, _who informed the 
Contracting Parties of the trade embargo imposed on Cuba in February 1962 by the 
Kennedy Administration, and thereafter the Administration invoked article XXI as its 
justification. See id. In contrast, the Reagan Administration informed the Contracting 
Parties of its May 1985 prohibition on imports of all Nicaraguan goods and services, and its 
ban on exports to Nicaragua of all U.S. goods and services other than those destined for 
the organized democratic resistance. See id. at 603. 
24 See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CAsES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN CoMMUNfiY 
LAw 2-14 (1993) (presenting history of European Community development and addition of 
members). 
.. See Gaugh, supra note 18, at 68-69. 
10 University of California, Davis [Vol. 31:1 
years of implementation of the General Agreement." 26 Mter 
some discussion, the U.S. representative stated in even bolder 
terms: "The General Agreement left to each contracting party the 
judgment as to what it considered to be necessary to protect its 
security interests. The CONTRACTING PARTIES had no power to 
question that judgment. "27 
The fourth corollary principle distinguishes between threat-
ened and actual dangers. A sanctioning Member may determine 
that its essential security interests are "threatened by a potential 
as well as an actual danger." 28 Nothing in article XXI(b) re-
quires that a sanctioning Member face a manifest and concrete 
danger, such as a physical invasion or armed attack, before im-
posing a national security measure. Do these four corollaries, in 
fact, mean that article XXI (b) is a license for a sanctioning 
Member to behave like a cowboy? 
Two checks may restrain cowboy behavior. First, in most cases 
it is politically prudent for a sanctioning Member to give prior 
notice to other WTO Members and attempt to garner a critical 
mass of multilateral acquiescence, if not de facto support, before 
invoking article XXI.29 Thus, on November 30, 1982, after dis-
cussing the Falkland Islands crisis, the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
adopted the Decision Concerning Anicle XXI of the General Agreement 
("Decision"). !!0 Subject to the article XXI:a exception concerning 
the right to withhold sensitive information, "contracting parties 
should be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures 
taken under Article XXI. "51 When action is taken under article 
XXI, all contracting parties affected by such action retain their 
full rights under the General Agreement. "52 To be sure, this 
first paragraph of the Decision is nothing more than a 
procedural recommendation. It is not an obligation to notify the 
WTO or its Members because the sanctioning Member decides 
26 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 600. 
'r7 /d. 
28 See id. (emphasis added) (presenting viewpoint of Ghana in debate of Ghana's 
boycott of Portuguese goods). 
29 See id. at 60!Hl6 (discussing procedures concerning notification of measures under 
article XXI). 
"" See id. 
31 /d. at 606 (emphasis added). 
"' See id. (discussing U.S. boycott of Nicaraguan goods and services). 
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whether contracting parties "should be informed" and whether 
notice is "possible." Moreover, there is no preference expressed 
as between propter or post hoc notice. However, the first 
paragraph reflects a consensus that prior notice is not just a 
matter of courtesy and respect for trading partners but also a 
means to reduce friction. Presenting the international 
community with national security sanctions as a fait accompli 
inevitably leads to quarrels among political allies. Countries 
opposing the sanctions will typically argue that they share the 
same end as the sanctioning countiy, but disagree with sanctions 
as a means to achieve that end. These quarrels have exploded 
into major trade rows because the United States has resorted to 
implementing secondary boycotts of a target country.88 This 
tactic not only penalizes the target country, but also alienates 
entities in third (potentially allied) countries that trade with or 
invest in the target nation.84 For present purposes, the key 
" See EJ. Prior, House Passes Iran/Libyan Oil Sanctions Act: Bill Widens Split Between U.S. 
and Allies OutT Use of Secondary Boycott Policy, EXPORT PRAc., July 15, 1996, at 13 (reporting 
Japanese and European allegations that United States's use of secondary boycott is hypo-
critical). 
"' See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 602.{14. To be sure, the United 
States is not the first WTO Member to resort to a secondary boycotL Countries in the Arab 
League have maintained a secondary boycott against firms that have relations with Israel. 
See id. at 602. The signatories to the Pact of the League of Arab States, which was entered 
into on March 22, 1945 at Cairo, are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine Liberation 
Organization, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen Arab Republic, and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. See 2 FRANK W. 
SWACKER ET AL., WORlD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS§ 16-2(a), at 586-87 (1996). Regarding 
the last two signatories, on May 22, 1990, Yemen became a single sovereign state known as 
the MRepublic of Yemen," and a member of the Arab' League. The Arab League has 
maintained the boycott for many years, though some League members do not adhere to iL 
This boycott is discussed in the 1970 GATT Working Party Report on the Accession of the 
United Arab Republic. In defense of the secondary boycott of Israel, the representative 
from the United Arab Republic stated it was political, not commercial, in nature, and 
resulted from the Mextraordinary circumstances to which the Middle East area had been 
exposed," including M[t]he state of war which had long prevailed in that area." See WORlD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 602. Accordingly, the representative concluded, Mit 
would not be reasonable to ask that the United Arab Republic should do business with a 
firm that transferred all or part of its profits from sales to the United Arab Republic to an 
enemy country." ld. at 602. Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat hypocritically in view of 
the recent use of secondary boycotts by the United States, the United States enacted 
blocking legislation making it illegal for American companies to comply with the Arab 
League boycotL See Stuart Anderson, Unthinking Critics . .. or Undue Sanctions7 Blow to 
Trading Partners, WASH. TIMES, July 19, 1996, at A21. 
12 University of California, Davis [Vol. 31:1 
point is that while notice is not mandated by article XXI or the 
Decision, it could assume an increasingly important de facto role 
in reducing trade friction if the United States persists in using 
increasingly aggressive, innovative, and extraterritorial types of 
unilateral sanctions. 
The second restraint on cowboy behavior is contained in the 
introductory chapeau to article XXI(b). A sanctioning Member 
is supposed to determine that its measure is necessary for the 
protection of its own essential security interests.35 For the most 
part, GATT contracting parties have exercised restraint in inter-
preting these terms, and most WfO Members have been equally 
cautious. Overall, the number of express or implicit invocations 
of article XXI remains relatively small. Nevertheless, the poten-
tial for abuse exists, and the considerable criticism of recent 
U.S. sanctions laws would lead some observers to doubt the 
continuing power of these terms to restrain cowboy behavior. 
Mter all, these terms are broad enough to encompass a variety 
of circumstances, and their factual application is subjective. At 
the same time, these terms are a gauge by which the world 
trading community can opine on a sanctioning Member's use of 
article XXI(b). Put differently, they can help shape world opin-
ion as to whether a sanctioning Member is "crying wolf." 
Consider Sweden's global import quota system for certain 
footwear in effect between November 1975 and July 1977. Swe-
den argued that the 
decrease in domestic production has become a critical threat 
to the emergency planning of .Sweden's economic defense as 
an integral part of the country's security policy. This policy 
necessitates the maintenance of a minimum domestic produc-
tion capacity in vital industries. Such a capacity is indispens-
able in order to secure the provision of essential products 
necessary to meet basic needs in case of war or other emer-
gency in international relations.ss 
It is true that, as one contracting party said during the discus-
sion of the 1949 Czech action, article XXI covers "goods which 
were of a nature that could contribute to war potentiaL"~' For in-
stance, it would be reasonable to include a software program or 
" See GA TI art. XXI. 
,.; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 603. 
" See id. at 602 (emphasis added). 
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hardware device within an export control measure that is not 
itself used for a military purpose, but which could be converted 
to that purpose. 
However, upon further reflection, the gauge suggested above 
illustrates why Sweden's argument is outrageous: it is a slippery 
slope. Would buttons for military uniforms be necessary for the 
protection of Sweden's essential security interests on the 
grounds that troops are disadvantaged if they lack appropriate 
attire? More generally, is article :XXI(b) really designed for po-
tential non-military - economic - threats? If so, then 
America's "Big Three" automakers- General Motors, Ford, and 
Chrysler - could argue that Japanese auto imports should be 
banned or severely restricted because of the threat they pose to 
their market share in the vital passenger car industry. Likewise, 
India could and has argued that it must enact extraordinary 
measures against imported food to ensure self-sufficiency, espe-
cially in light of India's long-standing border conflicts.ss These 
arguments, however, would stretch article :XXI(b) beyond recog-
nition, transforming it into a commercial as well as national 
security exception. The central thrust behind article :XXI(b) is 
to define the requisite link between the American passenger car 
industry and a threat to our national security interests or be-
tween India's food needs and its historical nemeses, Pakistan 
and China. But these arguments presuppose such a link and, 
thus, become self-fulfilling. To be sure, in some cases the com-
mercial and national security interests are so intertwined that a 
bright line between the two interests cannot be drawn.59 None-
theless, regular trade remedies condoned under other articles of 
GATT, most notably the escape clause in article XIX, exist to 
deal with non-military threats posed by fair foreign competition. 
As another example, consider Nicaragua's argument in its 
action against the United States concerning a trade embargo 
38 See Uli Schmetzer, 50 Yean of F1mJom, India Thirsts fur Progms: A Nuclear Puwer ~ 
Many People Remain Illiterate, Modem India Is a Diverse Natiml Brimming with Contradictions, 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1997, at 1 (describing long--'ltanding border conflict between India and 
China); Pakistan, India &cha"f!! Fm in Escalating Burder Conflict, VANCOUVER SUN, jan. 29, 
1996, at AS (reporting on border conflict between India and Pakistan). 
09 See james R. Wllch, Comment, GATT and the HalfLift of Umnium Industry Protection, 
10 Nw.J. INT'L L & Bus. 150, 193 (1989) (describing relationship between uranium indus--
try and national security). 
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that the Reagan Administration imposed in May 1985.40 Nicara-
gua urged that the key terms in the article XXI (b) chapeau 
constitute a self-defense requirement: a Member can invoke 
article XXI(b) only after it has been subjected to aggression. In 
the unadopted 1986 report, the GATT Panel decided that its 
strict terms of reference prevented it from ruling on this argu-
ment.41 However, Nicaragua's argument cannot be correct. If 
the drafters of GATT intended to include only self-defense cases, 
then the language of article XXI would have said so expressly 
and perhaps even referenced the article 51 language in the U.N. 
Charter. 42 Instead, the drafters used terms that balanced com-
peting interests to demonstrate the meaning of "essential securi-
ty interests." 43 Moreover, clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) follow the 
chapeau to article XXI (b), a further indication that actual ag-
gression is not a prerequisite. 
These clauses envision the invocation of article XXI (b) to 
manage nuclear weapons material, arms trafficking, or an inter-
national relations emergency. If a sanctioning Member had to 
wait until a hostile power acquired nuclear weapons, a 
40 See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 601 (contending United States 
must not enact restrictive trade measures of non-economic agreement). 
41 See id. (holding that examination of United States's invocation of article XXI was 
precluded by its mandate). 
•• See U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 1 (providing that U.N. Charter does not prevent 
Member from inherent right of self-defense against armed attack until Security Council has 
acted jointly to maintain international peace and security). 
43 See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 600 (discussing meaning of "es-
sential security interests"). One of the drafters of the Havana Charter stated the following: 
/d. 
We gave a good deal of thought to the question of the security exception 
which we thought should be included in the Charter. We recognized that there 
was a great danger of having too wide an exception and we could not put it 
into the Charter, simply by saying: "by any Member of measures relating to a 
Member's security interests," because that would permit anything under the 
sun. Therefore we thought it well to draft provisions which would take care of 
real security interests and, at the same time, so far as we could, to limit the 
exception so as to prevent the adoption of protection for maintaining indus-
tries under every conceivable circumstance .... [T]here must be some latitude 
here for security measures. It is really a question of balance. We have got to 
have some exceptions. We cannot make it too tight, because we cannot pr~ 
hibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. On the other 
hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of security, countries 
will put on measures which really have a commercial purpose. 
1997] Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law 15 
destabilizing number or type of non-nuclear arms, or a physical 
invasion, then it would be too late for trade sanctions to protect 
any Member. In addition, the threat may be orchestrated by a 
"military establishment," a term broad enough to include not 
only sovereign governments but also major terrorist organiza-
tions or drug cartels. 
At the same time, however, implicit in clauses (i), (ii}, and 
(iii}, and in the words "necessary," "protection," and "essential 
security interests," is the concept of a credible threat. Simply 
crying wolf will not do because article XXI could not have been 
designed to protect a hypersensitive government any more than 
tort law protects a hypersensitive plaintiff. Rather, the test 
should be objective - whether a reasonable government faced 
. with the same circumstances would invoke article XXI. In sum, 
Nicaragua's unduly restrictive self-defense argument should not 
be used to limit article XXI. Rather, the implicit concept of a 
credible threat judged from the objective standpoint of a reason-
able and similarly-situated government, coupled with the articula-
tion of specific types of dangers that track one or more of the 
three clauses, must restrain cowboy behavior. 
C. Strengthening the Restraints Against 
Abusive Invocations of Article XXI(b) 
The two restraints discussed in the previous section - giving 
prior notice to garner support, or at least minimize opposition, 
to national security sanctions and using the critical terms in the 
introductory chapeau to article XXI(b) as a gauge of the reason-
ableness of such sanctions - are not fail-safe devices against 
cowboy behavior. The world· community has yet to produce such 
devices. Until it does so, the risk of a corrosive effect on the 
multilateral trading system from abusive invocations of article 
XXI (b) is real. 
One observer suggests this risk cannot be hedged, asserting 
that "there may be little that can be done about" the "danger-
ous loophole to the obligations of GATT." 44 This statement is 
unduly pessimistic. Greater coordination between the WfO and 
44 jOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT§ 28.4, at 748 (1969). But 
see id. at 752 (suggesting that GAIT Working Party will review measures using this 
loophole). 
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the U.N. Security Council might ensure the proper use of article 
XXI(b).45 For example, a joint WfO-Security Council Commit-
tee on National Security Sanctions could be established to ren-
der a non-binding and non-precedential opinion in each case. 
Each case could address two questions. First, does the use of 
such sanctions comport with the terms of article XXI(b)? Sec-
ond, are the sanctions reasonable in relation to the threat or 
actual danger posed? 
A more ambitious step would be to encourage the use of 
national security sanctions only after an appropriate Security 
Council resolution has been adopted. 46 In addition, if the an-
swer to either of the above two questions is negative, then the 
joint Committee could render an advisory opinion on counter-
retaliatory measures by the sanctioned and adversely affected 
third-party countries. In sum, it is possible, and indeed may be 
necessary, to develop checks that preserve the sovereign national 
security prerogative of individual WfO Members, yet simulta-
neously highlight threats to the multilateral trading system posed 
by abusive assertions of this prerogative. 
D. Non-Controversial Provisions of Article XXI 
GAIT article XXI contains three parts that are not, or at least 
ought not to be, particularly controversial: sections (a), (b)(i), 
and (c). Article XXI(a) assures a sanctioning Member that it has 
no obligation to fumish information to the WfO or other Mem-
bers that "it considers contrary to its essential national security 
interests. "47 No sovereign country would be willing, or should 
be expected, to surrender its ability to keep sensitive informa-
tion confidential, particularly when its disclosure might compr~ 
mise intelligence sources. This prerogative does, and must, re-
main in the discretion of each country.48 In the 1949 Czech 
4
' See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 609-10 (discussing article 86 
which deals with relationship between International Trade Organization and United 
Nations). Indeed, article 86 of the Havana Charter, which was not part of GATT, attempted 
to sort out jurisdiction between the International Trade Organization and the United 
Nations by granting the latter jurisdiction not only over political matters, but also over 
economic measures adopted for political reasons. See id. 
46 See id. at 603 (mentioning Security Council Resolution 502). This situation in fact 
occurred during the Falkland Islands crisis. See id. 
47 GATT art. XXI(a). 
48 The word "itft makes clear that deciding which information is inappropriate for 
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case, for instance, the U.S. representative to GAlT invoked 
article XXI(a), stating that "[t]he United States does consider it 
contrary to its security interest - and to the security interest of 
other friendly countries - to reveal the names of the commodi-
ties that it considers to be most strategic." 49 At the same time, 
invoking article XXI without disclosing any credible evidence of 
a national security threat may be politically unacceptable. 50 
That is, as a political matter, to preclude criticism that a sanc-
tioning Member is crying wolf, article XXI seems to place a de 
facto requirement on each sanctioning Member to present at 
least a prima facie case that a real threat exists. 
Article XXI(b)(i) concerns national security sanctions neces-
sary to protect against threats from "fissionable materials" or 
their parent materials. Notwithstanding the introductory chapeau 
to article XXI(b), which raises interpretive issues discussed 
above,51 the particular exception in clause (i) is quite under-
standable. No sovereign country should concern itself with 
GAlT trade obligations 'when faced with a nuclear weapons 
threat. Clause (i) simply states the obvious: protecting oneself 
against a nuclear weapons threat and, more generally, deterring 
nuclear weapons proliferation is more important than adhering 
to the GATI.52 
Likewise, article' XXI(c) states the obvious point, that main-
taining international peace and s~curity by performing obliga-
tions under the U.N. Charter is more important than adhering 
to GAlT rules. It ensures proper prioritization between the 
WTO and the United Nations, particularly the Security Council. 
Accordingly, it is, and should .be, irrelevant if trade. embargoes 
or other Security Council sanctions imposed on rogue countries 
violate GAlT obligations to those countries. 
Notably, article XXI(c) does not expressly give WTO Members 
the right to determine whether its terms are met because, in 
contrast to article XXI(a) and (b), article XXI(c) does not 
disclosure rests with each Member. See id. art. XXI(a). 
49 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 601-02. 
50 See· infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text (discussing political issues surrounding 
1996 Sanctions Act). 
•• See supra notes 7-50 and accompanying text (discussing article XXI). 
•• See GAIT art. XXI (stating that nothing in GAIT ·prevents any contracting party 
from protecting itself against nuclear dangers). 
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contain the words "which it considers." However, this omission is 
not surprising. In practice, the Security Council agrees to Char-
ter obligations concerning international peace and security, and 
the problem of unilateral action is unlikely to arise in this con-
text. For example, in 1966, the Security" Council adopted Resolu-
tion 232 requiring a trade embargo against Rhodesia (now Zim-
babwe),53 and the resolution was followed by most, if not all, 
GATT contracting parties. 
E. Challenging the Invocation of Article XXI 
The relationship between GATT articles XXI and XXIII54 is 
not evident from the language of either of these articles. On the 
one hand, because article XXI does not require notice, approv-
al, or ratification, it would seem to follow that the article does 
not create a right for a non-sanctioning Member to sue a sanc-
tioning Member. On the other hand, the 1949 Czech complaint 
against the United States regarding American export controls 
did result in a favorable decision for the United States under 
article XXIII(2) as to "whether the Government of the United 
States had failed to carry out its obligations under the Agree-
ment through its administration of the issue of export licens-
es."55 The contracting parties appear to have thought that mere 
invocation of article XXI did not immunize a sanctioning Mem-
ber from an article XXIII action. Similarly, in the discussion of 
the restrictions imposed on Argentina during the Falkland Is-
lands crisis, one party expressed the view that Argentina "re-
served its rights under article XXIII in respect of any injury 
resulting from trade restrictions applied in the context of Article 
XXI." 56 More generally, the party stated that "the provisions of 
Article XXI were subject to those of Article XXIII(2)." 57 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the above-quoted November 1982 Decision 
specifies that "when action is taken under Article XXI, all 
" See jACKSON, supra note 44, § 28.4, at 751 (discussing Resolution 232 as only known 
example of measure falling under GATT article XXI(c)). 
54 See GATT art. XXIII (concerning complaints about nullification and impairment of 
benefits and resolution of disputes arising from such complaints). 
55 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 606. 
56 Id. 
57 ld. 
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contracting parties affected by such action retain their full rights 
under the General Agreement."58 
Thus, a non-sanctioning Member has a right to bring an arti-
cle XXIII action and invoke the Urug;uay Rnund Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputef>9 against a 
sanctioning Member's national security sanction. The basis for 
the action lies in whether the sanction nullifies or impairs bene-
fits under GATT that otherwise should accrue to the non-sanc-
tioning Member. The resulting action, moreover, may involve 
nullification or impairment either because the disputed sanction 
is an outright violation of a GATT obligation60 or because of 
the way in which the sanction is applied. 61 Indeed, in virtually 
every case, a non-violation nullification or impairment claim is 
likely to have merit because trade damage should not be in 
doubt if the disputed sanction is at all effective. 
However, does the right to bring an article XXIII action 
mean anything in practice - is a WfO panel or Appellate Body 
report likely to adjudicate the merits of a non-sanctioning 
Member's attack on the invocation of article XXI? The answer is 
almost assuredly negative. As the above textual analysis of article 
XXI(b) indicates,62 invocation of the natimial security exception 
is a matter left to the discretion of a sanctioning Member. More-
over, realpolitik6! demands that Members retain this sovereign 
prerogative even if additional multilateral checks against abuse 
are adopted in the future. Any attempt by the wro to encroach 
on this prerogative of sovereignty would damage it in the eyes 
of national legislatures. 
As a practical matter, a WfO panel, like the GATT panel in 
the United States-Nicaragua case, would likely interpret its terms 
of reference narrowly to exclude a ruling on the substantive 
article XXI arguments. Inevitably, this interpretation would 
.. ld. at 607. 
"" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade- Multilateral Negotiation (the Uruguay 
Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
reprinted in RAJ BHAIA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE lAW- DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 397 (1996). 
60 See GATT arL XXIII(1) (a). 
61 See id. arL XXII1(1)(b). 
62 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (analyzing article XXI(b)). 
"' Realpolitik is based upon the realities of national interest and power, as 
distinguished from theoretical, ethical, or moralistic objectives. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1890 (3d ed. 1986). 
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displease the complaining non-sanctioning Member, as it did in 
the Nicaragua case. Nicaragua blocked adoption of the October 
1986 report in part because of its failure to make recommenda-
tions.64 To an American litigator, this interpretation ought not 
to be a surprise. U.S. courts, including the Supreme Court, 
routinely seek to base a decision on less controversial procedural 
grounds and thereby avoid more complex and controversial 
substantive issues. Put bluntly, the 1949 decision of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES may prove to be the first and last major sub-
stantive ruling on the invocation of article XXI rendered under 
GATT-WfO adjudication procedures. 
II. FIGHTING DRUG KINGPINS: THE 1986 NARCOTICS Acr 
A. The Carrot and Stick Approach 
Congress and the President have used intemational trade law 
not only to deal with the threat to Americans from terrorists, 
but also to combat the scourge of drugs in .American society. As 
former Secretary of State James Baker suggested, both are na-
tional security threats: "there is no foreign policy issue short of 
war or peace which has a more direct bearing on the well-being 
of the American people" than the intemational trade of illicit 
drugs.65 Secretary Baker's statement is not hyperbole. The Unit-
ed Nations estimates that the intemational trade in illicit drugs 
is worth $400 billion - approximately 8% of world trade -
more than the trading in iron, steel, or motor vehicles.66 There 
are very few commodities that the United States is more heavily 
dependent upon foreign countries than drugs. Approximately 
95% of the illegal narcotics consumed in the United States is 
imported.67 Moreover, about 61% of America's federal prison 
population is comprised of drug law violators, and each year 
about 20,000 Americans die from drug-related causes.68 
64 See WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 608 (stating that Nicaraguan 
delegation would not support adoption until counsel made recommendation). 
65 See International NaTCOtics Contro~ 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 503, 516 (1991). 
66 See Stephen Fidler & Jimmy Bums, IUicit Drugs TTIJde Is Put at $400 Billion, FIN. 
TIMES, June 26, 1997, at 11. 
67 See International NaTCOtics Contro~ supra note 65, at 516 (describing domestic impact of 
international narcotics). 
68 See Martin Wolf, The Profit of Prohibition, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at 12. Ironically, 
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Worldwide, about 22% of people infected with the HIV virus are 
intravenous drug users.69 
Among the particularly severe drug threats to the United 
States are cocaine and heroin. 70 Both cocaine and heroin are 
highly addictive. 71 Extracted from the coca leaf, cocaine and its 
derivative "crack" are stimulants that destroy their addicts within 
a few months or years while heroin, derived from opium, is a 
depressant that can be used over decades. 72 Both cocaine and 
heroin are highly profitable: by one . estimate, the wholesale 
price of a kilogram of cocaine may range from $15,000 to 
$30,000, and the wholesale price of heroin may range from 
$180,000 to $200,000.7s Another estimate tracks the stunning 
markups at each stage of distribution: 
The price of opium to a Pakistani fanner is $90 a 
kilogramme. The wholesale price of heroin in Pakistan is 
$2,870. Wholesale in the United States, heroin is $80,000. 
The final retail price, at 40 percent purity, is $290,000. Simi-
larly, South American peasants receive $610 a kilogramme for 
their coca leaves. Cocaine base is $860, while cocaine hydro-
chloride is $1,500. Wholesale in the United States, at 83 per 
cent purity, it is worth $25,250. As crack cocaine it is $50,000 
to the consumer and as cocaine powder $110,000.74 
Both drugs originate almost entirely from overseas: Bolivia, Co-
lombia, and Peru account for essentially all of the world's coca 
cultivation,75 and the "Golden Triangle" countries of Myanmar 
the fatality figure is less than the annual number of deaths attributed to alcohol or tobacco 
- 100,000 and 400,000, respectively. See id. · 
.. See id. 
70 See Intematitmal Narcotics Control Efforts in the Western Hemisphere, 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 
30!1, !1!17 (1995) (providing statement of Roben Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere of House International Relations Committee, Mar. 29, 1995); Intematimlal 
Narcotics Control - 1990, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 40!1, 417 (1991) (describing threat of 
cocaine, "crack," and heroin to American society). 
71 See Mohammad Ghanea, A Retrospective Study of Poisoning in Tehran, !15 J. TOXICOLOGY 
!187 (1997). . 
72 See Summary of Af!rill993 International Narcotics Control Report. 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 
225, 2!18 (199!1) (illustrating switch of drug producers to heroin as drug of 1990s). 
73 See id. (highlighting wholesale prices of heroin and cocaine). 
74 Wolf, supra note 68, at 14. 
75 See International Narcotics Control Strategy ReJxrrt Released, 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 183, 
19~97 (1995) (providing statements of Timothy E. Winh, Undersecretary for Global M-
fairs, and Roben S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law En-
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(Burma), Laos, and Thailand account for 75% of the world's 
opium production.76 Most of the balance of the world's opium 
production occurs in the "Golden Crescent" countries of Iran, 
Mghanistan, and Pakistan. 77 During the early 1990s, the share 
of the illicit drug industry in the gross domestic product was 6% 
in Peru, more than 7% in Colombia, and more than 9% in 
Bolivia. 78 The most important Burmese and Mghan exports are 
also drugs. 
In an effort to combat the scourge of drugs, Congress amend-
ed the Trade Act of 1974 with title IX of the Drug Enforce-
ment, Education, and Control Act in 1986, also known as the 
1986 Narcotics Act.79 The 1986 Narcotics Act is a "carrot and 
stick" approach to dealing with the problem of illegal drug 
smuggling into the United States and the threat of foreign-
sourced drug production. The 1986 Narcotics Act empowers the 
President to take unilateral trade actions against a country pro-
ducing or transporting drugs if that country does not cooperate 
fully with the U.S. government in keeping drugs out of the 
United States.80 These "stick" actions are to be taken as of 
March 1 of each year.81 The "carrot" is the possibility of obtain-
ing presidential certification that would exempt a country from 
trade sanctions. 82 
The carrot and stick approach of the 1986 Narcotics Act re-
flects an important development in U.S. strategy in the war on 
drugs. Until Congress passed this Act, the United States concen-
trated much of its effort on interdiction - intercepting drug 
shipments during transit from the source countries of the drugs 
forcement Affairs, Mar. 1, 1995). The article also notes that Peru and Bolivia together pro-
duce more than 80% of the world's coca, and that Burma is the world's largest producer of 
heroin. See id.; su also Summary of Aprill993 International Narcotics Control Repent. supra note 
72, at 237 (stating that Peru accounts for more than 60% of world coca cultivation, with 
Columbia and Bolivia comprising majority of remainder). 
76 See Summary of April1993 International Narcotics Control Repent. supra note 72, at 238 
(discussing opium production in Burma, l.aos, Thailand, and Afghanistan). 
77 See Grant Peck, Drug Traffic Moving Along New Asian Routes, Hous. CHRON., July 7, 
1996, at 26. 
78 See Wolf, supra note 68, at 12-14 (stating U.N. estimates of percentage of gross do-
mestic product that illegal drug trade comprises in Peru, Bolivia, and Columbia). 
79 See Narcotics Control Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2491-2495 (1994). 
80 See id. § 2492(a). 
81 See id. 
82 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(E). 
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to the U.S. border. Interdiction is a game of cat and mouse that 
raises the cost of doing business for drug producers and traffick-
ers each time a seizure occurs. However, interdiction cannot 
stem the wave of drug smuggling. As the State Department de-
clared in 1995, "We are not satisfied with simply raising the cost 
of doing business for the traffickers." 85 The 1986 Narcotics Act 
reflects what might be called a "source country" strategy. The 
major source countries of drugs are identified; the weak link in 
the chain from drug production overseas to drug sales in the 
United States is attacked, namely the drug crops lying dormant 
in the field.84 This strategy is attractive because the bulk of 
world production of cocaine and heroin is concentrated in a 
relatively small number of countries. 
The 1986 Narcotics Act identifies two target classes of possible 
unilateral trade sanctions: "major drug producing countries," 
and "major drug-transit countries." 85 A major drug producing 
country is defined by the annual output of opium, cocaine base, 
or marijuana produced in that country. Specifically, it is a coun-
try that illegally produces at least five metric tons of opium or 
opium derivative, 500 metric tons of coca, or 500 metric tons of 
marijuana during one fiscal year.86 A major drug-transit country 
is a conduit for narcotics or a money laundering center. It is a 
country "that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or 
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly 
affecting" the United States.87 In addition, the country's govem-
"' International Narrotic.s Control Effurts in the Western Hemisphere, supra note 70, at 338 
(furnishing statement of Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs, before Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of House 
International Relations Committee, March 29, 1995). 
84 See Yielding to U.S., Thais Target opium F~elds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 4, 1981, at 21. For a 
discussion of the source country strategy from the Clinton Administration's perspective, see 
Drug Control in the Western Hemisphere, 7 DEP'T OF ST. DISP. 293, 310-12 (providing statement 
of RobertS. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs before Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of House International Relations 
Committee,June 6, 1996) . 
.. ~ 19 u.s.c. § 2492(b)(1)(C). 
86 See id. § 2495 (2). 
87 /d. § 2495(3) (A). The Secretary of State, after consulting with Congress, established 
numerical standards and other guidelines for determining which countries are significant 
direct sources of drugs. See id. § 2492(e) (establishing duty of Secretary of State to deter-
mine major drug-transit countries). The term •narcotic or psychotropic drugs" is defined 
either by an applicable international narcotics control agreement, or by the domestic law 
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ment must either know or be in complicity with drug transport-
ing and money-laundering of significant sums of drug-related 
profits.88 To establish a suspect country as a major drug pro-
ducing country, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that a country's 
government is involved in producing or trafficking drugs. 
1. The Stick: Trade Sanctions 
The 1986 Narcotics Act establishes the stick- five sanctions 
the President must impose on a major drug producing or drug-
transit country.89 Although the sanctions are mandatory in most 
cases, the President has some discretion whether to impose any 
or all of the sanctions.90 First, the President may revoke any 
preferential treatment afforded to the country's products under 
the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), Caribbean Basin 
Initiative ("CBI"), or other ~referential scheme.91 Second, the 
President may impose an additional duty of up to 50% ad valo-
rem on any or all of the country's products, and he may impose 
a duty of up to 50% on duty-free products.92 Third, the Presi-
dent may suspend air carrier transportation between the United 
States and the country, and may terminate any air service agree-
ment with the country.9s Fourth, the President may withdraw 
U.S. personnel and resources that are participating in a service 
arrangement for customs pre-clearance.94 Finally, a country 
whose government is involved in illegal drug trade or that fails 
to cooperate with U.S. narcotics enforcement activities cannot 
receive a quota allocation for sugar imports into the United 
States.95 In the abstract, these sanctions may not appear 
of the country concerned. See id. § 2495(4). 
88 See id. § 2495(3)(B)-(C). 
89 See id. § 2492 (presenting sanctions available). Some of these sanctions were added 
to the Act by section 806 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FISCal Years 1988 and 
1989 and section 4408 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. See id. §§ 2492, 2495(3) (C). 
90 See id. § 2492(a)(6). 
91 See id. § 2492(a) (1) (allowing President to deny tariff treatment to any or all of 
country's products). 
92 See id. § 2492(a) (2)-(3). The first and second sanctions apply to imports that are 
placed into, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, during the period the action 
is in effecL See id. § 2492(c). 
•• See id. § 2492(a)(4), (d). 
94 See id. § 2492(a)(5). 
.. See id. § 2493. 
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particularly severe. In some cases, however, the first and second 
sanctions may inflict harm on another country and thereby 
cause it to alter its behavior with respect to drug production or 
transit. 
2. The Carrot: Certification 
The 1986 Narcotics Act contains an important exception to 
these sanctions. The United States will not impose sanctions on 
a major drug producing or drug-transit country if the President 
determines and certifies to Congress that, during the previous 
year, the country "has cooperated fully" with the United States, 
or "has taken adequate steps on its own," to change its behav-
ior.96 The four certification criteria97 are the carrot in the 
1986 Narcotics Act because they attempt to compel a major 
drug producing or drug-transit country to alter its behavior and 
thereby avoid the stick of trade sanctions.98 Because there is no 
definition of "cooperation fully" or "adequate steps," the Presi-
dent has considerable discretion in using the carrot. 
First, a m,Yor drug producing or drug-transit country must 
reach a bilateral or multilateral narcotics agreement with the 
United States and cooperate fully with the U.S. government in 
satisfying the agreement's goals.99 The statute contemplates an 
agreement with specific objectives: to reduce drug production, 
consumption, and trafficking within the country, and address 
illicit crop eradication and crop substitution.100 Under the 
agreement's ·terms, a nation must also increase drug interdiction 
96 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i). 
97 See id. (providing that unfavorable tariff treaunent shall not apply to countries that 
adhere to certain drug control practices). These criteria are similar to the criteria set forth 
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Whereas the stick in the 1986 Narcotics 
Act is trade sanctions, the stick in the 1961 Act is the withholding of U.S. foreign aid from 
major drug producing and drug-transit countries, and the opposition to loans to such 
countries from multilateral development banks. Compa7ll22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (1994) (pro-
viding President with two considerations for certification) with 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b) (1) (pro-
viding President with four considerations for certification). (The original version of the 
1961 Act is Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961)). The certification is due on March I of 
each year. See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(1)(A); 22 U.S.C. § 2291h(a). 
98 See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(a) (requiring imposition of sanctions upon major drug produc-
ing or drug-transit countries). 
99 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(I). 
100 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(B)(i). 
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and enforcement, drug education and treatment programs, co-
operate with U.S. drug enforcement officials, and participate in 
extradition, mutual legal assistance, sharing of evidence, and 
other treaties aimed at drug enforcement. 101 The country must 
also identify and eliminate illicit drug laboratories, as well as the 
trafficking of essential precursor chemicals used to produce 
illegal drugs. 102 If a country has already been designated as a 
major drug producing or drug-transit country during the previ-
ous year/05 the President similarly cannot certify a country as 
cooperating fully with the United States unless that country 
enacts a bilateral or multilateral narcotics agreement.104 This 
requirement induces countries to enter into such an agreement. 
Second, a country must cooperate fully with the United States 
to prevent illegal drug sales and transports to U.S. government 
personnel and their dependents.105 Unfortunately, the statute 
does not specify how a country is to prevent drugs from being 
sold to U.S. government personnel, particularly where a U.S. 
government official is determined to buy drugs. Certainly, a 
country cannot be expected to police the behavior of U.S. offi-
cials within a U.S. embassy, which is U.S. property, and where 
U.S. officials may enjoy diplomatic immunity. 
Third, before the President certifies a major drug producing 
or drug-transit country, that country must also cooperate fully 
with the United States to prevent and punish the laundering of 
drug-related profits in that country. This requirement may prove 
especially difficult for smaller countries with limited law enforce-
ment resources and little experience in prosecuting sophisticated 
white-collar crimes. Money laundering cases typically involve 
extensive and painstaking investigation. For example, it may be 
necessary to trace wire transfers of funds among banks around 
the world, which may require obtaining exemptions from appli-
cable bank secrecy laws. 106 These tasks are likely to require the 
101 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(l), (B)(ii)-(iii), (vi)-(vii). 
102 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(l), (B)(iv)-(v). 
10
' See id. § 2492(b)(1)(C). 
104 See id. 
105 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(II). 
106 For a discussion of wire transfer transactions and law, see ERNEST PATRIKIS ET AL., 
WIRE TRANSFERS 3-14 (1993). See also Cleaning Up DiTty Money, ECONOMIST, july 26, 1997, at 
14 (arguing that bank secrecy laws must be change if more "laundrymen" are to be held 
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assistance of bank regulators in relevant countries. Further, mon-
ey laundering is a criminal offense requiring proof that the 
funds in question were generated by drug sales and that they 
were laundered. 107 
The final requirement for certification takes aim at official 
corruption that often is connected with drug production and 
trade. A major drug producing or transit country must cooper-
ate fully with the United States to prevent and punish bribery 
and other public corruption that facilitates the production, prc:r 
cessing, and shipment of illegal drugs, or that discourages the 
investigation and prosecution of these acts. 108 This requirement 
may prove difficult in a country whose government is riddled 
with corruption. "Clean" government officials may lack the politi-
cal clout to punish bribery and 'other corrupt acts by "dirty" 
officials. Indeed, they may fear for their own lives. Even in a less 
extreme situation, rooting out corruption may be difficult. 
The statute imposes one further requirement to obtain presi-
dential certification, pertaining· to a major drug producing or 
drug-transit country that produces licit opium.109 The opium 
producing country must take steps to prevent significant diver-
sion of its licit cultivation and production into the illicit market, 
maintain production and stockpiles at levels no higher than 
those consistent with licit market demand, and prevent illicit 
cultivation and production.uo This requirement acknowledges 
the legitimate reasons for producing opium and induces coun-
tries to act against the illicit market. 
Consider the 1997 certification of Mexico granted by Presi-
dent Clinton under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ("1961 
Assistance Act"), as amended.m The President certified Mexico 
accountable); That Infernal Washing Machine, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 19 (stating that 
Switzerland and Cayman Islands made it easier for bankers to report suspect transactions 
without breaking bank-secrecy laws). For overviews of U.S. and international efforts to com-
bat money laundering, see generally Raj Bhala et al., Legal Aspects of Money Laundering, 3 
MAlAYAN LJ. xxxiii (1991). 
107 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994) (identifying specified unlawful activities un-
der 1986 Money Laundering Control Act). 
108 See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(IV). 
109 See id. § 2492(b)(1)(E). 
110 See id. 
"' See 22 U.S.C §§ 2151-2430 (1994). 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291-2291j concern international 
narcotics control. These sections require the President to prepare a list of major drug pro-
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as a full partner in the U.S. war on drugs despite the arrest of 
Mexico's top anti-narcotics law enforcement official on charges 
of collaboration with drug traffickers. 112 The House of Repre-
sentatives voted 251 to 175 against the President's certifica-
tion, m and the Senate voted ninety-four to five in favor of a 
non-binding resolution criticizing the certification. 114 This 
ducing and drug-transit countries and withhold half of most U.S. government assistance 
until the President certifies that they have cooperated fully with the United States in the 
war on drugs. See id. § 2291j(a)(1). A country that receives full certification receives the 
balance of U.S. aid that had been withheld when that country was designated a major drug 
producing or drug-transit country. All aid (except humanitarian and counter-narcotics 
assistance) is cut off immediately to a major drug producing or drug-transit country that is 
denied certification. See id. § 2291j(e). Also, the United States must vote against loans from 
a multilateral development bank for the decertified country, and the country is ineligible 
for U.S. Export-Import Bank financing and all benefits from the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation ("OPIC") other than insurance. See id. § 2291j(a)(2). Afghanistan, 
Myanmar (Burma), Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria are prominent examples of decerti-
fied countries. See Rossella Brevetti, Senaton Introduce Resolution to Revme Administrntion' s 
Drug Certification of Mexico, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 410, 41(}.11 (Mar. 5, 1997) (discuss-
ing Senators Corerdell, Helms, and Feinstein's introduction of joint resolution to reverse 
Mexico's certification as reliable partner on war on drugs); Sen. lY Amato Introduces Resolu-
tion to Deny Me:cican Drug Certification, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 426, 426 (Mar. 13, 1996) 
(reporting Senate Banking Committee Chairman's introduction of joint resolution denying 
Mexico certification under Foreign Assistance Act's anti-drug trafficking provision).. A 
major drug producing or drug-transit country that fails to meet the requirements for full 
certification may receive a "vital national interests" certification, meaning that it would not 
be in the vital U.S. interests to cut off assistance to that country. Lebanon and Pakistan are 
examples of countries that have received vital national interests certifications. See 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2291j(b)(3); Brevetti, suflm, at 41(}.11 (examining requirements for certification and pro-
posed joint resolution to reverse Mexico's certification). Congress can overturn a presiden-
tial certification by passing a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 days following the 
certification. See22 U.S.C. § 2291j(d). 
For brief overviews of how the 1961 Act operates, see Intemational Narrotics Control 
Efforts in the Western Hemisphere, supra note 70, at 337-42 (providing statement of Robert S. 
Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, be-
fore Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of House International Relations Committee); 
see also International Narcotics Control Strategy Repqrt Released, supra note 75, at 195-97 (provid-
ing statements of Timothy E. Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs and Robert S. 
Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs). 
112 See Brevetti, supra note 111, at 410 (discussing Mexico's failure to substantially re-
duce drug trade and organized crime). 
"' See House Appruues Decertification Delay Measu~ fur Me:cico with Conditions Attached, 14 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 525, 525 (Mar. 19, 1997) (describing Senate vote to reject Clinton 
administration's certification of Mexico as reliable anti-drug ally while staying certification 
for 90 days to allow Mexico to respond). 
11
' See Rossella Brevetti, Senate Approves Compromise Measu~ on U.S.-Me:cico Drug Coopera-
tion, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 556, 556 (Mar. 26, 1997) (discussing Senate vote criticism 
of Mexico's anti-drug efforts). 
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congressional action was not surprising in the wake of the arrest. 
While the arrest signified that Mexico was making some prog-
ress, many members of Congress questioned the integrity of 
Mexico's entire law enforcement apparatus. Moreover, by 1996, 
more than half of all cocaine entering the United States came 
through Mexico. 115 Mexico had become a major money laun-
dering center even though it had introduced legislation to 
criminalize money laundering and fight organized crime.116 
However, the President's certification was foreseeable. The 
Clinton administration had invested considerable time and mon-
ey in forging closer ties with Mexico and helping it develop 
economically through two controversial events: Mexico's inclu-
sion in the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") 
and the multi-billion dollar rescue package117 arranged for 
Mexico after its peso crisis. Politically, President Clinton was not 
in a position to reverse course and impose trade sanctions on 
Mexico. At the same time, the Republican Congress assuredly 
did not fail to point out Mexico's shortcomings in the war on 
drugs. 118 The end result reflected this political stand-off. 
The 1961 Assistance Act and 1986 Narcotics Act work in tan-
dem, in a manner analogous to a cross-default clause in an 
international loan agreement. For example, suppose a country 
fails to obtain certification and does not qualify for the "vital 
national interests waiver," discussed below, under the 1961 Assis-
tance Act. Because the certification and waiver criteria are simi-
lar to the criteria in the 1986 Narcotics Act, the country should 
not be certified under the 1986 Narcotics Act. The result would 
be a loss of foreign assistance and the imposition of trade sanc-
tions under the 1961 Assistance Act. 
"' See Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile-Drugs: Mexican Drug Cmtel Bid to Tap Asian Marl!et Thwart-
ed, INTER PREss SERV., August 15, 1997, at 2. 
116 See Fact Sheet: CooperatiJm with Mexico - in OuT Nationallntemst, 7 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 
249, 257-59 (1996) (describing steps taken by Mexico to expand enforcement and reform 
criminal justice system to more effectively combat drug trafficking and organized crime). 
117 See Nora Lusting, Mexico in Crisis, the U.S. to the Rescue: The Financial Assistance Packag-
es of 1982 and 1995, 2 UCLAJ. INr'L L. 25, 25 (1997). The Department of Treasury admin-
istered the funds through the Exchange Stabilization Fund. See id. 
118 See Brevetti, supa note 111, at 410-11 (discussing Senator.~' introduction of joint 
resolution to rever.~e Mexico's certification as reliable partner in war on drugs). 
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The 1986 Narcotics Act provides guidance to the President in 
administering the above four certification criteria to determine 
whether the government of a major drug producing or transit 
country is cooperating fully with the United States, or making 
adequate efforts on its own in the war on drugs. The 1986 Nar-
cotics Act lists eleven issues the President must consider when 
evaluating a government for potential certification.119 First, has 
the government of that country acted to effect "the maximum 
reductions in illicit drug production" that the U.S. government 
has determined to be achievable?120 Second, has the foreign 
government adopted judicial and law enforcement measures to 
eliminate illicit drug production and trafficking, as evidenced by 
seizures of drugs and illicit laboratories and prosecutions of 
violators?121 Third, has the foreign government adopted judicial 
and law enforcement measures to eliminate money laundering, 
as evidenced by the enactment of anti-money laundering laws 
and cooperation with U.S. anti-money laundering efforts?122 
Fourth, has the foreign government adopted judicial and law 
enforcement measures to eliminate bribery and other forms of 
public corruption that facilitate drug production and trafficking 
and discourage investigation and prosecution?123 Fifth, has the 
foreign government, as a matter of policy, encouraged or facili-
tated the production or distribution of illegal drugs?124 Sixth, 
does any senior official of the foreign government engage in, 
encourage, or facilitate the production or distribution of illegal 
drugs?125 Seventh, has the foreign government aggressively in-
vestigated cases in which a U.S. drug enforcement official has 
119 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2491·2495 (1994). These 11 issues are similar to the issues raised in 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (1994) with 
19 U.S.C. § 2492(b) (2) (highlighting similarities in criteria President considers when deter· 
mining certification). 
120 See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(2)(A) (describing factor President considers regarding cer· 
tification). Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the U.S. govern· 
ment sets specific numerical reduction targets for each major drug producing country to 
which the United States proposes to give foreign aid. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (2) 
(discussing considerations regarding cooperation, including reductions in illicit produc· 
tion). 
121 See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(2)(B). 
122 See id. § 2492(b)(2)(C). 
123 See id. § 2492(b) (2) (D). 
12
' See id. § 2492(b) (2) (E). 
125 See id. § 2492(b) (2) (F). 
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been the victim of acts or threats of violence, inflicted by or in 
complicity with a law enforcement officer, and has the govern-
ment "energetically sought to bring the perpetrators . . . to jus-
tice?"126 Eighth, has the foreign government failed to provide 
reasonable cooperation to U.S. drug enforcement officials, in-
cluding the refusal to allow these officials to pursue aerial smug-
glers a reasonable distance into the airspace of the foreign 
country?127 Ninth, has the foreign government revised its con-
spiracy and asset seizure laws to combat drug traffickers more 
effectively?128 Tenth, has the foreign government expeditiously 
processed U.S. extradition requests relating to drug traffick-
ers?129 Finally, has the foreign government protected or grant-
ed safe haven to known drug traffickers?1so 
While the President must consider these eleven questions in 
applying the certification criteria, the precise statutory language 
. used to frame several of these questions leaves considerable 
room for the President to maneuver. For example, the second, 
third, and fourth questions contain the phrase "to the maximum 
extent possible." m Thus, using the fourth question as an ex-
ample, the President must decide whether a foreign government 
has taken measures against money laundering to the maximum 
extent possible. Similar flexible wording is contained in other 
questions. For instance, the sixth question uses the term "senior 
official" but does not define this term; the seventh question asks 
the President to determine whether a foreign government has 
investigated cases aggressively and brought perpetrators to justice 
energetically; the eighth question inquires about reasonable 
cooperation and a reasonable invasion of airspace; and the 
ninth question addresses expeditious processing of extradition 
requests.1s2 In sum, while the statute provides the President 
with a checklist of issues to consider in applying the certification 
criteria, this subjective checklist invites the President to exercise 
discretion. 
126 See id. § 2492(b)(2)(G). 
127 See id. § 2492(b)(2)(H). 
128 See id. § 2492(b)(2)(1). 
129 See id. § 2492(b) (2) (J). 
"" See id. § 2492 (b )(2)(K) .. 
"
1 See id. § 2492(b)(2)(A)-(D). 
132 See id. § 2492(b)(2)(J). 
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B. The Vital National Interests Waiver 
Even if a country is a major drug producing or transit country 
and even if it fails to meet the four certification criteria, the 
country may still avoid the stick of sanctions under the 1986 
Narcotics Act. This possibility depends upon whether, from the 
U.S. perspective, sanctions would be counterproductive. The 
President may determine and certify to Congress that the "vital 
national interests" of the United States require that it not apply 
sanctions. m 
The President must define why imposing sanctions on a par-
ticular country that does not meet the certification criteria is 
counterproductive. In doing so, the President should consider 
whether imposition of sanctions would, on balance, promote 
U.S. anti-drug efforts. However, the statutory language allows the 
President to define the interest at stake to include matters indi-
rectly related to these efforts.154 
Countries are likely to obtain a vital national interests waiver 
in five scenarios. For example, in 1987 and 1988, President 
Reagan found that Laos had failed to cooperate fully with the 
United States on narcotics control and to take adequate steps 
on its own. Nonetheless, he gave Laos a vital national interests 
certification in both years to promote continuing investigations 
of Americans missing in action and prisoners of the Vietnam 
War.155 Plainly, the United States has a unique issue to address 
with Laos that qualifies as a vital national interest. Second, sup-
pose the non-certified country is a principal U.S. supplier of a 
precious commodity, and there is no other readily available 
substitute source. Examples include oil from Saudi Arabia, or 
certain minerals like uranium from countries such as Russia. 
The non-certified country's supplier status may effectively 
"" See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(ii) (stating inapplicability of subsection (a) to country in 
which United States has vital national interest). 
'" See id. (discussing inapplicability of sanctions to countries in which United States has 
vital national interest). 
135 See Global Narcotics Cooperation and Presidential Certification, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1989, 
at 49, 50. (providing statement of Ann B. Wrobleski, Assistant Secretary for International 
Narcotics Matters, before Senate Foreign Relations Committee); PresiJJential Certification of 
Narcotics Source Countries, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1988, at 47, 48-50, (providing statement of 
Ann B. Wrobleski, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters, before Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee). 
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immunize it from sanctions. Third, suppose the non-certified 
country could inflict significant economic damage to U.S. 
businesses through a denial of market access or government 
procurement contracts. China would be an obvious example of a 
country that may be too big to penalize. A fourth category of 
non-certified country is one that might be too dangerous to 
penalize. Such a country may be able to inflict significant 
damage to American military and civilian personnel working 
abroad. Egypt and Turkey might be examples. Finally, consider a 
country in which the United States has too much invested to 
sanction. Surely Mexico, a partner in NAFTA, is a case in point. 
Certainly, these five illustrations or . categories of countries 
likely to obtain a vital national interests waiver are not mutually 
exclusive. A country may be fortunate to obtain a waiver of 
sanctions because more than one of these broader national 
interests, not directly connected with. the drug trade, are at 
stake. Whatever the reasons for a vital national interests waiver, 
the President must, in certifying that such interests are at stake, 
explain these reasons. The President's statement must include a 
full and co~plete description of relevant vital national interests 
if the United States imposes trade sanctions against a major 
drug producing or drug-transit country.1116 Further, the Presi-
dent must weigh all·of the risks at stake. 
Plainly, a vital national interests waiver is an important safety 
valve or escape clause that is also contained in the amended 
1961 Assistance Act. In that statutory context, President Clinton 
has not hesitated to employ the waiver to avoid cutting off most 
foreign assistance to foreign governments and voting against 
their requests for loans from multilateral development banks. 
For example, in 1994, the President did not certify ten of twen-
ty-six countries reviewed; however several of these countries 
received vital national interests waivers to avoid U.S. sanc-
tions. m Lebanon and Afghanistan were among these coun-
tries.1!11 
,,. See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(l)(D) (providing when President may grant vital national 
waiver interest to country). 
'" See Combating International Narrotics TraJficking, 5 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 421, 440-44 
(1994) (providing statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International 
Narcotics Matters, before House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 22, 1994). 
"
18 See id. Other counuies that received a vital national interests waiver were Bolivia, 
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The United States based Lebanon's waiver on the need to 
continue promoting economic and political stability and to avoid 
a devolution of Lebanon into a chaos similar to that in the 
1980s when terrorists held many Americans hostage in and 
around Beirut. IS!l Mghanistan 's 1994 vital national interests 
waiver also was based on the need to promote political order 
after years of war.140 In both cases, President Clinton deter-
mined that encouraging political stability would be more helpful 
in promoting counter-narcotics efforts than imposing sanc-
tions.141 In contrast, the President declined to certify and also 
could not justify a waiver for Burma, Iran, and Syria, three 
countries notorious for their involvement or acquiescence re-
garding drugs and terrorism. 
Congress has the last word regarding presidential determina-
tions and certifications regarding both exceptions. It may disap-
prove a certification and require the imposition of sanctions 
through a joint resolution.142 Congress must enact this resolu-
tion within forty-five legislative days of the President's certifica-
tion.145 Accordingly, any sanctions imposed remain in effect 
until the President makes a certification excepting a country 
from sanctions, forty-five legislative days have elapsed, and Con-
gress has not enacted a joint resolution of disapproval during 
that forty-five day period. 
C. An Imperialistic Statute? 
Our trading partners may consider the 1986 Narcotics Act to 
be an imperialistic statute. In defending the certification process 
under the amended 1961 Assistance Act, the Department of 
State claims that "[n]arcotics certification is an honest process," 
"[w]e do not seek to embarrass governments," and "[w]e do not 
Laos, Panama, and Peru. See id. 
139 See Michael Isikoff, World Output of Narcotics Soan, Congress Told; Annual State 
Department Repurt Notes Undermining of Law Enfurumenl Effurts, WASH. Posr, Mar. 2, 1990, at 
A24 (reporting grant of waiver to Lebanon to restore stability). 
140 See Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Pinpoints Nicaragua on Worldwide Heroin Traffic, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Apr. 5, 1994, at A3 (describing grant of waiver to Mghanistan). 
141 See id. (illustrating Clinton's willingness to sacrifice narcotics enforcement for 
stability in Lebanon and Mghanistan). 
142 See 19 u.s.c. § 2492(b)(3) (1994). 
143 See id. 
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want to force them to adopt our standards." 144 Because the 
certification process under the 1986 Narcotics Act is very similar 
to that under the 1961 Assistance Act, it may be reasonable to 
assume that the State Department would defend the 1986 Nar-
cotics Act process in a like manner. However, such a defense is 
dubious for three reasons. 
First, the certification process - how a country can avoid the 
imposition of trade sanctions - can be highly political. A coun-
try may fall victim to trade sanctions, or avoid such sanctions, 
due to considerations far afield from the war on drugs. The case 
of Mexico, discussed above, illustrates the point. · 
Second, the 1986 Narcotics Act focuses and visits blame en-
tirely on drug-supplying countries. It pays no attention to the 
tremendous demand for drugs by Americans. Consider the state-
ment of former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew: 
Let me give you an example that encapsulates the whole 
difference between America and Singapore. America has a vi-
cious drug problem. How does it solve it? It goes around the 
world helping other anti-narcotic agencies to try and stop the 
suppliers. It pays for helicopters, defoliating agents and so 
on. And when provoked, it captures the President of Panama 
and brings ·him to trial in Florida. Singapore does not have 
that option. We can't go to Bunna and capture the warlords 
there. What we can do is pass a law which says that any cus-
toms officer or policeman who sees anybody in Singapore 
behaving suspiciously, leading him to suspect the person is 
under the influence of drugs, can require the man to have 
his urine tested. If the sample is found to contain drugs, the 
man immediately goes for treatment. [And, of course, if the 
drug supplier is caught, then he is hanged.] In America if 
you did that it would be an invasion of the individual's rights 
and you would be sued.145 
The profoundly embarrassing fact is that while Americans consti-
tute no more than 5% of the world's population, we are respon-
sible for about 70% of the world's cocaine consumption and 
roughly 10% of the world's heroin consumption. 146 Nonethe-
144 Combating International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 137, at 442. 
'" TOMMY T.B. KOH, THE UNITED STATES AND EAsT AsiA: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 
10()..()1 (1995). 
146 See Assruing the Current Trends in opium Production and Heroin Trafficking, 3 DEP'T ST. 
DISPATCH 461, 469 (1992) (furnishing statement of Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for 
International Narcotics Matters before House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
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less, a foreign country may be penalized for supplying a sub-
stance that a large number of Americans demand. 147 Curtailing 
demand, in addition to spotlighting supply, might yield im-
proved results in the war on drugs and not antagonize our al-
lies. 
Third, even the State Department admits that some govern-
ments of drug-supplying countries lack the ability, assuming they 
have the will, to reduce or eliminate drug production in their 
territory. Consider the context in which the governments of 
Laos, Mghanistan, and Burma, all major heroin-producing coun-
tries, 148 must lead an anti-heroin campaign. Laos has "a diffi-
cult geography, an impecunious central government that has 
delegated fiscal responsibility to regional entities and thus lost 
some measure of control, and a dependency on international 
institutions for external financing." 149 In Mghanistan, years of 
warfare diverted government attention from the problem of 
poppy cultivation; without a vigorous central government, M-
ghanistan fell under the thumb of regional commanders who 
are akin to feudal warlords.150 Moreover, Mghanistan is 
plagued by a "devastated economy and a large refugee popula-
tion." 151 In Burma, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration 
Commission is hardly a sympathetic government.152 Insurgent 
armies in Burma control the poppy fields in areas largely out of 
the central government's reach.155 The Rangoon government 
Control, June 9, 1992). 
"' See Joseph B. Treaster, The 1992 Campaign: Candidates' Recurd.s; Four Yean of Bush's 
Drug War. New Funds but an 0/Jl Strategy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1992, at A1 (reporting on pen-
alties for supplying drugs). 
148 See Andrew B. Campbell, Note, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in the 
War on Dru,g:s, 23 VAND.j. TRANSNAT'L L 385, 393 (1990). 
1 
.. A.s.wsing the Currmt Trends in opium Production and Heroin Trafficking, supra note 146, 
at 469. 
150 See id. 
151 /d. -
152 See Lori Fisler Darnrosch, Politics Acrass Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforr:ible Influence 
Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 50 n.138 (1989) (describing United States's cur-
tailed .economic relations with Burma pending political change); Patricia Stirling, The Use of 
Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rjghts: A Proposal for Addition to 
the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL 'v 1, 31 (1996) (describing United 
States's failed attempts to correct Burma's human rights violations); Thomas K. Ragland, 
Note, Burma's Rohinjyas in Crisis: Protection of •Humanitarian • Refugees Under International 
Law, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 301, 302 (1994) (describing human rights violations of 
State Law and Order Restoration Commission). 
153 See K.l. Douglas, War and the Global opium Supply, 21 FLETCHER F. WORlD AFF. 121, 
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allows poppy cultivation in return for peaceful coexistence with 
these armies. 154 
Imagine the· reaction in the United States if our trading part-
ners enacted a converse. piece of legislation. This hypothetical 
bill would mandate the identificatio~ and publication of major 
drug-consuming countries; the United States surely would be 
blacklisted. Such legislation would require the United· States to 
cooperate fully with its trading partners to reduce drug demand 
or take steps on its own according to criteria set by our trading 
partners. These criteria would include creating drug rehabilita-
tion programs, prosecution initiatives, and the commitment of 
specific budgetary allocations to support these efforts. The crite-
ria also would include enactment of the death penalty for drug 
traffickers and its prominent advertisement on the U.S. Customs 
form filled out by all persons entering the United States.1!;!; 
Failure to satisfy these criteria could lead to denial of access to 
our trading partners' markets in key sectors like agriculture, 
services, and aviation. This hypothetical legislation, if enacted by 
a trading partner, would undoubtedly provoke outrage in the 
United States; however, the 1986 Narcotics Act is precisely this 
. sort of legislation visited l;lPOn our partners. 
Ill. FIGHTING FIDEL: THE 1996 HELMs-BURTON Acr 
A. Two Themes: The "Overthrow Castro" Act and 
Its Defensible Features 
Aside from section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amend-
ed/56 few U.S. international trade statutes have generated as 
much controversy as the Helms-Burton Act.1!;7 The language 
128 (1997) (describing Burmese hilltribes' control of poppy fields) . 
... See id. 
'" Mter all, this penalty exists in key trading partners like Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Singapore, and (as any traveler to these destinations knows) it is prominently displayed on 
immigration and customs entry forms to these countries. See, e.g., Sidney L. Harring, Death, 
Drugs and Deuelopment: Malaysia's Mandatory Death Penalty fur TraJJickers and the International 
War on Drugs, 29 COLUM.J. 'TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1991) (describing mandatory death penalty 
for drug trafficking in Malaysia). 
156 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2419 (1994) (amending rights and regulations of Trade Act). 
For a discussion of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, see BHALA, supra note 4, at 1059. 
157 See 22 U.S.CA §§ 6021-6091 (West Supp. 1997). The Act is named after its principal 
co-sponsors, Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Republican 
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and legislative history of the Helms-Burton Act indicate that its 
fundamental objective is to overthrow Fidel Castro's communist 
dictatorship in Cuba.158 In this regard, the Act is more aggres-
sive - more offensive and less defensive in nature - than any 
other U.S. national security sanctions legislation. No doubt many 
share this objective to overthrow Castro, including congressional 
cnt:J.cs of the Ace59 and, more importantly, persons in 
Cuba.160 Whether international trade law is an appropriate or 
effective means of achieving this objective, however, is a divisive 
issue that pits the United States against many of its most impor-
tant trading partners and divides the ranks of American trade 
policy makers and observers. The American public is almost 
evenly split in its opinion about the Helms-Burton Act, with 45% 
in favor and 48% opposed. 161 
Indeed, the United States has come under intense pressure to 
modify or repeal the act from its key trading partners, including 
Representative Dan Burton of Indiana. For a section-by-section account of the similarities 
and differences between the House bill and Senate amendment and the resulting language 
adopted by a joint Congressional committee, see JOINT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE 
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H. CONF. REP. NO. 104-468 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 558. 
Coverage of the Helms-Burton Act in the business media has been extensive, and 
space does not permit citation herein of all of the articles. Some of the excellent pieces 
include: Biter Bitten: japanese Firms Acquisitions, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1992, at 85 (discussing 
state of Japan's industry); Stephen Fidler, Comment and Analysis: The Long Ann of American 
Law, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 1996 (stating that Helms-Burton Act has angered Cuba as well as 
other trading partners of United States); Deroy Murdock, Cuba - This Island of Lost 
Potential, WORlD TRADE, Aug. 1997, at 28 (proposing that Helms-Burton Act allows 
Americans to sue foreign companies that deal with property of American firms nationalized 
by Castro); Therese Raphael, U.S. and Europe Clash wer Cuba, WAIL ST.]., Mar. 31, 1997, at 
A14 (discussing U.S. trading partners' anger over Helms-Bunon Act); Carla Anne Robbins, 
Sherritt Officials to & Barred from U.S., WAIL ST.J.,July 11, 1996, at All (illustrating pressure 
that United States is putting on Cuban and American allies that trade with Cuba); Anneke 
van Dok-van Weele, U.S. Should Quit &ssing Its Friends, INT'L HERALD TRm. (France),July 1, 
1997, at 10 (criticizing Helms-Burton Act). 
158 See H.R REP. No. 104-202 (1995), at 22, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 527 
(stating that Helms-Bunon Act would take proactive steps to encourage early end to Castro 
regime and would direct President to suppon transition to democratic government in 
Cuba). 
159 See id. at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 556 (stating dissenting views that agree 
that Castro "must go" and Cuba must make difficult transition to democracy and free 
markets, but rightly questioning how to advance U.S. national interest). 
160 See id. (arguing that Cuba's real problem is Castro's authoritarian system). 
161 See Americans Against Helms-Burton ITy Small Ma?gin, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 699, 
699 (Apr. 16, 1997). 
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the European Union ("EU"), Canada, Mexico, China, and Japan. 
For example, three months after the Act took effect, the U.N. 
General Assembly approved a non-binding resolution calling for 
an end to all U.S. economic measures against Cuba. One hun-
dred thirty-seven countries voted in favor of the resolution, twen-
ty-five abstained, and just three - the United States, Israel, and 
Uzbekistan - voted against the resolution. 162 In the fall of 
1996, the EU brought a WTO action against the United States 
concerning the Act. 163 This action prompted the United States 
to suggest that the wro had no jurisdiction to determine 
whether the Act was in America's national security interests un-
der article XXI of GATT. 164 For the time being, the EU has 
agreed to suspend the action if President Clinton (1) reassures 
the EU that he will continue to suspend the application of civil 
liability for trafficking in confiscated property until his term 
expires in January 2001, and (2) obtains congressional authority 
to waive the provision excluding aliens, their spouses, and their 
minor children from the United States who traffic in such prop-
erty.165 The EU has accused the United States of not following 
162 See U.N. General Assembly Votes fur End to Cuba Embargo, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
1755, 1755 (Nov. 13, 1996). 
165 See Audit of U.S. Trade Policies Is GeneraUy Favorable, Helms-Burton Questioned, 13 Int'1 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1733, 1733 (Nov. 13, 1996) (discussing WTO members' response to 
Helms-Burton Act); EU Takes Action Against U.S. Helms-Burton, IY Amato Acts, 8 EURECOM 1 
(1996) (indicating that EU agreed on October 1, 1996 to challenge Helms-Burton Act in 
WTO); Guy dejonquie'res, EU to Ro.ise Stakes in Trade Law Row with U.S., FIN. DMES, Feb. 3, 
1997, at 1 (stating that EU will ask WTO director-general to name members of panel). 
164 See Rossella Brevetti et al., U.S. Says "7'0 Panel Not Competent to Judge Cuba Dispute, 
Hopes to Settle, 14 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 351 (Feb. 26, 1997); Cuban Feud, FIN. DMES, Feb. 
4, 1997, at 21 (stating that EU claims United States's objection to WTO action on Helms-
Burton Act could threaten WTO); Guy de Jonquie'res, U.S. Dodges Bnwels Onslaught. FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at 6; Guy de Jonquie'res & Nancy Dunne, U.S. Leaves Dour Ajar in Row 
with EU Over Cuba TratU, FIN. DMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at 18 (stating that United States would 
formally object to formation ofWTO panel on Helms-Burton dispute). 
,., See Lionel Barber & Guy de Jonquie'res, Brussels and U.S. in Deal to.End Cuba Trade 
Rift, FIN. DMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at 1 (stating that jesse Helms did not believe that Congress 
would grant President Clinton's request to amend Helms-Burton Act); Guy de Jonquie'res, 
EU Delays Clash on U.S. Anti-Cuba Law, FIN. DMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at 5 (stating that EU asked 
WTO to postpone establishment of dispute panel); EU Suspends Effort to Challenge in WTO 
Helms-Burton Legislation, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 742, 742 (Apr. 23, 1997) (stating that 
WTO action over Helms-Burton Act is waived unless United States takes action under Act 
against EU companies); Gary G. Yerkey, EU Said Not Planning to Revive Challenge to Helms-
Burton Challenge. 14 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1040, 1040 Uune 11, 1997) (explaining that 
EU agreed to suspend its request for WTO panel immediately); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU 
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through on the second commitment; indeed, in June 1997, the 
House of Representatives approved legislation to tighten the 
alien exclusion provision by requiring that the State Department 
report on companies whose officials might be sanctioned under 
the provision.166 
To its supporters, the Helms-Burton Act provides a vital safe-
guard against physical threats to U.S. national security posed by 
Castro's regime, a reinforcement of the importance private prop-
erty ownership plays in economic development, and a noble 
effort to support human rights and civil liberties in Cuba.167 
President Clinton calls the Act "a justified response to the Cu-
ban govemment's unjustified, unlawful attack on two unarmed 
U.S. civilian aircraft that left three U.S. citizens and one U.S. 
resident dead," and a reaffirmation of "our common goal of 
promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by tight-
ening the existing embargo while reaching out to the Cuban 
people." 168 To its detractors, the Act is an outrageous and 
Approve Plan to Resolve Dispute Ouer Helms-BuTton, OJJicials Say, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
686, 686 (Apr. 16, 1997) (stating that EU would waive its case in WTO in exchange for 
United States's amending Helms-Burton Act). 
166 See EU Warns It Wall Reinstate Complaint on Helms-BuTton if Congress Tightens Law, 14 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1089, 1089 Oune 18, 1997); GOP Howe Member3 Pms Administration 
on Helms-BuTton Title IV Implemmtation, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1148, 1148 Ouly 2, 1997). 
In July 1997, Stet, an Italian telecommunications group and one of Europe's largest 
investors in Cuba, immunized itself from suit under the Helms-Burton AcL Stet agreed to 
pay compensation to America's ITT for its confiscated Cuban assets. See Guy de Jonquie'res 
& Emma Tucker, Keeping the Lid on Helms-BuTton, FIN. 'nMES, July 31, 1997, at 4. Stet 
benefits from these assets by providing telecommunications services to Cuba, but ITT 
promised not to sue Stet because of the compensation arrangemenL The State Department 
agreed to exempt Stet from the visa denial provisions of the Helms-Burton AcL See id. 
167 See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 22-30 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 527-
535. 
168 Statement by President of the United States, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 479, 479 
(Mar. 18, 1996). 
The U.S. trade embargo was imposed under the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act 
("TWEA"), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. The 
relevant provision of TWEA under which a trade embargo against Cuba was imposed is 50 
U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1994). The relevant provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
pursuant to which sanctions were imposed on Cuba is 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1994). The 
relevant sections of the Cuban Democracy Act is 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994). See also 22 
U.S.CA § 6040 (West Supp. 1997) (describing provision of Helms-Burton Act in which 
Congress acknowledges existing import restrictions on Cuban products); H.R REP. No. 
104-202, at 34, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 539-40 (discussing legislative history of 
section 6040); JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMfiTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R 
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 46 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 561 (expressing 
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possibly illegal extraterritorial assertion of U.S. jurisdiction,169 
another example of America's annoying tendency to act unilater-
ally in the world trading system, and a reflection of American 
naivete about the efficacy of trade sanctions to achieve political 
aims. 170 Indeed, the Act's critics in Congress argue that it 
"marks a radical shift in U.S. foreign policy" 171 that plays into 
Castro's hands.172 As the treatment below suggests, the truth 
about the Act lies somewhere in the middle between these two 
extreme views. 
Proponents of the Helms-Burton Act often understate or fail 
to articulate arguments in favor of the Act because they are 
mesmerized by their own anti-Castro rhetoric. While some of the 
critics' arguments are overstated or rebuttable, some of the criti-
profound conviction of Joint Committee of Conference that executive branch agencies 
must be more vigorous in enforcement of certain provisions of U.S. embargo on Cuba). 
For overviews of the trade embargo, see generally Annie Swank, The U.S. Trade 
Embargo Against Cuba: The Time Has Come to End this Cold-War Relic, 4 CURRENTS 14 (1995) 
(discussing history of U.S. embargo against Cuba). 
169 See, e.g., Neil Buckley, U.S. Extra-territorial Trade Laws A~ EU, FIN. TIMEs, July 30, 
1997, at 4 (discussing Stet-ITT-State Department agreement to shield Stet from Helms-
Burton Act). 
170 See Archie Dunham, Alternatives to Unilateral Trade Sanctions, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 
1997, at B4 (chronicling past failures of trade sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals). 
171 H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 53, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 551 (dissenting views). 
172 See id. at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 556 (dissenting views). Helms-Burton is 
not without its critics: 
I d. 
H.R. 927 [i.e., the Helms-Burton Act] is not a status quo bill, it is an 
extreme bill. It toughens the embargo against Cuba and tightens the noose on 
the Cuban people. It adopts measures against Cuba harsher than those against 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
A policy of contact, dialogue, and exchange with Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union helped foster a democratic revolution .... 
Those who favor increased isolation of Cuba have a responsibility to ex-
plain why the engagement that helped kill communism in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union should not be the hallmark of our policy toward Cuba. 
Throughout the past 36 years, Castro has used two mechanisms to relieve 
pressure on his regime - letting his people take to the seas and appealing to 
Cuban nationalism. This bill hands Castro a fresh deck of nationalist cards .... 
This bill, he says, proves that exiled Cubans want to tum the clock back to 
1958. . 
The message should be clear to all: this bill gives Castro new scapegoats to 
distract the Cuban people from their real problem: Castro's authoritarian sys-
tem. 
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cisms are more powerful than the critics themselves seem to 
realize. Not surprisingly, neither proponents nor critics are en-
tirely correct, and a more balanced view of the Act is needed. 
The starting point is to recognize that all international trade 
lawyers and their clients must live with, or ignore at their peril, 
the Act's sanctions for as long as Castro remains in power. If 
the longevity and resilience of China's Mao, the Soviet Union's 
Stalin, Albania's Hoaxa, and North Korea's Kim II Sung and 
Kim Jong II, are any gauge, then certainly Castro is not 
planning for retirement in the near future. Indeed, a June 1997 
EU report found neither progress in human rights nor 
movement toward a pluralistic democracy in Cuba. 175 
As a technical legal matter, the Helms-Burton Act is not diffi-
cult to understand. The rights and obligations that the Act cre-
ates are relatively straightforward, and its provisions are generally 
clear. However, as intimated above, at a deeper level the Act is 
difficult to grasp because its emotional and sometimes bombastic 
language masks a variety of policy goals and associated sanctions. 
Whether these goals are appropriate and whether the sanctions 
support the goals, are issues that divide the Act's supporters 
from its opponents. One approach toward a balanced view of 
the Act is ( 1) to identify the underlying policies and the reasons 
for those policies; then (2) to understand the specific types of 
sanctions set forth in the Act and consider how they support 
one or more of the policy goals; and finally (3) to appraise the 
arguments for and against the sanctions and goals. This three-
step approach is adopted below. 
The policies underlying the Helms-Burton Act can be placed 
into three related groups: property, freedom, and physical secu-
rity. First, the Act seeks to redress American claims regarding 
property confiscated by Castro's government and more generally 
support the right of individuals to hold and enjoy private prop-
erty in Cuba.174 Second, the Act aims to promote both human 
"' See joe Kilwin, EU &pm1 Cites No Progress on Cuba Human Jljght.s Issues, 14 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1147, 1147 Guiy 2, 1997) (discussing Cuba's lack of progress in human rights 
and democratic reforms). 
174 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6022(6) (West Supp. 1997) (stating that pwpose of Helms-Burton 
Act is to protect U.S. nationals against confiscatory takings and wrongful trafficking in 
property confiscated by Castro regime); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 22, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 527 (stating that Helms-Burton Act would take proactive steps to provide 
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rights, as set forth in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, and civil liberties, as understood from 
an American perspective, in Cuba.175 Third, the Act attempts 
to safeguard the United States against physical threats posed by 
the Castro regime.176 
These three policies are equally important and, indeed, inte-
grally related; each addresses America's long-term interest in 
creating an economically robust and politically stable neighbor 
and trading partner who will not jeopardize national security. A 
pluralistic political system ensures that an extremist leader - a 
madman like Iraq's Saddam Hussein- will not plunge a coun-
try into war. 177 With a robust economy, a country has too 
much to lose to risk a reallocation of resources and destruction 
of property associated with war.178 The logic, based partly on 
historical experience frorri the First and Second World Wars and 
the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, is that prosperous democra-
cies tend not to go to war with, or threaten violence against, 
one another.179 In enacting the Helms-Burton Act, Congress 
expressed the reasonable view that respect for private property is 
a prerequisite for economic progress, 180 while economic stagna-
tion breeds instability that could threaten U.S. national 
additional protection for rights of U.S. nationals whose property had been illegally 
confiscated by Cuban government). 
,. See 22 U.S.CA § 6022(1) (stating that purpose of HeJ.ms..Burton Act is to assist 
Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 23, 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 528 (observing that •Fidel Castro is alone in the Americas" 
and reviewing abysmal human rights record of his regime). 
176 See 22 U.S.CA § 6022(3) (stating that purpose of HeJ.ms..Burton Act is to provide for 
continued national security of United States against continuing threats from Castro 
government). These threats encompass terrorism, the theft of property from U.S. nationals, 
and political manipulation of many Cubans' desire to escape that results in a mass 
migration to the United States. See id. 
177 See Hisashi Owada, lnternatUmal Agmda of japan for the Nineties, 84 AM. SOc'V INT'L L. 
PRoc. 95, 9S.99 (1990) (stating that pluralistic political systems ensure political peace). 
178 See id. (noting pluralistic political systems produce economic prosperity). 
179 See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Develbpment: On Tapping, Guunling, and Serving 
Palm-Wine, 29 CAsE W. REs.]. INT'L L. 167, 207~8 n.124 (1997) (presenting President 
Clinton's speech to United Nations which emphasized that democracy is rooted in com-
promise, not conquest). 
180 See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 24, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 529 (arguing 
that economic development is not possible without private property, and property rights do 
not exist in Cuba today, hence legislation protects property rights and undermines lawless 
exploitation of property that jeopardizes prospects for future trade and investment). 
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security.181 Likewise, respect for human rights and civil liberties 
is another prerequisite for economic progress, which, in turn, 
leads to prosperity and stability.182 Since 1959, when Castro 
assumed power, his lack of respect for private property, human 
rights, and civil liberties has been accompanied by direct and 
indirect physical threats to, and confrontations with, Americans. 
These threats, which the Helms-Burton Act expressly states 
would be acts of aggression, 183 include ( 1) Cuban government 
attempts to construct and operate nuclear facilities under sub-
standard conditions that, were an accident to occur, would 
threaten parts of the United States as far north as Washington, 
D.C. with radioactive poisoning/84 (2) the operation of intelli-
gence facilities to gather sensitive information that may be used 
against the United States/85 and (3) the encouragement of 
U.S. border control problems by motivating waves of Cubans to 
escape repression and poverty and seek asylum in the United 
States. 186 The confrontations include the October 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis187 and the February 24, 1996 incident when 
Cuban MiG fighters deliberately shot down two unarmed private 
American planes outside of the airspace over Cuba's twelve-mile 
181 See Annual Public Review of National Security Thrw.ts to the United States: Hearings Befm1! 
the Senate Select Comm. on lntelligmce, 104th Gong. (1997) (statement of George Tenet, 
Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency) (discussing impact of economic stagnation 
on situation in North Korea and Iran). 
1 
.. See 22 U.S.CA § 6031(1) (West Supp. 1997) (defining Castro's regime as 
perpetrating human rights violations and threatening international peace). 
183 See id. § 6031. 
184 See id. § 6031(3)-(4) (discussing threat to U.S. national security posed by operation 
of any nuclear facilities in Cuba). 
185 See id. § 6031(3) (discussing threat to U.S. national security presented by Cuban 
intelligence activities). 
186 See id. § 6031(4) (discussing threat to U.S. national security posed by mass migration 
from Cuba). 
187 See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 2~ 
128 (1969) (discussing Cuban missile crisis). The literature on this crisis is voluminous but 
Robert F. Kennedy's account is one of the most riveting. See id. 
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territorial sea limit.188 The four crew members aboard, three 
U.S. citizens and one permanent resident, were killed.189 
The policy consequences of this logic are obvious. America's 
long-term national security interest boils down to the simple 
objective behind the Helms-Burton Act - assisting the Cuban 
people to replace Castro's communist dictatorship with a transi-
tional government that will eventually lead to a bona fide 
pluralistic democracy. For evidence of this objective, the state-
ment of the Act's purposes is excellent testimony: 
The purposes of this Act are -
(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro 
government; 
( 4) To encourage the holding of free and fair democratic 
elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of 
internationally recognized observers; [and] 
(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support 
to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a 
transition government or a democratically elected gov-
ernment in Cuba . . . . 190 
The Act contains additional supporting testimony. For instance, 
the President is authorized to support non-governmental organi-
zations and individuals in their efforts to build democracy in 
Cuba.191 Further, in thinly veiled statutory terms, Congress in-
cites the Cuban people to radically change their political and 
economic status quo. 
The policy of the United States is ... 
(1) To support the self-determination of the Cuban people. 
(3) To encourage the Cuban people to empuwer themselves with a 
government which reflects the self-determination of the Cuban 
people. 
188 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6046 (condemning Cuban attack on defenseless planes of 
"Brothers to the Rescue," Miami-based humanitarian organization that was searching for 
and aiding Cuban refugees in Straits of Florida); Statement on Signing the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 479, 479 
(Mar. 12, 1996). 
189 See Statement by President of the United States, supra note 168, at 479. 
100 22 U.S.C.A. § 6022. 
091 See id. § 6039(a) (authorizing President to furnish assistance and other support to 
such organizations and individuals). 
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( 4) To recognize the potential for a difficult transition from 
the current regime in Cuba that may result from the initia-
tives taken by the Cuban people for self-determination 
in response to the intransigence of the Castro regime in 
not allowing any substantive political or economic re-
forms, and to be prepared to provide the Cuban people 
with humanitarian, developmental, and other economic 
assistance.192 
To implement this policy, several provisions in the Helms-Burton 
Act direct the President to prepare for a post-Castro Cuba. First, 
the President should develop a multinational economic assis-
tance plan from the United States, other countries, and interna-
tional financial institutions/9s and create an administrative ap-
paratus to distribute this aid to a post-Castro Cuba.194 Second, 
after a democratically elected government replaces the Castro 
regime, the President should report to Congress about signifi-
cant barriers to United States-Cuban trade and the possibility of 
extending MFN treatment to Cuba, designate Cuba as a benefi-
ciary under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") or 
program Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"), and negotiate the 
accession of Cuba to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
("NAFTA"). 195 Third, once the Castro regime is overthrown, 
the President should suspend, and eventually end, the U.S. trade 
embargo against Cuba.196 
As the above testimony suggests, the Cold War-era technique 
of CIA-sponsored assassinations of foreign leaders has probably 
192 /d. § 6061. 
193 See id. § 6062(a)(1), (e) (directing President to develop plan for providing economic 
assistance when traditional or democratically elected government is in power). Interesting-
ly, the Act directs the President to communicate the plan to the Cuban people, but does 
not say when the communication should occur. See id. § 6062(f). Presumably, Congress 
would like the President to communicate the plan even before Castro is overthrown so that 
the Cuban people have some degree of comfort that foreign assistance will be forthcoming. 
See generaUy H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 26, 36-38 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 
530, 541-43 (discussing provisions regarding preparation for inevitable democratic transi-
tion in Cuba); jOINT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R 
CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 52-53 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 567-68 (dis-
cussing same provisions as H.R Rep. No. 104-202). 
194 See 22 U.S.CA § 6063 (describing coordination and implementation of assistance 
programs). 
195 See id. § 6062(h) (providing for reports on trade and investment relations). 
196 See id. § 6064(a), (c) (establishing termination of economic embargo). 
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ended. In its place, economic assassinations ~ccur through uni-
lateral trade action. 
The course of action prescribed by H.R 927, as amended 
[i.e., the Helms-Burton Act], preseiVes U.S. credibility with 
the Cuban people as one of the few countries not willing to put 
aside what it knows about the Castro regime in exchange for mythi-
cal market-share. H.R 927, as amended, seeks to break the status 
quo by extending an offer of broad U.S. support for a peace-
ful transition and providing disincentives to investment in 
Cuba by companies whose ventures might otherwise buoy the 
regime by exploiting the labor of the Cuban people and the 
property of U.S. citizens whose property in Cuba was wrong-
fully confiscated.197 
In truth, the Helms-Burton Act might as well be called the 
"Overthrow Castro" Act. That rubric accurately describes how the 
United States has unilaterally defined its national security inter-
est under article XXI of GATT, and thereby justified the sanc-
tion measures set forth in the Act. 
The policies concerning property, freedom, physical security, 
and the bottom-line goal of toppling Castro, also resonate in the 
congressional "findings." These are dramatic and stunningly 
blunt statements not normally, if ever, found in an international 
trade statute. Regarding property, consider section 301 of the 
Helms-Burton Act: 
(1) Individuals enjoy a fundamental right to own and· enjoy 
property which is enshrined in the United States Consti-
tution. 
(2) The wrongful confiscation or taking of property belong-
ing to United States nationals by the Cuban Govern-
ment, and the subsequent exploitation of this property 
at the expense of the rightful owner, undermines the 
comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic 
development. 
(3) Since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959 -
(A) he has trampled on the fundamental rights of the 
Cuban people; and 
(B) through his personal despotism, he has confiscated 
the property of -
(i) millions of his own citizens; 
(ii) thousands of United States nationals; and 
197 H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 24, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 529. 
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(iii) thousands more Cubans who claimed asylum 
in the United States as refugees because of 
persecution and later became naturalized 
citizens of the United States. 
(5) The Cuban Government is offering foreign investors the 
opportunity to purchase an equity interest in, manage, 
or enter into joint ventures using property and assets 
some of which were confiscated from United States 
nationals. 
(6) This "trafficking" in confiscated property provides badly 
needed financial benefit[s], including hard currency, oil, 
and productive investment and expertise, to the current 
Cuban Government and thus undermines the foreign policy 
of the United States -
(A) to bring democratic institutions to Cuba through the 
pressure of a general economic embargo at a time 
when the Castro regime has proven to be vulnera-
ble to international economic pressure; and 
(B) to protect the claims of United States nationals who 
had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban 
Government.198 
Regarding freedom and physical security, section 2 of the Act 
contains further "findings" stated in unmistakably combative 
terms and is highly suggestive of the fundamental goal of over-
throwing the Castro regime: 
(I) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at 
least 60 percent in the last 5 years [i.e., between 1990-
95] .... 
(2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban 
people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this 
economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to 
permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba. 
( 3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it wiU 
not engage in any substantive political reforms that would lead 
to democracy, a market economy, or an economic recooery. 
( 4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free 
and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations of 
fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban re-
gime as the only completely nondemocratic government 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
198 22 U.S.C.A. § 6081 (emphasis added). 
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(5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the economic 
condition of the country and the welfare of the Cuban 
people will not improve in any significant way. 
(6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has de-
prived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to 
improve their· condition and has led thousands of Cu-
ban citizens· to risk· or lose their lives in dangerous at-
tempts to escape from Cuba to freedom. 
(9) The United States . . . considers it a moral obligation, to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms 
as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
(13) The Cuban government engages in the illegal interna-
tional narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice 
in the United States. 
( 14) The Castro government threatens international peace and 
security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and temnism 
such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated to 
international violence. 
(15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception and 
continues to utilize torture in various furms (including by 
psychiatry), as weU as execution, exile, confiscation, political 
imprisonment, and other furms of terror and repression, as [a] 
means of retaining power. 
(16) Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as "pluralistic 
garbage"' and continues to make clear that he has no intention 
of tolerating the democratization of Cuban society. 
( 17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage 
in Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely 
because relatives have escaped the country. 
(18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-American 
Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (which protects the right to 
leave one's own country), Cuba nevertheless surrounds 
embassies in its capital by armed forces to thwart the 
right of its citizens to seek asylum and systematically 
denies that right ·to the Cuban people, punishing them 
by imprisonment for seeking to leave the country and 
killing them for attempting to do so (as demonstrated 
in the case of the confirmed murder of over 40 men, 
women, and ·children who were seeking to leave Cuba 
on July 13, 1994). 
(20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has 
repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights 
49 
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situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step 
of appointing a Special Rapporteur. 
(21) The Cuban Government has consistently refused access 
to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its 
decision not to "implement so much as one comma" of 
the United Nations Resolutions appointing the Rappor-
teur. 
(23) Article 39 of ... the United Nations Charter provides 
that the United Nations Security Council "shall deter-
mine the existence of any threat to peace . . . . " 
(24) The United Nations has determined that massive and systemat-
ic violations of human rights may constitute a "threat to 
peace" under Article 39 and has imposed sanctions due to 
such violations of human rights in the cases of Rhodesia, 
South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia. 
(27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner 
to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years, and 
the continued failure to do so constitutes ethicaUy improper 
conduct by the international community. 
(28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and 
continues to pose a national security threat to the United 
States. 199 
In sum, the above-quoted Congressional findings on the record 
from the Helms-Burton Act leave no doubt that the Act's prima-
ry purpose is to shake up the current Cuban status quo. 
The international community already has accepted the use of 
multilateral economic sanctions to attempt a fundamental 
change in a target country's status quo that may incite a popu-
lar overthrow of the government.200 But is Helms-Burton's use 
of unilateral trade action to overthrow a government legitimate? 
It seems that if a prima facie case in favor of this objective can 
be made under GATT article XXI, then notwithstanding all of 
the other obligations in GATT and the Uruguay Round agree-
ments, nothing in the GATT-WfO system forbids such action. 
Moreover, nothing in this system confers subject matter jurisdic-
199 /d. § 6021 (emphasis added). 
200 See Steve Mufson & Lawrence Ingrassia, Smah Africa Looks Capable of Suroiving Sane· 
tinns fur Years- But at a Stiff Price, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1985 (reporting on economic sanc-
tions against South Africa); Carla Anne Robbins, Containing Saddam Remains a Challenge, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1996, at All (describing multilateral economic sanctions against 
Iraq). 
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tion on a WTO panel, the Appellate Body, or the Dispute Settle-
ment Body to determine whether a case has been made. Indeed, 
the prima facie case may be necessary not because of article 
XXI, but rather to persuade other countries of the substantive 
basis for the action. In this instance, perhaps reasonable minds 
can differ as to whether Castro's Cuba poses a national security 
threat to the United States. To concede subject matter jurisdic-
tion would involve an extraordinary ceding of sovereignty incon-
ceivable in the present international political economy. Undoubt-
edly, there are philosophical grounds, and perhaps even good 
policy reasons, in favor of a revolutionary shift in subject matter 
jurisdiction on national security matters, but such arguments are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 201 
Although the "Overthrow Castro Act" theme resonates 
throughout the Helms-Burton J\ct, a second theme emerges, 
suggesting that several of the Act's sanctions are defensible 
when critically appraised. That is not to say these sanctions are 
wise public policy, or that they are invulnerable to criticism on 
doctrinal grounds. Rather, it is to counterpoint the critics of the 
Helms-Burton Act, many of whom would have international 
trade law observers believe that the Act is rotten to the core. In 
truth, several of its provisions are modest and entirely within the 
sovereign prerogative of the United States, and even the more 
controversial provisions are arguably legitimate. 
To flesh out these two themes, it is important to understand 
how the Helms-Burton Act implements the property, freedom, 
and physical threat policies to hasten Castro's downfall. The 
Helms-Burton tactic is to impose three distinct categories of 
sanctions that might be termed "foreign assistance" sanctions, 
"ostracism"· sanctions, and "trafficking" sanctions. Each category 
is discussed in greater detail below. In brief, foreign assistance 
sanctions refer to the withdrawal or withholding of U.S. foreign 
assistance to countries that aid or abet the Castro regime. Ostra-
cism sanctions are measures that further isolate Cuba from the 
mainstream of the world trading system. Trafficking sanctions 
201 See Raj Bhala, Hegtlian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 16 
BERKEI.EYJ.lNT'L L. (forthcoming Spring 1998) (proposing philosophical argument regard-
ing shift in subject matter jurisdiction). 
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are liabilities for engaging in transactions in American proper-
tf02 conflscated205 by the Castro regime. All three categories 
202 See 22 U.S.CA § 6023(4), (12) (defining •confiscated" and "property"). The term 
"property" is broadly defined to include any kind of property - real property, personal 
property, intellectual property, and security interests - and covers present, future, and 
contingent rights and interests. See id. Thus, for example, if the Castro regime confiscated 
inheritance rights under a will and produced a product in violation of a patent right in a 
state-owned enterprise, the beneficiary of the inheritance rights and the patent holder 
might be potential claurumts under the Helms-Burton Act. 
20
' The definition of "confiscated" obviously relies on another important term: "proper-
ty." See id. The term "confiscated" (or, equivalently, "confiscated property") is commonplace 
in the Act. See id. § 6067(a) (requiring Secretary of State to prepare report on claims held 
by U.S. nationals regarding property that Castro regime had confiscated); id. § 6081 (listing 
congressional findings on confiscated property); id. § 6082 (creating liability for trafficking 
in confiscated property); id. § 6083 (concerning proof of ownership claims to confiscated 
property); id. § 6091 (b) (excluding any alien who has trafficked in confiscated property 
from United States). It refers to: 
(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Govern-
ment of ownership or control of property-
(i) without the property having been returned or adequate and effec-
tive compensation provided; or 
(ii) without the claim to the property having been settled pursuant to 
an international claims settlement agreement or other mutually 
accepted settlement procedure; and 
(B) the repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default by the Cuban 
Government on, or the failure of the Cuban Government to pay-
(i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, expropriated, 
or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; 
(ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or 
otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; or 
(iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban Government in satisfac-
tion or settlement of a confiscated property claim. 
Id. § 6023(4). 
Of course, the terms "confiscated" and "property" refer to property owned by a "Unit-
ed States national." Thus, whether the beneficiary and patent holder in the preceding 
example actually have a claim under the Act depends on whether they are "United States 
nationals." Any U.S. citizen, and any other legal entity organized under federal or state law 
with its principal place of business in the United States, is a "United States national." See id. 
§ 6023(15). It is extremely significant that a person need not have been a "United States 
national" (in particular, a U.S. citizen) at the time the Castro regime confiscated the prop-
erty. See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 31 (1995), -rtprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 536 (stat-
ing that "[p]ersons who were not United States citizens at the time their property in Cuba 
was confiscated but who subsequently became United States citizens are included within the 
definition of a United States national" (emphasis added)). 
Consider a likely example: the factory of a Cuban citizen living in Havana is seized by 
the government in 1960, and no compensation is paid. The citizen escapes Cuba in 1961 
and resettles legally in Miami, becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1970. This person is 
considered a "United States national" under the Helms-Burton Act. Accordingly, a substan-
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of sanctions are designed to tighten the economic noose around 
Cuba and thereby hasten the demise of the regime. The unstat-
ed logic is that the Cuban people are rational actors who will 
weigh the costs and benefits of Castro's communism and eventu-
ally conclude that, on balance, this system impedes their eco-
nomic and political development. Mter all, is this calculation not 
unlike the one made by millions of people in the former Soviet 
bloc countries? Of course, this logic assumes that, unlike many 
Iraqi and Iranian citizens, the Cubans populace will not rally 
around their leader in the face of "America the Bully." 
B. Definitions of Key Terms 
How the sanction measures operate in practice depends in 
part on certain key terms. The definitions of three of these 
terms are relevant to the fundamental objective of the Helms-
Burton Act, the overthrow of the Castro regime, and merit dis-
cussion at the outset.204 That is, all three definitions concern 
the ruling government and none would be necessary but for this 
fundamental objective. 
First, the unqualified term "Cuban Government" refers to "the 
government of any political subdivision of Cuba, and any agency 
or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba." 205 While this 
definition does not expressly refer to the present Castro regime, 
that implication is clear from the remaining two definitions, a 
"transition government in Cuba" and a "democratically elected 
government in Cuba." 206 Both definitions envision a change in 
the status quo - the removal of Fidel Castro from power -
and rely on the President to determine whether the enumerated 
criteria are fulfilled. 
tial number of Cuban-Americans whose property was taken from them by Castro, and who 
then fled Cuba for the United States and subsequendy became U.S. citizens, are eligible to 
file suits under the AcL 
204 See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 31, ~nted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 536 (discussing 
legislative history of key terms). 
206 22 U.S.C.A § 6023(5). 
206 See id. § 6023(14) (defining •transition government in Cuba"); id. § 6023(6) 
(defining ·democratically elected government in Cuba"); H.R REP. No. 104-202, ·at 38, 
~nted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 543-44 (discussing definitions of these terms); JOINT 
ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITI'EE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R CoNF. REP. NO. 104-
468, at 54-56 (1996), ~in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 558, 569-71 (explaining drafting history 
of these terms). 
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To qualify as a transition government in Cuba, at a minimum, 
the President must determine that Cuba has met the following 
eight criteria: the government has ( 1) legalized all political activ-
ity; (2) released all political prisoners and allowed in~ernational 
human rights inspectors to examine Cuban prisons; (3) dissolved 
the state secret police apparatus; ( 4) made public commitments 
to hold free and fair elections for a new government within 
eighteen months after the transition government assumes power, 
an election in which all political parties have full and equal 
access to the media and international observers supervise; (5) 
ceased interference with Television Marti and Radio Marti broad-
casts; (6) made public commitments and demonstrable progress 
toward establishing an independent judiciary, respecting interna-
tionally recognized human rights as set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and allowed for the establishment 
of independent trade unions; (7) severed all ties with Fidel or 
Raul Castro; and (8) given adequate assurances that it will allow 
the speedy and efficient distribution of aid to the Cuban peo-
ple.207 In determining whether a government is transitional, 
the President must examine four additional criteria: if the gov-
ernment ( 1) is demonstrably in transition from a communist 
totalitarian dictatorship to a representative democracy; (2) has 
made public commitments and demonstrable progress toward 
guaranteeing free speech and freedom of the press, permitting 
Cuban-born persons to regain their citizenship and return to 
Cuba, assuring the right to private property, and returning prop-
erty seized by the Castro regime (or equivalent compensation) 
to U.S. citizens; (3) has extradited criminals to the United 
States; and ( 4) has permitted the deployment of independent 
human rights monitors throughout Cuba.208 These criteria are 
designed to ensure that a post-Castro government will not be a 
puppet regime within Castro's sphere of influence. In other 
words, the criteria aim to ensure a bona fide transition to a new 
political, economic, and social status quo. However, as critics of 
the Helms-Burton Act point out, the glaring problem is that 
while each criterion is valid in isolation, the criteria become 
unrealistic as a multi-factor test. It is unlikely that any 
207 See 22 U.S.CA § 6065(a). 
208 See id. § 6065(b). 
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government could meet such criteria after thirty-six years of 
totalitarian rule and, thus, "ensures that the United States will sit 
on the sidelines during the transition." 209 
To determine whether a Cuban government is a democratical-
ly elected government, the President must evaluate fewer criteria 
than to determine whether it is a transition government. This 
fact is not surprising, because doubts about a complete over-
throw of the Castro regime would more likely surround a transi-
tion government than a democratic government. In brief, a 
democratically elected government in Cuba is one that the Presi-
dent determines: ( 1) results from free and fair elections super-
vised by international observers, in which opposition parties had 
ample time to organize and campaign and all candidates had 
full access to the media; (2) respects both human rights ·and 
civil liberties; (3) is moving substantially toward a market eco-
nomic system based on the right to own and enjoy property; ( 4) 
is committed to enshrining the principles of regular free and 
fair elections, human rights, and civil liberties in a constitution; 
(5) has made demonstrable progress toward establishing an 
independent judiciary; and (6) has made demonstrable progress 
toward returning property seized by the Castro regime to U.S. 
citizens or providing full compensation for such property.210 
Two remarkable facts about the definitions of a democratically 
elected government and transition government in Cuba should 
not go unmentioned. First, these definitions are the first effort 
in U.S. international trade law to specifically define what kind of 
new political system the United States seeks in another country. 
To be sure, some international trade statutes contain political 
criteria. 211 However, no other statute is so ambitious or majes-
tic in its attempt to define an entirely new form of government 
for another country. Accordingly, these definitions embody both 
the noble commitment to freedom supporters of the Helms-
Burton Act emphasize and the legal imperialism that antagonists 
highlight. 
209 H.R CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 5~54, Tl!flrinted at 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 552 
(dissenting views). 
210 See 22 U.S.CA § 6066. 
211 See BHAIA, supra note 4, at 531-95, 1281-360 (discussing Generalized System of 
Preferences with trade and labor issues). 
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Second, all of the criteria in both definitions, several of which 
overlap, are based on one value: the rule of law. On the other 
hand, Castro's regime is an ugly example of the rule of man. 
Free and fair elections in a pluralistic multi-party democracy, 
respect for human rights, civil liberties, property rights, and an 
independent judiciary all function within the rule of law. Why is 
this value worth promoting? A practical answer to this question 
comes from Hong Kong. At midnight on June 30, 1997, British 
administration of the territory ended, and Chinese sovereignty 
resumed.212 The international business community's principal 
fear about the handover continues to be whether China will 
presetve the rule of law that has been the scaffolding upon 
which Hong Kong has built its phenomenal successes.m It is 
this scaffolding that allows wealth to be created and spread. 
Most, if not all, of the criteria in the Helms-Burton Act defini-
tions of a democratically elected government and a transition 
government are among the criteria the international business 
community will use to evaluate whether continued and expand-
ed trade relations in Hong Kong are worthwhile. In sum, not-
withstanding all of the possible sophisticated philosophical and 
jurisprudential arguments that justify it, the rule of law is worth 
promoting in a post-Castro Cuba, as in a post-British Hong 
Kong, because it is good for business. 
C. Suspension of Sanctions 
The Helms-Burton Act contains three provisions that allow for 
the suspension of sanctions. First, the President may suspend the 
effective date of the Act, which was August 1, 1996,214 for up 
to six months, and thereby suspend operation of the entire 
Act. 215 The criterion for this suspension is based upon the 
report to Congress that it is "necessary to the national interests 
of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy 
212 See Andrew Pollack, Asian Nations' Hr1Je fur Hong Kong Is Bwines.s as Usual; Don't ShaTII 
U.S. Fear of Crackduum on Civil Liberties, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 3, 1997, at A22 
(reporting on Chinese takeover of Hong Kong). 
215 See id. (reporting on international businesses' misgivings that Chinese rule of law will 
increase difficulty of conducting business in Hong Kong). 
••• See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085(a). 
... See§ 6085(b)(l). 
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in Cuba." 216 Using the same criterion, the President may 
suspend the effective date for additional periods of up to six 
months each.217 In practice, the authority to postpone the ef-. 
fective date is irrelevant because the President decided on July 
16, 1996 not to invoke it;218 hence, the Act took effect on Au-
gust 1, 1996. 
Second,· the President is authorized to suspend foreign assis-
tance sanctions, such as the bar on indirect financing of Cuba, 
if he determines a transition government has gained control in 
Cuba.219 Whenever the economic embargo against Cuba is ter-
minated, the President will lift the bar on foreign assistance 
sanctions.220 Heretofore, the President has declined to invoke 
this suspension authority. 
Finally, the President is authorized to suspend the right to 
bring an action for trafficking in confiscated property for up to 
six months, if this. "suspension is necessary to the national inter-
ests of the United States artd will expedite a transition to de-
mocracy in Cuba." 221 In July 1996, President Clinton invoked 
this suspension authority. 222 In suspending the trafficking sanc-
tion, the President must report in writing to Congress that the 
criteria regarding U.S. national interests and a transition in 
Cuba are satisfied.223 In January 1997, and again in July 1997, 
President Clinton invoked this right-to-sue authority for a further 
six months.224 The President can rescind any suspension if it 
216 See id. The President can rescind a suspension if it will expedite a transition to 
democracy in Cuba. See. id. § 6085(d). 
217 See id. § 6085(b)(2). 
218 See Statement by President Clinton on Implementation of Helms-Burton Law Issued July 16, 
1996, 131nt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1155, 1189 Quly 17, 1996) (stating that President declined 
to use his authority to postpone effective date); Rossella Brevetti & Peter Menyasz, Clinton 
Delays Lawsuits Under Title Ill of Helms-Burton, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1155, 1158 Quly 
17, 1996) (reporting that President decided to allow Helms-Burton Act to take effect); 
White Howe Fact SMet on Presidenf s Decision, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1155, 1190 Quly 17, 
1996) (explaining presidential authority under title III to postpone effective date). 
219 See 22 U.S.CA. § 6033(b)(1). 
... See id. § 6033(b) (2). 
221 See id. § 6085(c)(1)(8). 
222 See Brevetti & Menyasz, supra note 218, at 1158 (reporting that President decided to 
suspend right to bring private causes of action for six months.). 
m See22 U.S.CA. § 6085(c)(1)(8), (2). . 
... See Brevetti & Menyasz, supra note 218, at 1158 (reporting that President suspended 
right to sue for six months); Canada Weighs NAFTA Action, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 37, 
42 Qan. 8, 1997); Nancy Dunne, Clinton Suspends Helms-Burton Again, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 
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will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.225 Under the 
United States-EU agreement discussed earlier,226 the President 
appears committed to invoking this authority until his term 
expires in January 2001. 
Interestingly, even if President Clinton's suspension has not 
defused some of the controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton 
Act, it has at least allowed the United States and its trading 
partner critics to relax. However, Congress neither intended nor 
desired this benefit when it passed the Act. 227 The President 
sought a criterion for suspending the operation of the traffick-
ing sanction that focused on whether suspension is important to 
U.S. national interests, including expediting the transition to 
democracy in Cuba. 228 Congress flatly rejected that proposal, 
opting to use the term "necessary" so that expediting the transi-
tion to democracy would be the "central element of the 
President's decision." 229 Congress inserted in the legislative his-
tory that "under current circumstances [in Cuba] the President 
could not in good faith determine that suspension of the right 
of action [under the trafficking sanction] is either 'necessary to 
the national interests of the United States' or 'will expedite a 
transition to democracy in Cuba. '" 230 Congress felt that suspen-
sion "would remove a significant deterrent to foreign investment 
in Cuba, thereby helping prolong Castro's grip on power." 2~1 
To vigorous supporters of the Act, the President's decisions 
regarding suspension have undoubtedly been in bad faith. In 
reality, perhaps the President was caught off guard by the vehe-
ment and widespread criticism of the Act from U.S. trading 
partners, and, thus, invoked the suspension authority to steer a 
temporary middle course between proponents and critics. 
1997, at 1. 
225 See 22 U.S.CA. § 6085(d). 
226 See supra note 165 and accompanying text (highlighting EU agreement to suspend 
action so long as President Clinton continues to suspend provision on civil liability). 
227 See jOIJIIT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 104-468, at 65 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 558, 580 (stating that 
President has power to suspend right to sue if necessary to seiVe national interest and to 
expedite transition in Cuba) . 
... See id. 
... See id. 
... /d. 
231 ld. at 66, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 581. 
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D. Foreign Assistance Sanctions 
1. Non-Controversial Sanctions 
59 
The Helms-Burton Act uses foreign assistance sanctions to 
restrict the amount of American capital entering Cuba and, 
hence, hasten the demise of the Castro regime. For example, no 
U.S. national, permanent resident alien, or U.S. agency may 
lend, extend credit, or provide any· other form of funding to 
any person to finance a transaction in confiscated property if a 
U.S. national owns a claim on that property.252 Critics of the 
Helms-Burton Act can hardly view this sanction as controversial. 
It is simply an act of self-restraint, and the United States is free 
to channel indirect public and private financing to regimes it 
finds politically acceptable. 
Another illustration of a non-controversial foreign assistance 
measure concerns general licenses for U.S. families to send 
funds to their relatives in Cuba. Before reinstituting general 
licenses for these remittances, Congress urges the President to 
insist that the Cuban government permit small businesses to 
operate without restraint, with the right to hire employees, pay 
wages, purchase necessary supplies, and exercise other rights 
that will encourage the operation of small businesses in 
Cuba. 255 This measure is uncontroversial in two respects. First, 
no . sanction is attached. Congress is simply exhorting the Presi-
dent to push the Castro regime to allow some measure of entre-
preneurial capitalism to develop; the President is free to ignore 
the exhortation. Second, the measure is logical. Presumably, the 
point of sending funds to relatives in Cuba is to improve their 
standard of living, which is possible if the relatives can invest the 
funds in a small business and enjoy the resulting profits. The 
measure, therefore, could help ensure that the Castro regime 
allows remittances to be put to their intended use. 
"" See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a) (West Supp. 1997). 
m See id. § 6042(1) (A) (requiring President to submit report on assistance to Cuba). 
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Targeting Third-Party Countries 
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Other foreign assistance sanctions in the Helms-Burton Act 
are somewhat more controversial and target official U.S. aid to 
third-party countries that support the Castro regime. Essentially, 
these sanctions present third-party countries with a choice to 
either cease dealing with Fidel or risk losing U.S. aid.2M Ulti-
mately, however, even these financial assistance sanctions may be 
reasonable. Surely the United States is free to establish political 
criteria, prudent or not, for U.S. taxpayer-financed foreign aid 
eligibility. Critics of the Helms-Burton Act must yield to realpoli-
tik: · this carrot-and-stick approach to modifying the behavior of 
donee countries has always been a feature of the foreign aid 
programs of every donor country. Unless a donor country is 
seized with a fit of unprecedented altruism, the feature is cer-
tain to remain. 
One illustration of sanctions targeting third-party countries 
addresses relations between independent countries of the former 
Soviet Union ("FSU"). To understand this scenario, suppose the 
Ukraine, or another independent state of the FSU, engages in 
transactions with Cuba. Specifically, the FSU state assists Cuba 
through financial aid or technical advice, supports the construc-
tion or operation of intelligence facilities in Cuba, and trades 
goods, including commodities like oil, or seiVices with Cuba.235 
The Helms-Burton Act amends the 1961 Assistance Act to ren-
der an independent FSU state ineligible for U.S. government aid 
if it provides assistance to Cuba, supports Cuban intelligence 
facilities, or engages in non-market based trade with Cuba. 236 
Of these three activities, sanctioning the first two should not be 
controversial. If the donee country aids an enemy, the United 
States has a sovereign prerogative to decline to give aid for this 
234 See id. § 6003(b)(1)(A) (allowing President to tenninate aid to countries that pro-
vide assistance to Cuba). 
""' See id. § 6038(a). The Helms-Burton Act requires the President to submit annual 
reports to Congress (due on January 1) on commercial and military dealings between for-
eign countries and Cuba and the amount of assistance provided by foreign countries to 
Cuba. See id. This reporting requirement is not limited to FSU countries. See id. 
236 See id. § 6021 (amending § 498A of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 
2295a(a)(ll), (d) (1994)). 
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or any other reason. Indeed, regarding the second activity, the 
legislative history to the Helms-Burton Act points out: 
With respect to Russian intelligence facilities located at 
Lourdes, Cuba . . . a senior Russian government official an-
nounced in November 1994 that his government was provid-
ing $200 million in credits to the Castro regime in exchange 
for the continued use of that facility. The Lourdes facility is 
one of the world's largest and most sophisticated intelligence 
stations, which Department of State and Department of De-
fense documents say is used to intercept and monitor U.S. 
commercial satellites, U.S. military and merchant shipping 
communications, NASA activities, and telephone conversations 
of U.S. citizens. The [joint congressional] committee of con-
ference notes that the Department of State has assured the 
Congress that no part of the [Helms-Burton] Act would vio-
late U.S. treaty obligations, nor does any existing arms con-
trol treaty prevent the United States from urging Russia to 
end its use of Cuba as a base for intelligence operations 
against U.S. interests.237 
However, sanctioning non-market based trade with Cuba is more 
problematic because the United States clearly is trying to dictate 
the terms on which two other sovereign countries trade. 
The goal of sanctioning non-market based trade with Cuba is 
to hasten its economic collapse by forcing the Castro regime to 
consume precious resources, including hard currency, by paying 
market prices for imports. However, the breadth of the sanction 
should not be misunderstood: trade must be non-market based. 
That is, an FSU country is ineligible for U.S. foreign aid only if 
it trades with Cuba "on terms more favorable than those gener-
ally available in applicable markets for· comparable commodi-
ties."238 Examples of non-market terms for exports to Cuba 
would be charging a concessional price, providing a subsidy, 
delivering goods or services in advance with no accountability 
for full payment, not requiring payment for appropriate trans-
portation and insurance costs, or forgiving debt in exchange for 
an equity interest in property of the Cuban government. 2!9 An 
""
7 jOINT Exi'I.:ANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R CoNF. 
REP. No. 104-468, at 48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 558, 563 . 
.,.. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6021 (amending § 498A(b) of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 
U.S.C. § 2295a(b)(5)). 
""' See id. (amending § 498A(b) of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 
2295a(b)(5), 2295b(k)(3) ). 
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example of an off-market term for Cuban imports would be a 
preferential tariff rate240 or a countertrade transaction, such as 
a barter exchange of Russian oil for Cuban sugar. Here, the 
terms of the transaction are more favorable to Cuba than would 
be available to Cuba on the free market, resulting in a subsidy 
to Cuba.241 
Conversely, nothing in the Helms-Burton Act sanctions trade 
in non-confiscated property conducted on market terms. This 
omission is significant because many state-owned enterprises 
("SOEs") or newly privatized companies within FSU countries 
are certain to have trading relationships within the Castro re-
gime based on previous economic ties between the former Sovi-
et Union and Cuba. Yet because many of these FSU entities are 
likely to be struggling economically, they may be unwilling to 
trade with Cuba on unprofitable off-market terms. In other 
words, notwithstanding the Helms-Burton Act, they cannot afford 
to subsidize Castro, and the Act does not preclude them from 
earning an arm's length profit from his regime. 
In addition to the "non-market based trade" requirement, 
three further limitations exist on the scope of the financial 
penalty sanction imposed on FSU countries for dealing with 
Cuba. First, Congress can elect to continue U.S. foreign aid to 
an FSU country that assists or engages in non-market based 
trade with Cuba by disapproving a presidential determination 
triggering the cessation of aid.242 Second, the President can 
continue U.S. aid to an FSU country that supports Cuba's intelli-
gence facilities if the aid is important to U.S. national securi-
ty.243 Third, several categories of U.S. aid are immune from 
cut-off: humanitarian aid; aid for the development of a demo-
cratic political system, the rule of law, private sector organiza-
tions, and a free market system; and certain educational ex-
change programs.244 Plainly, it would be counterproductive to 
240 See id. (stating preferential tariff rales would be "nonmarket based trade"). 
241 See H.R CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 48, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 563 (ex-
plaining why more favorable trade is considered subsidy). 
242 See 22 U.S.CA. § 6021 (amending§ 498A(b) of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 
U.S.C. § 2295a(b)(5)). 
2
" See id. 
244 See id. § 2295a(d)(3) (describing exceptions to assistance reductions). 
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the U.S. policy goal of facilitating FSU countries in trans1Uon 
from communism to market capitalism to shut down these aid 
programs. 
The second illustration targets any country that helps Cuba 
complete construction of a particular semi-finished nuclear pow-
er plant. This form of a third-party country foreign assistance 
sanction is designed to prevent the completion of a nuclear 
power plant in Juragua, Cuba.245 Congress expressed profound 
skepticism in the Helms-Burton Act about the ability and willing-
ness of the Castro regime to operate the Juragua plant in a safe 
manner that does not threaten the United States, reminding the 
world about Castro's past nuclear brinkmanship and present 
threats: 
(I) President Clinton stated in April 1993 that the United 
States opposed construction of the Juragua nuclear 
power plant because of the concerns of the United States 
about Cuba's ability to ensure the safe operation of the facility 
and because of Cuba's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty . . . . 
(3) The State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, and the Department of Energy have expressed 
concerns about the construction and operation of 
Cuba's nuclear reactors. 
( 4) In a September 1992 report to the Congress, the Gener-
al Accounting Office outlined concerns among nuclear 
energy experts about deficiencies in the nuclear plant 
project in Juragua ... including -
(A) a lack in Cuba of a nuclear regulatory structure; 
(B) the absence in Cuba of an adequate infrastructure to 
ensure the plan( s safe operation and requisite mainte-
nance; 
(C) the inadequacy of training of plant operators; 
(D) reports by a former technician from Cuba who, by 
examining with x-rays weld sites believed to be part 
of the auxiliary plumbing system for the plan, 
found that 10 to 15 percent of those sites were defective; 
245 Su H.R REP. No. 10~202, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 540. 
Construction was halted in September 1992. However, Cuba, possibly with the assistance of 
third-party countries such as Russia, seeks to finish the project. See id. at 35-36, reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 540-41. 
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(E) since September 5, 1992, when construction on the 
plant was halted, the prolonged exposure to the ele-
ments, including corrosive salt water vapor, of the prima-
ry reactor components; 
(F) the possibk inadequacy of the upper portion of the 
reactors' dome retention capability to withstand only 7 
pounds of pressure per square inch, given that normal 
atmospheric pressure is 32 pounds per square inch and 
United States reactors are designed to accommodate pres-
sures of 50 pounds per square inch; 
(5) The United States Geological SuiVey claims that it had 
difficulty determining answers to specific questions re-
garding earthquake activity in the area near Cienfeugos 
because the Cuban Government was not forthcoming 
with information. 
( 6) The Geological Suroey has indicated that the Caribbean plate, 
a geological formation near the south coast of Cuba, may pose 
seismic risks to Cuba and the site of the power plant, and may 
produce large to moderate earthquakes. 
(7) On May 25, 1992, the Caribbean plate produced an 
earthquake numbering 7. 0 on the IOchter scale. 
(8) According to a study by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, summer winds could carry radioactive poUut-
ants from a nuckar accident at the power plant throughout aU 
of Florida and parts of the States on the coast of the Gulf of 
Mexico as Jar as Texas, and northern winds could carry the 
poUutants as Jar northeast as Vnginia and Washington, D. C. 
(9) The Cuban Guvemment, under dictator Fidel Castro, in 1962 
advocated the Soviets' launching of nuckar missiles to the 
United States, which represented a direct and dangerous 
provocation of the United States and brought the world 
to the brink of a nuclear conflict. 
(10) Fidel Castro over the years has consistently issued threats 
against the United States Government, most recently 
that he would unleash another perilous mass migration 
from Cuba upon the enactment of this [Helms-Burton] 
Act. 246 
Assuming these Congressional findings are true, they establish a 
persuasive case of bona fide U.S. security concerns and suggest 
Congress and the President would be irresponsible to fail to 
block completion of the Juragua plant. In tum, U.S. efforts to 
persuade third-party countries to decline to help Cuba to build 
the Juragua plant seem entirely reasonable. These efforts are 
246 22 U.S.C.A. § 604l(a) (emphasis added). 
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certainly less unilateral or forceful than a U.S. Air Force attack 
on the plant akin to the Israeli destruction of an Iraqi facility 
several years ago. 247 
These efforts, embodied in the Helms-Burton Act, involve the 
imposition of a financial penalty on any country that supports 
completion of the Juragua plant.248 As a penalty, the United 
States would withhold foreign assistance in an amount equal to 
the aid given by the third-party country to Cuba to help Castro 
finish the plant.249 Once again, however, several categories of 
U.S. aid could not be cut off: humanitarian aid; aid for the 
development of a democratic political system, the rule of law, 
private sector organizations, and a free market system; and cer-
tain educational exchange programs.250 
Interestingly, in passing the Helms-Burton Act, Congress 
opined that the executive branch had been slack in enforcing 
existing economic sanctions - most notably the trade embargo 
- against Cuba.251 Consequently, a suspicious Congress direct-
ed the President to: ( 1) encourage third-party countries to re-
strict trade and financial relations with the Cuban regime,252 
(2) apply extant sanctions against countries that assist Cuba,25s 
(3) direct that the United States deny visas to officials of the 
Castro regime or Cuban Communist Party,254 (4) and encour-
age the Secretary of State to ensure that all U.S. diplomats post-
ed overseas understand and communicate to their foreign coun-
terparts the reasons for the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, 
and encourage them to cooperate with the embargo.255 While 
.. 
7 See Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects After 
the Gulf War, 86 AM. j. INT'L L. 524, 525-26 ( 1992). 
248 See22 U.S.CA § 6041(b)(1) . 
... See id. 
... See id. § 6041(b)(2). 
251 See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 537 (de-
claring profound concern that executive branch agencies are not vigorous in enforcing 
certain provisions of U.S. embargo on Cuba or advocating U.S. policy before foreign gov-
ernments). 
252 See 22 U.S.CA § 6032(a)(1); see also H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 24, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.CAN. at 529 (noting need to encourage countries to stop "undermining" U.S. trade 
embargo against Cuba). 
"" See 22 U.S.CA § 6032(a)(2), (c). 
254 See id. § 6032(e). · 
... See id. § 6032(b). 
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the trade embargo may be ineffectual, there is little to cnt1c1ze 
in the aforementioned exhortations in the Helms-Burton Act. 
E. Ostracism Sanctions 
The "ostracism" sanctions in the Helms-Burton Act are de-
signed to further isolate Cuba from the mainstream of the world 
trading system. Doing so, according to supporters of the Act, 
will further tighten the economic noose around the Castro re-
gime.256 Critics argue that implementing a policy that further 
isolates Cuba will only help Castro by allowing conditions in 
Cuba to become much worse than they are today.257 Moreover, 
even if isolation eventually topples the Castro regime, it only 
increases the prospect of violent change and the chances of 
another mass exodus of refugees to the United States. For these 
reasons, critics argue, no other govemment agrees with such a 
draconian isolationist policy toward Cuba and the policy is des-
tined to fail without the support of foreign govemments. 258 
Thus, critics contend that the ostracism sanctions paradoxically 
wind up ostracizing the United States and thereby damage our 
relations with our trading partners.259 In this regard, the critics 
are correct. 
The ostracism sanctions are straightforward. Until the Presi-
dent determines that Cuba is run by a democratically elected 
government, the United States will continue to oppose Cuba's 
admission into any intemational financial institution, including 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and 
Inter-American Development Bank.260 Likewise, the United 
States will continue to oppose any attempt to allow Cuba to 
once again participate in the Organization of American States 
("OAS"). In 1961, the OAS member states voted to suspend 
Cuba from the OAS261 until democracy takes root. 262 Propo-
nents of ·the Helms-Burton Act probably are correct in stating 
256 See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 53, rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 551. 
257 See id., rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 552. 
258 See id. 
259 See id. at 53-54, rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 552. 
200 See 22 U.S.C.A § 6034(a)(l), (c). 
261 See H.R.. REP. No. 104-202, at 33, rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 538. 
262 See 22 U.S.CA § 6035. 
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that "it is inconceivable that any OAS member government 
would consider Cuba to be worthy of active participation in the 
OAS without first undertaking fundamental democratic re-
forms."265 After all, the OAS has recognized "representative 
democracy as an indispensable condition for stability, peace, and 
development. "264 
Whereas exile from the OAS is a diplomatic loss of face for 
Cuba, exclusion from the World Bank and IMF squeezes Cuba's 
economy, making it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain devel-
opment funding. Suppose an international financial institution 
were to approve a loan or other assistance to Cuba over U.S. 
opposition. The United States would have to withhold the 
amount of the loan or other assistance from that institution by 
not contributing to its capital stock.265 Here, domestic oppo-
nents of the Act have a valid concern: withholding funds from 
the World Bank, IMF, or other international financial institution 
undermines U.S. leadership of those institutions and consumes 
precious goodwill toward the United States in those institu-
tions.266 
F. Trafficking Sanctions 
By far the most controversial provisions in the Helms-Burton 
Act concern trafficking in confiscated property of U.S. nationals. 
The United States has the sovereign prerogative to give or with-
hold assistance from individual foreign countries on political 
grounds, and even from international financial institutions. 
These sanctions may be unwise because the breaching of com-
mitments fosters ill will. The United States also has the sover-
eign prerogative to attempt to ostracize Cuba because of its 
government, though this sanction may be unwise; constructive 
engagement, which the United States has used in the past 
against China,267 may be more effective. Critics of the Helms-
.., jOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 104468, at 47 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 558, 562 . 
... /d. 
260 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6034(b) (stating that Secretary of Treasury shall not pay any 
institution that approves loans or other assistance to Cuba over opposition). 
,.. See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 5~54, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 552 (dissenting 
views). 
267 See Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of 
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Burton Act consider the imposition of severe civil money damag-
es for trafficking in confiscated property of U.S. nationals to be 
illegitimate.268 Equally obnoxious is a denial of entry to the 
United States because of a tenuous connection to trafficking in 
confiscated property. 
In contrast, to supporters of the Act, the trafficking provisions 
are rationally calculated or, in the words of the legislative histo-
ry, "unique but proportionate" 269 measures "intended primarily 
to create a 'chilling effect.'" 270 "This 'chilling effect' should 
deny the current Cuban regime venture capital, discourage 
third-party country nationals from profiting from illegally confis-
cated property, and help preserve such property until such time 
as the rightful owners can successfully assert their claim." 271 
Further, liability for trafficking exists only after the end of a 
three-month grace period beginning on the date on which the 
trafficking provision takes effect. m Originally, that date was Au-
gust 1, 1996,275 but because President Clinton suspended the 
application of the trafficking provision,274 presumably this grace 
period will not begin to run until the United States lifts the 
suspension. Accordingly, supporters could contend this liability 
will hardly come as a surprise to defendants if the threat of 
liability becomes a reality. 
Human Rjghts on Business Investtm in China, 14 Nw. j. INr'L L & Bus. 66, 73-82 (199!1) 
(discussing U.S. policy of constructive engagement towards China). 
268 8« Peter Morici, The United States, World Trade, and the Helms-Burton Act, CuRRENT 
HIST., Feb. 1997, at 87 (stating that Helms-Burton would be difficult to defend under 
international law). 
269 H.R REP. No. 104-202, at !19, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 544; !« also H.R 
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 57!1 (describing right of 
action as unique but proportionate remedy for U.S. nationals who were targeted by Castro 
regime when their property was wrongfully confiscated). 
• 
270 H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 25, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5!10; su also H.R 
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 57!1 (explaining that one 
purpose of civil remedy is to discourage persons and companies from engaging in com-
mercial transactions in confiscated property). A civil remedy also deters the exploitation of 
property confiscated from U.S. nationals. See id. 
6. 
271 H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 25, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 530. 
272 8« 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997). 
m 8« id. § 6085(a). 
274 8« Pascal Fletcher, Israelis Press Ahead with Cuba VentuTf, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at 
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1. Civil Liability for Trafficking 
a. The Scope and Amount of Liability 
The statement of civil liability in the Helms-Burton Act is 
straightforward, sweeping, and applies both retroactively and 
prospectively:27" "any person that . . . traffics in property . . . con-
fiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, 
shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim 
to such property." 276 Moreover, the alleged trafficker cannot 
use what may in some cases be an obvious defense: the act of 
state doctrine.277 It is critical to understand that this statement 
in the Act creates a private right of action for U.S. nationals 
against traffickers. Such a right is rare in U.S. unilateral interna-
tional trade action statutes. 
Any one of four adjustments to this sweeping statement of 
liability - modifications to the meaning of "any," "property," 
"United States national," or the amount of liability - might 
have rendered the trafficking sanction far less fearsome and, 
"'' See id. § 6082(a)(4)(A) (clarifying that actions can be brought regarding property 
confiscated before, on, or after enactment date of Helms-Burton Act). Various require-
ments concerning procedures for filing of claims and the election of remedies are set forth 
in 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(c), (f) (1) and discussed in H.R. REP. No. 104202, at 41, reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 546. . 
276 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see aLso H.R. REP. No. 104202, at 40, 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 545 (summarizing liability for trafficking). As required by 
the Act, the Attorney General has published a summary of this liability provision. See 22 
U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(8); Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996). 
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission issues certificates of a claim of ownership 
of an interest. In any action brought under the Helms-Burton Act, a court must accept the 
certificate as conclusive proof of ownership of an interest of property. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 
6083(a)(1). This Commission was established under the International Claims Settlement 
Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). If a Helms-~urton case involves an uncertified claim, 
the court may appoint a special master (including the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion) to determine the ownership and amount of the claim. See id. § 6083(a)(2). In addi-
tion, a court will accept as conclusive evidence of ownership or amount a determination as 
to the validity of a claim or its amount by an international arbitrator where the United 
States or the claimant submitted the matter for binding arbitration. See id. § 6083(a)(3). 
However, determinations of foreign courts or decrees of foreign administrative agencies are 
not conclusive evidence of the ownership or amount of a claim. See id. The provisions re-
garding proof of ownership claims to confiscated property are discussed in JOINT ExPLAN-
ATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 104-468, at 63-
64 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 578-79. 
277 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(6). 
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hence, far less controversial than it is. However, in each case 
Congress declined to narrow the sanction and thereby defuse 
some of the controversy it has generated. 
First, for example, if only Americans were held liable, then 
the traffic sanction would hardly raise an eyebrow. Further, 
critics of the Helms-Burton Act might not have minded if, along 
with Americans, only officials of the . Castro government and 
Communist Party members were held liable. However, the word 
"any" in the liability provision, without limitation in the statute 
or legislative history, obviously puts all foreigners at risk. 
Second, if liability likewise pertained to only a narrow class of 
property interests, then perhaps the sanction would not be so 
controversial, as it would have little practical effect. However, 
the broad definition of "property", which includes all real and 
personal property, securities, intellectual property, and all pres-
ent and future interests,278 eliminates this possibility. 
Third, if the term "United States national" expressly excluded 
Cuban-Americans whose property was confiscated before they 
became U.S. citizens, this limitation would reduce the practical 
effect of the traffic sanction. But because the definition includes 
any U.S. citizen, and any entity whose principal place of business 
is in the United States, this limitation also is excluded. Congress 
estimates that thousands of U.S. nationals can substantiate a 
valid claim to Cuban property in a U.S. court.279 Approximately 
6000 U.S. citizens and businesses with outstanding claims against 
confiscated property in Cuba have filed their claims with the 
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission; an additional 15,000 
U.S. nationals have not filed claims with the Commission but 
also have had commercial property confiscated in Cuba.280 
Whatever the exact figure, it is clear that the potential number 
of private rights of action is staggering. 
The fourth and final modification that Congress could have 
made, but did not, concerns the amount of liability. Suppose 
the civil money damages imposed for violating the trafficking 
278 See id. § 6023(12). 
""' See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 39, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 544. 
280 See id. at 43-45, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 549-51 (letter from James L. Blum, 
Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Hon. Benjamin A Gilman, Chairman, House 
Committee on International Relations, July 24, 1995) (discussing benefits of strengthening 
sanctions against Cuba). 
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sanction were so insignificant that potential defendants regarded 
them as merely a cost of doing business. Here too, perhaps no 
one would care about the sanction because it would amount to 
a right without a remedy. But, once again, the Helms-Burton 
Act's language eliminates this possibility. The amount of the 
liability is the largest of three possible values, plus court costs 
and reasonable attorneys' fees:281 (1) the amount, if any, certi-
fied to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion, plus interest;282 (2) for an uncertified claim, the amount 
determined by a court-appointed special master, plus inter-
est;28s and (3) the fair market value of the property, deter-
mined by the greater of the current value, or the value when 
calculated, plus interest.284 An amount in controversy less than 
$50,000, exclusive of interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and treble 
damages, is deemed de minimis and, therefore, not action-
able.285 Property used for accredited diplomatic purposes is im-
mune from attachment and execution of a judgment under the 
trafficking sanction.286 Similarly, a judgment cannot be en-
forced against the property of a transition or democratically 
elected government in Cuba.287 
Treble damages are available to a claimant in two instances, 
making the specter of liability particularly fearsome. First, if the 
value used to determine liability is the amount certified to the 
claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, then 
the claimant may recover treble damages.288 In light of the re-
281 See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
282 See id. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(I). Interest is computed at a statutory rate set forth in 28 
U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) from the date of confiSCation until the date on which the action is 
brought. See id. § 6082(a)(1)(B). 
283 See id. §§ 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(II), 6083(a)(2); see also supra note 282 (defining compu-
tation of interest). . 
284 See id. § 6082(a) ( 1) (A) (i) (III); see also supra note 282 (defining computation of inter-
est) . 
... See id. § 6082(b). 
286 See 28 U.S.CA § 16ll(c) (West Supp. 1997). 
287 See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(d); JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF 
CoNFERENCE, H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468 (1996), at 61, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 
558,576. 
288 See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(3)(A), (C)(ii). In the event the United States were to 
enter into an agreement with Cuba settling claims to confiscated property, certified claim-
ants who had recovered an amount equal to or greater than the amount of their certified 
claim would not be entitled to any further recovery under the agreement. Claimants who, 
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buttable presumption that the certified amount should be used 
to calculate liability, a trafficker is potentially exposed to signifi-
cant liability.289 Second, suppose a U.S. national with an uncer-
tified claim learns that a person is about to traffic in that 
claimant's confiscated property. The claimant should give written 
notice of his or her intention to commence an action, and 
demand that the unlawful trafficking cease.290 Nonetheless, the 
person traffics in the property. In this instance, the claimant is 
eligible to recover treble damages for what amounts to a brazen 
and willful violation of the trafficking sanction.291 
The distinction between the two classes of potential defen-
dants subject to treble damages is significant. As suggested 
above, a non-certified claimant cannot institute an action seek-
ing treble damages against the defendant until thirty days after 
written notice has been provided; this thirty-day period runs 
from the date on which the claimant posts the notice or delivers 
it personally to the defendant. 292 During this thirty-day grace 
period, a cautious defendant will immediately cease trafficking in 
confiscated property, use the thirty days to research the validity 
of the plaintiff's claim, and decide upon a course of action. H 
the defendant ceases trafficking by the conclusion of the thirty-
day period, then the defendant can avoid treble damage liabili-
ty.295 However, the defendant remains liable, under the normal 
liability amount rule, for trafficking that occurred between the 
end of the three-month grace period following the Act's effec-
tive date and the time the trafficking ceased.294 In contrast, a 
plaintiff with a certified claim is not obligated to give any 
in a Helms-Burton action, recovered less than the amount of their certified claim could 
recover the balance under the agreement See id. § 6082(0 (2) (A) (i)-(iii). 
289 See id. § 6082(a)(2). It is also noteWorthy that if actions brought under the Helms-
Burton Act are consolidated to satisfY claims, including in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, U.S. nationals holding claims whose amounts have been certified by the For-
eign Claims Settlement Commission are entitled to full payment before any other claimant 
See id. § 6082(0 (2) (B). 
290 See id. § 6082(a) (3) (D) 
""' See id. § 6082(a)(3)(B)-(C). 
292 See H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 5S.59, -nprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 57~74. 
""' See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(3)(B); H.R CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, -nprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 573. 
294 See H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, -nprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 573 (discuss-
ing civil remedy for trafficking). 
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advance notice to the defendant before commencing an action 
seeking treble damages. Consequently, a defendant against a 
certified claimant cannot benefit either from the additional 
thirty-day grace period or the consequent opportunity to avoid 
treble damage liability. 
This distinction creates an obvious priority for certified claim-
ants. While at first glance this distinction may appear unfair, it is 
entirely defensible. The legislative history indicates that since the 
Cuban claims program ended on July 6, 1972, claimants have 
effectively put Cuban investors on notice of 5911 certified U.S. 
claims and "[i]nformation regarding whether the claim to a 
particular property in Cuba . . . held by a certified U.S. claimant 
is readily available." 295 Conversely, it is only fair that non-certi-
fied claimants bear an affirmative duty to provide notice to 
potential defendants before seeking treble damages; these defen-
dants are unlikely to have a formal and reliable informational 
mechanism available to them to check whether the property in 
question was confiscated. 
To be sure, five relevant safeguards ensure that opportunists 
do not abuse the liability for trafficking. First, a U.S. national 
cannot bring a claim regarding property confiscated before the 
enactment date of the Helms-Burton Act- March 12, 1996-
unless the national acquired the claim before this date. 296 Oth-
erwise, a secondary market in ownership claims to pre-enactment 
confiscated property might arise. Second, a U.S. national cannot 
bring a claim regarding property confiscated on or after March 
12, 1996, if the national acquired the claim after the confisca-
tion.297 Again, a secondary market in ownership claims might 
arise. Third, neither a U.S. national who could have, but failed 
.,. See id. at 59, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 574. 
296 See 22 U.S.C.A § 6082(a)(4)(B); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 40 (1995), rqninted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 527, 545. 
297 See 22 U.S.C.A § 6082(a)(4)(C). Note that the legislative history to 22 U.S.C.A § 
6082(a)(4)(C) incorrectly states that the relevant date by which a U.S. national must have 
acquired a claim is the date of enactmenL See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 40, rqmnted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 545-46. 22 U.S.C.A § 6082(a)(4)(C) logically requires the national to 
acquire ownership of the claim to the property before the date of confiscation. See H.R. 
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 59, rqmnted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 574 (stating that "with 
respect to property confiscated on or after the date of enactment . . . an action for damag-
es is precluded only if the claim to the property was acquired by assignment for value after 
the property was conjiscatetl' (emphasis added)). 
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to, file a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion,298 nor a national who did file such a claim but whose 
claim was rejected by the Commission, may recover under the 
Helms-Burton Act.299 Fourth, there is a two-year statute of limi-
tations calculated from the date trafficking has ceased.500 The 
fifth safeguard, clarified by the legislative history, concerns "per-
sons or entities that would relocate to the United States for the 
purpose of using" the trafficking remedy.301 These opportunists 
could seek to become "United States nationals" after the date of 
enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, by incorporating in the 
United States. However, they are not eligible to make a claim 
on property confiscated before the date of enactment. 302 
Notwithstanding the above safeguards, the scope and amount 
of liability for trafficking in confiscated property is broad and, 
therefore, more controversial because of the terms "any," "prop-
erty," and "United States national," and because of the potential 
to recover treble damages. Accordingly, in the sweeping state-
ment of liability quoted at the outset, only the definition of the 
term "traffic" provides hope to critics of the Helms-Burton Act 
that the traffic sanction might be narrow and less controversial. 
The hope is dashed immediately, however, by the broad defini-
tion of the term "traffic." A person, entity, or foreign govern-
ment305 traffics in confiscated property: 
298 See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(l)(A); H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 41, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.CAN. at 546. 
299 See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a) (5) (A)-(8). 
""" See id. § 6084; see also id. § 6082(a)(5)(C) (prohibiting U.S. national with uncertified 
claim from bringing action before two years from date of enactment of Helms-Burton Act, 
i.e., March 12, 1998); id. § 6082(h) (concerning suspension and termination of rights upon 
overthrow of Castro). Regarding 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(5)(C), an interesting question aJis. 
es as to whether President Clinton's suspensions of the operation of the trafficking sanc-
tion also suspends the prohibition. On the one hand, the President's suspensions affect the 
entire trafficking sanction, thus suggesting the prohibition is pushed out into the future by 
the amount of time of the suspensions. On the other hand, Congress was aware of the 
possibility of one or more suspensions when it wrote this prohibition, and it nonetheless 
fixed the date as two years from the date of enactment. The latter argument gives full ef-
fect to both the suspension and prohibition sections and, thus, seems more appealing than 
the first argument. Note that the date of enactment is different from the effective date of 
the Act, which was August I, 1996. See id. § 6085(a). 
"'' See H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 59, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 574 (discuss-
ing intended applicability of title and amendments with regard to proper parties). 
,.. See id. 
"" See 22 U.S.CA § 6023(11) (defining person as individual, business entity, and gov-
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if that person knowingly and intentionally -
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, 
manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated 
property, or purchases, leases, receives, pos-
sesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or 
otherwise acquires or holds an interest in 
confiscated property, 
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or 
otherwise benefitting from confiscated proper-
ty, or 
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits 
from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or 
(ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages 
in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or 
(ii)) through another person, without the 
authorization of any United States national 
who holds a claim to the property. !104 
75 
Aside from the mens rea requirement,!!05 that a person must 
both know she is trafficking and intend to do so, there are 
precious few exceptions to this definition. 
Delivering telecommunications signals to Cuba, however, is. 
one exception to trafficking. !106 This exception ensures that per-
sons can communicate with family, friends, and business contacts 
in Cuba and allows for the transmission of American television 
and radio programs to Cuba. 507 This exception includes, of 
course, Radio and Television Marti as discussed in other provi-
sions of the Helms-Burton Act. !!08 
emment). 
""' /d.§ 6023(13)(A). 
,.,. The term "knowingly" is defined as "knowledge or having reason to know." /d. § 
6023(9). The Act does not define "intentionally." 
... See id. § 6023(13)(B)(i)-(ii) (stating that term "traffics" does not include delivery of 
international telecommunications signals to Cuba or trading or holding of securities). 
""' See id. § 6023(13) (B) (i) (stating that term "traffic" does not include delivery of tele-
communication signals to Cuba); see also id. § 6037(a) (directing United States Information 
Agency to convert television broadcasting to Cuba under Television Marti Service) . 
..,. See id. § 6021(7) (observing that Radio and Television Marti have been "effective 
vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and information and have helped 
bolster the morale of the people of Cuba living under tyranny"); id. § 6037 (converting 
Television Marti to ultra high frequency ("UHF') broadcasting so it is accessible to larger 
number of Cubans); id. § 6044 (authorizing President to establish exchange of news bu-
reaus between United States and Cuba if, inter alia, Cuban Government agrees not to in-
terfere with movement in Cuba of journalists working for Radio or Television Marti); id. § 
6065(a) (5) (listing cessation of interference with Radio or Television Marti broadcasts as 
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Holding or trading publicly-traded securities also does not 
constitute trafficking.309 The securities exception is important 
for investors who purchase shares in companies that may traffic 
in confiscated property or who purchase shares in mutual funds 
that, in tum, hold the stocks of such companies. The trafficking 
sanctions are designed to hit the company that traffics in the 
confiscated property, but not the individual investor or mutual 
fund that buys stock in that company. 510 
Transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to 
Cuba are also excluded from the definition of trafficking.m 
This exception makes it logistically possible to travel to Cuba. 
One can hardly expect to stay in Cuba for more than a day 
without taking sufficient funds and a suitcase of appropriate 
personal belongings. It is not clear, however, how far this excep-
tion extends. Would it, for instance, cover a businessperson's 
marketing literature or commercial samples? The exception to 
trafficking also protects innocent Cubans. The Act does not 
deem a Cuban citizen and resident who is not an official in the 
Castro government or Communist Party, but who transacts in or 
uses confiscated property, to be trafficking in such property.512 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the breadth of this defini-
tion means that the reach of the Helms-Burton Act extends far 
beyond U.S. shores. Here lies the heart of the criticism of the 
Helms-Burton Act: it is an illegitimate extraterritorial extension 
of American enforcement jurisdiction. For example, a transac-
tion in confiscated property between a Singaporean and French 
company negotiated, consummated, and performed outside the 
United States, involving no U.S. parties, and completed in a 
currency other than U.S. dollars, is snared by the definition of 
one crirerion for Presidential derermination that government is "transition government in 
Cuba"); see alsojOINf EXPlANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. 
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 49 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 564 (discussing 
conversion of Television Marti to UHF). 
""' See 22 U.S.CA § 6023(13)(B)(i)-(ii) (stating that Jerm "traffics" does not include 
delivery of international Jelecommunications signals to Cuba or trading or holding of secu-
rities). . 
"" See id. § 6023(13)(B)(i) (declaring that lerm "traffic" does not include trading or 
holding securities publicly traded or held, unless Secretary of Treasury delermines person 
trading is specially designaled national). 
511 See id. § 6023(13)(B)(iii). 
"
2 See id. § 6023(13)(B)(iv). 
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"traffic" and is, therefore, subject to sanction. Clause (i) of the 
Act's definition of the term "traffic" makes clear that the trans-
action could take virtually any form, regardless of the label the 
Singaporean and French companies attach to the contract docu-
ments.515 Clause (iii) of the definition denies these companies 
certain defenses: namely, they dealt in confiscated property only 
indirectly, they dealt through another party, or they happened 
to profit from such dealing but did not themselves handle the. 
property. 514 
Indeed, various third parties may be ensnared by clause (iii). 
Suppose the Singaporean company pays the French company 
100 million pounds sterling in the confiscated property transac-
tion by means of a wire transfer through Barclays Bank in Lon-
don. Barclays Bank earns a fee for processing the wire transfer. 
· Subsequently, the Singaporean company deposits profits it earns 
from the confiscated property in National Westminster Bank in 
London. National Westminster earns fees and generates new 
business as a result of handling the Singaporean company's 
account. Are Barclays and National Westminster liable under the 
phrase in clause (iii) that they have participated in, or profited 
from, trafficking by another person? Certainly, if they did so 
"knowingly and intentionally," then an aggressive plaintiff might 
seek to hold them liable. 
Certain terms in the definition of trafficking render its poten-
tial breadth uncertain, thus causing both fear and resentment 
among foreign businesses and governments. The term "commer-
cial activity" in clause (ii) of the definition of trafficking relies 
on a definition of this term set forth in title 28 of the United 
States Code.515 Nevertheless, there may be some ambiguities. 
Would commercial activity include generic advertising or promo-
tion of a business enterprise without express reference to confis-
cated property? Would it include marketing free services, or 
"' See id. § 6023(13)(A)(i). 
'" See id. § 6023(13)(A)(iii). 
515 See id. § 6023(3) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (d), which defines "commercial activ· 
ity" as regular course of business conduct or specific ttansaction or commercial act). The 
definition examines the nature of the conduct, not the purpose of the conduct. See 28 
u.s.c. § 1603(d) (1994). 
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seeking volunteers to provide services? In other words, how spe-
cific must the link be between the action and the confiscated 
property to be considered a commercial activity? 
b. The Problem of Extraterritoriality 
The above hypothetical suggests a loose analogy between the 
anti-trafficking provisions and general time-honored criminal law 
principles. These provisions may be thought of as a global scale 
civil statute against both the receipt of stolen property and laun-
dering the resulting proceeds. The underlying unlawful activity is 
knowing or intentional receipt of suspected stolen property -
stolen by Castro, of course. The derivative unlawful act is any 
knowing or intentional involvement in transactions involving the 
stolen property, which includes laundering profits garnered from 
business dealings using this property. Mter all, the analogous 
criminal law principles are familiar, so the anti-trafficking provi-
sions are consistent with accepted legal concepts.516 
The problem with the broad reach of these Helms-Burton Act 
concepts is the resulting global ramifications. In anticipation of 
the hue and cry from foreign governments, the United States 
defends the extraterritorial reach of the anti-trafficking provi-
sions in the Act itself. The Act provides a private judicial remedy 
to U.S. nationals whose property is wrongfully confiscated by 
foreign nations or their citizens. 517 This defense is adapted al-
"
6 See Malcolm Wilkey, Helms-BuTton: Its Fundamental Basis, Validity, and Practical Effect, 
26 AB.A. INT'L L. NEWS 1, 1 (1997). 
"' See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6081. Congress made the following findings: 
(8) The international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks fully effec-
tive remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for unjust 
enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property by govern-
ments and private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the 
property. 
( 9) International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide fur rules of laW 
with respect to conduct outside its territory that has ur is intended to have substan-
tial effect within its territory. 
(10) The United States Government has an obligation to its citizens to provide 
protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their 
citizens, including the provision of private remedies. 
(11) To deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property, United States na-
tionals who were the victims of these confiscations should be endowed 
with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States that would deny 
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most verbatim from the public international law doctrine of 
extraterritoriality set forth in section 402(1)(c) of the American 
Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United. States. 518 Section 402 (I) (c) provides that a legitimate 
basis of jurisdiction is the effects principle, which holds that "a 
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . con-
duct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substan-
tial effect within its territory." 519 Yet, this statement is an Amer-
ican principle, and not universally accepted.520 Other countries 
resist and resent an aggressive American use of this principle, 
and it raises howls of legal imperialism, perhaps rightfully so. 
2. The Wisdom of Imposing Liability for Trafficking 
Even if the United States can legitimately assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, the wisdom of imposing civil liability for trafficking 
in confiscated property must be questioned on three grounds. 
First, if the ultimate goal of the Helms-Burton Act is to over-
throw Castro, this liability might not facilitate this goal. The 
specter of liability means that potential investors in Cuba could 
never be sure whether a U.S. citizen or an entity incorporated 
in the United States could claim a piece of property.521 There-
fore, the very investors needed to promote the development in 
Cuba of a free market economy and pluralistic democracy "will 
be skittish about making financial commitments." 522 
Second, if other countries were to impose a rule against traf-
ficking in confiscated property, then it might be more difficult 
traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful 
seizures. 
/d. (emphasis added). 
318 See 1 REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1)(c) (1987) . 
... /d. 
..., See id. § 402 cmt d (admitting that "[c]ontroversy has arisen as a result of economic 
regulation by the United States," and that Restatement is taking position in controversy); see 
also IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 308-09 (4th ed. 1990) (dis-
cussing strong reaction from large number of foreign governments to American policies 
concerning extraterritorial enforcement measures). · 
"'' See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 55-56 (1995), reprinJuJ in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 527, 554 
(dissenting views) (discussing uncertainty bill creates regarding foreign property and Amer-
ican investors). · 
... See id. 
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for Americans to protect their overseas investments in countries 
other than Cuba. Suppose a former communist bloc country, 
such as Bulgaria, enacted a liability rule similar to that in the 
Helms-Burton Act. Bulgarians could then sue American investors 
in Bulgarian courts over any investment in a disputed property 
- a property in which a Bulgarian held an ownership claim. As 
a result, "no bilateral property agreement would be safe from 
subsequent litigation." 525 In contrast to imposing liability for 
trafficking, international commercial arbitration under an accept-
ed set of rules and procedures would effectively resolve disputed 
property claims in overseas investments and, thus, avoid an up-
ward spir.il of litigation in individual countries. 
Finally, imposition of liability for trafficking in property confis-
cated in Cuba exalts the claims of former Cuban property own-
ers over the claims of all others who have experienced confisca-
tion in third-party countries. There is absolutely no reason to 
believe "those who lost property in Cuba are more deserving 
than those who lost property in Germany, Eastern Europe, Viet-
nam, or Russia." 524 In brief, the Helms-Burton Act liability pr<r 
vision is unequal justice. 
While the third criticism is theoretically appealing, it is at 
least partly rebutted by two practical facts. First, the United 
States is not trying to overthrow governments in Germany, East-
ern Europe, Vietnam, or Russia. The previous regimes that were 
anathema to U.S. national security interests have long since 
been replaced by governments that, to one degree or another, 
attract political sympathy and economic assistance. 525 In addi-
tion, those persons who lost property in Cuba represent a 
uniquely solid and vocal block of voters, particularly in Florida, 
a state rich with electoral college votes. 526 Certainly a candidate 
... /d. 
524 /d. at 55, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 553. 
,.. See id. at 54-55, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 553 (commenting on painful ttansi-
tion to democracy in Russia and Eastern Europe). 
'
26 See Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War 
Asswment of the Legality and Utility of the Thiny-Fwe Year Old Embargo Agninst Cuba, 28 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 914-15 (1995) (noting that both candidates in 1992 presidential elec-
tion proclaimed support for Cuban Democracy Act in response to block of influential vot-
ers in Florida that appeared to dictate U.S. policy toward Cuba). 
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as politically shrewd as President Clinton was aware of this fact 
when he sought re-election in 1996. 
G. Exclusion from Entry into the United States 
An essential feature of sovereignty is that a nation is able to 
control its borders.827 Logically, the United States has the right 
to exclude any person or class of persons it chooses from entry 
into the ·United States.· In the Helms-Burton Act, the United 
States has chosen to exclude 
any alien who the Secretal}' of State determines is a person 
who, after March 12, 1996-
(1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen 
the confiscation of, property a claim to which 
is owned by a United States national, or con-
verts or has converted for personal gain con-
fiscated property, a claim to which is owned 
by a United States national; 
(2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to 
which is owned by a United States national; 
(3) is a corporate officer, principal, or sharehold-
er with a controlling interest of an entity 
which has been involved in the confiscation 
of property or trafficking in confiscated prop-
erty, a claim to which is owned by a United 
States national; or 
( 4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a per-
sonal excludable under paragraph (I), (2), or 
(3).328 
The exclusion rule is mandatory: subject to three exceptions, the 
U.S. Secretary of State829 must deny an entry visa to anyone in 
the above four categories, and the Attorney General must ex-
clude anyone in these categories from the United States.8so 
'
27 See James A Casey, Sauerrignty l1y Suffnuna: The /Uwion of Indian Tribal Sauemgnty, 79 
CORNELL L REv. 404, 419 (1994) (supporting fundamental notion that sovereignty controls 
borders) . 
... 22 U.S.CA § 6091(a) (West Supp. 1997). For purposes of excluding aliens, the 
tenns "confiscated• and "traffics• are defined in 22 U.S.CA § 6091(b)(1)-(2), respectively. 
These definitions are very similar to the definitions of these tenns quoted and discussed 
earlier. Comptm id. § 6023(4), (13) with id. § 6091(b)(l), (2) (highlighting identical lan-
guage for definitions of tenns "confJSCated• and "traffics•). 
329 See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 555 (dissenting 
views) (stating consular official's actual job is to prevent undesirable persons from obtain-
ing visas) . 
..., See 22 U.S.CA § 6091 (a) (using phrases •shall deny a visa" and "shall exclude" (em-
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Moreover, Congress asserts in the legislative history that this 
exclusion rule is not an idle threat. It "expects the Departments 
of State and Justice to enforce these restrictions vigorously and, 
at the very least, to immediately incorporate [sic] the names of 
all persons known to U.S. embassies and other agencies" who 
come within the categories of excludable persons into "comput-
erized records that are regularly consulted by consular officials 
when issuing visas." 551 
The far-reaching scope and, to critics, the obnoxious nature, 
of the Helms-Burton Act is evident from the third and fourth 
categories of excludable aliens. Consider this hypothetical: a 
woman is an assistant vice president (one of a hundred assistant 
vice presidents) in a Malaysian plantation company involved in a 
joint venture with an Australian agribusiness to cultivate pineap-
ples in Cuba. Her husband is a law professor at the University 
of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, and they have a two-year-old daugh-
ter. In 1960, the Castro regime confiscated the land on which 
the pineapples are now cultivated. The regime seized the land 
from a Cuban who has since escaped to Miami and become a 
U.S. citizen. The acts of trafficking (for example, the export of 
pineapples from the property) occurred after the date of enact-
ment of the Helms-Burton Act. The assistant vice president did 
not choose the property in Cuba where the pineapples grow. 
Rather, other corporate officers in her company were responsi-
ble for site selection as well as for the associated contract negoti-
ations between the Malaysian and Australian companies and the 
Cuban government. Suppose further that the assistant vice presi-
dent and her law professor husband have a twenty-two-year-old 
nephew graduating from the College of William & Mary in 
Williamsburg, Virginia. Accordingly, she and her husband apply 
for a visa to enter the United States and attend the William & 
Mary graduation ceremony. Under clause (3) of the exclusion 
rule, the Malaysian assistant vice president must be denied entry 
into the United States. Under clause (4), her law professor hUs-
band and baby girl must be denied entry into the United States. 
This result is, plainly, obnoxious. The exclusion rule "is so 
phasis added)). 
'" H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 42, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 548. 
1997] Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law 83 
broadly written that it would capture entirely innocent people." 552 
Indeed, because of earlier actions taken by others, the rule may 
punish people who follow all applicable local laws when purchas-
ing property. sss 
To be sure, this criticism is overstated because it implies that 
the exclusion rule create"s strict liability. Regarding the second 
category of excludable aliens, a mens rea requirement exists. 
While the plain language of the exclusion rule does not require 
a person to have engaged in the proscribed conduct in a know-
ing or intentional manner, the definition of the term "traffics" 
contains an intent requirement that is applicable to the exclu-
sion provisions. 554 Because the third category of excludable 
aliens uses the term "trafficking," it also contains the same mens 
rea requirement. Likewise, because the fourth category incorpo-
rates the second and third categories by reference, the fourth 
category contains this requirement insofar as the excluded per-
son is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person listed in the 
second or third categories. Only the first category eschews use of 
the term "traffics," focusing instead on the initial confiscation of 
property. Consequently, as a technical matter, there is no mens 
rea requirement for a person in the first category, or for the 
spouse, minor child, or agent of a person in the first category. 
In practice, however, it is hard to imagine confiscation of prop-
erty that is not knowing or intentional. 
If the hypothetical is altered slightly to involve a Canadian or 
Mexican businessperson, the objectionable result in the above 
hypothetical of the Malaysian businesswoman and her family may 
well violate the North American Free Trade Agreement 
("NAFTA"). The Mexican and Canadian governments could 
argue that the. exclusion rule violates NAFTA which limits the 
restrictions countries can place on business travel.m Here too, 
332 /d. at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 555 (dissenting views) (emphasis added). 
333 See id. . 
"' See 22 U.S.CA § 6091 (b)(2)(A); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 42, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.CAN. at 547 (explaining that alien must "knowingly and intentionally traffic" in 
confiscated property for alien to be excluded). 
335 See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 555 (dissenting 
views). The opponents of the Act argue that the exclusion rule violates NAITA and the 
Uruguay Round Trade Agreement, which allow countries to restrict business travel only for 
public health and national security reasons. 
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the criticism is somewhat overstated. It assumes that U.S. nation-
al security concerns are entirely without merit. 
Critics of the Helms-Burton Act would have fewer provisions 
to attack if Congress had been more judicious in choosing the 
categories of aliens it sought to exclude from the United States. 
Yet the statute sets forth only three grounds for excepting an 
alien from the exclusion rule: when trafficking is ongoing, but 
not new or different from the original trafficking acts that oc-
curred before March 12, 1996, the date of enactment;536 a 
finding by the Secretary of State that the person needs medical 
treatment in the United States;"' or a finding by the Secretary 
of State that the person needs to appear in federal district court 
to answer an accusation of trafficking in confiscated property of 
a U.S. national.sss 
When he signed the Helms-Burton Act, President Clinton 
carved out a fourth exception to the exclusion rule: the Act 
cannot restrict diplomats traveling to the United States or the 
United Nations.!IS9 Curiously, the legislative history to the 
Helms-Burton Act indicates that an alien will not be excluded if 
the Secretary of State finds that admission "is in the national 
interests of the United States." 540 However, nothing in the 
statute's plain language, or even a liberal interpretation of this 
language, supports a national interests exception from the exclu-
sion rule. 
As a practical matter, perhaps the most potent criticism of the 
exclusion rule concerns its enforceability. Critics of the Helms-
Burton Act rightly point out that the exclusion rule complicates 
I d. 
This is not a theoretical concern .... [A]n executive for a Canadian company 
could be barred from entering the United States because his or her company 
had some involvement with confiscated property in the 1960s- perhaps be-
fore the executive was born. The Canadian and Mexican Governments consider 
this provision to be a violation of NAITA, and have said they will initiate dis-
pute-settlement proceedings against the United States if it is enacted. 
..,; See 22 U.S.CA § 6091(d)(2);jOINf ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF TifE COMMITTEE OF 
CONFERENCE, H.R CONF. REP. NO. 104-468, at 66 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 
558, 581. 
"'' See 22 U.S.CA § 6091(c). 
"" See id. 
,.,. See Statement by President of the United States, supra note 168, at 479. 
540 H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 42, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 547-48. 
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the issuance of visas because consular officials will have to make 
visa decisions without the benefit of complete information on 
those confiscated property transactions. 541 The Immigration 
and Naturalization Service ("INS") would have an unbelievably 
complex task to organize a thorough, up-to-date, and secure 
computer database accessible to all U.S. consular officials world-
wide. No doubt Congress had this type of database in mind 
when it enacted the exclusion rule. Even if the database existed, 
the exclusion rule would require U.S. consular officers to ask 
every visa applicant everywhere in the world new questions: 
[The exclusion rule] is not limited to Cuban property issues 
- it applies to property issues worldwide. A consular officer 
will have to ask all visa applicants: 
Have you ever bought property? 
Can you prove that the person you bought it from did not 
confiscate it from someone else? 
Can you prove that the person they bought it from did 
not confiscate it from someone else? 
Are you a principal shareholder in a company that owns 
property? If so where is it, who owned it before, and can 
you prove it wasn't confiscated? 
The questions go on and on. No matter what the answers, 
the consular officer will have no basis for evaluating the in-
formation provided - and no ability to enforce the law. 542 
The criticism that the exclusion rule is unenforceable545 is es-
pecially poignant in light of other, arguably more important; de-
mands on consular and INS officials. Both are overwhelmed by 
the task of stemming the flow of illegal aliens, drug traffickers, 
convicted felons, and terrorists into the United States. 544 At-
tempting· to enforce the Helms-Burton exclusion rule seems an 
imprudent allocation of consular and immigration resources. 
,., See id. at 55, ~nted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 553 (dissenting views) . 
... /d. at 56-57, ~nted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN at 555 (dissenting views) . 
... See id. 
... See id. 
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IV. FIGHTING THE MULIAHS545 AND QADDAFI: 
THE 1996 SANCfiONS Acr 
A. The Purpose of New Sanctions Against Iran and Libya 
National security is the obvious stated purpose behind the 
1996 Sanctions Act.MS As President Clinton summed up when 
signing the legislation, Iran and Libya are "two of the most 
dangerous sponsors of terrorism in the world." 547 Moreover, 
each country is widely reputed to be seeking the acquisition of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The aggressive lan-
guage of the congressional findings in sections 2 and 3 of the 
Act reveals the perceived national security threats with respect to 
Iran and Libya: 
Sec. 2. Findings. 
(1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire weap-
ons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them 
and its support of acts of international terrorism endan-
ger the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States .... 
( 4) The failure of the Government of Libya to comply with 
Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of 
the United Nations, its support of international terror-
ism, and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruc-
tion constitute a threat to international peace and secu-
rity that endangers the national security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States .... 
345 A mullah is an Islamic teacher and religious leader. See WEBSTER'S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICfiONARY 1484 (3d ed. 1993). 
,... Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp. 
1997)). The Department of State has published guidelines on the implementation of the 
Act at 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996). 
The Act is sometimes referred to as the "D'Amato Act," after Senator Alphonse 
D'Amato of New York, who introduced the original bill. Because the entire Act is codified 
as a note to 50 U.S.CA § 1701, references below to provisions in the Act are to the 
sections in the Act as set forth in the note. The legislative history to this Act is contained in 
two House Reports. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1) (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 
1296 (accompanying original version of H.R. 3107); H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11) (1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 1311 (accompanying bill as enacted). In general, these 
House Reports offer few insights beyond what is already obvious from the language of the 
Act. 
"' Gary G. Yerkey, President Clinton Signs into Law Legislation to Punish Fomgn Fmns 
Investing in Iran, Libya, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1273 (Aug. 7, 1996). 
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Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. 
(a) ... The Congress declares that it is the policy of 
the United States to deny Iran the ability to support 
acts of international terrorism and to fund the devel-
opment and acquisition of weapons of mass de-
struction and the means to deliver them by limiting 
the deveLopment of Iran's ability to explore for, extract, 
refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources of 
Iran. 
(b) ; . . The Congress further declares that it is the 
policy of the United States to seek full compliance 
by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions 731, 
748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, including ending all support for acts of inter-
national terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire 
weapons of mass destruction.548 
87 
The highlighted language bespeaks the theory behind the Act. A 
direct connection exists between ( 1) profits earned by the Irani-
an and Libyan governments made possible by foreign investment 
in the development of the petroleum resources549 in these 
countries, and (2) the threat to U.S. national security arising 
from Iranian- and Libyan-sponsored terrorism and their efforts 
to obtain certain weapons. As Undersecretary of State Peter 
Tarnoff testified with respect to the 1996 Sanctions Act, "a 
straight line links Iran's oil income and its ability to sponsor 
terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, and acquire so-
phisticated armaments." 550 In brief, these rogue governments 
use some of their petroleum industry profits to fund terrorist 
activities and buy materials for nuclear, chemical, and biological 
"" 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 3. Decla-
ration of policy) (emphasis added) . 
..,. "Petroleum resources,~ the heart of the target of the sanctions against Iran and 
Libya, refer (somewhat circularly) to "petroleum and natural gas resources." See 50 U.S.CA 
§ 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions). 
"" H.R REP. No. 104-523(1), at 9, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 1298. 
88 University of California, Davis [Vol. 31:1 
weapons. 351 The Act aims to constrict their key funding source 
and thereby constrain their threatening activities. 352 
To apply and enforce these sanctions in support of U.S. na-
tional security interests, the Act carefully defines the terms "act 
of international terrorism," "develop" and "investment." An act 
of international terrorism is an act that (1) is "violent or danger-
ous to human life," (2) violates federal or state criminal laws or 
would violate these laws if committed within federal or state 
jurisdiction, and (3) "appears to be intended" to "intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population," "influence the policy of a govern-
ment by intimidation or coercion," or "affect the conduct of a 
government by assassination or kidnaping." 355 The terms "de-
velop" and "development" are used only in the context of petro-
leum resources and refer to the exploring, extracting, refining, 
or transporting of these resources.554 Investment focuses on 
three specific activities within the petroleum industry undertaken 
after August 5, 1996 (the date of enactment), under an agree-
ment with the governments in Iran or Libya. These three invest-
ment activities are: developing Iranian or Libyan petroleum 
resources, or guaranteeing another person's agreement to devel-
op these resources; acquiring an equity interest (i.e., buying 
shares) in the development of Iranian or Libyan petroleum 
resources; and receiving royalties, earnings, or profits from the 
development of Iranian or Libyan petroleum resources. 555 The 
definition of "investment" is further qualified because it does 
not include any agreement to buy or sell goods, services, or 
technology.556 However, this qualification is confusing because 
it may conflict with one of the aforementioned three investment 
301 See genero.Uy Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., Differentiated Containment, 76 FOREIGN AFF., 
May-June 1997, at 20, 27. It is worth underscoring the breadth of Mnational security" con-
cerns encompassed by the Act. Two prominent former national security advisors, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, argue the Act should focus more narrowly on the quest for 
nuclear weapons capability, which is M[t]he single most worrisome aspect of Iran's behav-
ior." ld.; see also Edward Mortimer, The Satanic Dialogue, FIN. TIMEs, May 21, 1997, at 28 
(stating that Iran is attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear 
bombs and long-range missiles). 
302 See H.R REP. No. 104-523(1), at 13-14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1302-03. 
,., See 50 U.S.CA. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions) . 
... See id. 
... See id. 
... See id. 
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activities. For example, suppose a company develops the Iranian 
petroleum industry by selling drilling equipment to the govern-
ment of Iran. The qualification suggests the sale is not an invest-
ment. 
As with the other two Acts discussed in this Article, the stated 
purpose of the 1996 Sanctions Act is to safeguard national secu-
rity. However, it is less obvious why Congress and President 
Clinton enacted new sanctions against Iran and Libya. Pursuant 
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 
("IEEPA"), the United States already has a trade embargo 
against Iran and Libya. ss? Why enact another statute? Given 
existing embargoes, what types of novel sanctions could possibly 
exist, and what purposes could any further sanctions possibly 
serve? 
One answer to these questions is that the 1996 Sanctions Act 
is a secondary boycott, whereas IEEPA trade embargo is a prima-
ry boycott. IEEPA trade embargo imposed against Iran and Lib-
ya is a primary boycott because the United States forbids U.S. 
citizens from importing goods or services from, or exporting 
goods or services to, the target countries. The essential nature of 
a primary boycott is that it is an act of self-restraint by the boy-
cotting country and concerns only the boycotting country and 
the target country.558 
A secondary boycott involves not only the boycotting and 
target countries, but also third-party countries. A secondary boy-
cott attempts to limit the extent of economic dealings of third-
party countries with the target country.ss9 The 1996 Sanctions 
Act not only reinforces America's primary boycott but, more 
importantly, imposes a secondary boycott against Iran and Libya. 
It levies penalties against U.S. and non-U.S. citizens and busi-
nesses alike that invest in the Iranian and Libyan petroleum 
industries. Like the Helms-Burton Act, the 1996 Sanctions Act 
also contains a secondary boycott measure that bars U.S. and 
'
57 See Pub. L No. 9~223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 
(1994)). For a discussion of IEEPA and the Iranian and Libyan embargoes, see HOUSE 
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPIU\TION OF U.S. TRADE STAT-
UTES 167-70 (Comm. Print 1997). 
"" See Barbara]. Anderson, Sectmdary Boycotts and the First Amendment, 51 U. CHI. L REv. 
811, 811-15 (1984) (elaborating on use and effectiveness of secondary boycotts) . 
... See id. 
90 University of California, Davis [Vol. 31:1 
non-U.S. persons from trafficking in confiscated property and 
denies entry into the United States to non-U.S. persons engaged 
in trafficking. 
This economic distinction between primary and secondary 
boycotts is evident from a petroleum development transaction 
involving Conoco, Inc., an American oil company, Total S.A., a 
French oil giant, and Iran. In early 1995, Conoco reportedly 
initialed a $1 billion contract with Iran to develop oil fields 
around Iran's Sirri Island. In response, President Clinton in-
voked IEEPA to prohibit U.S. persons from financing, managing, 
or supervising the development of Iran's petroleum resourc-
es.360 This response was a primary boycott and it successfully 
forced Conoco to withdraw from the contract.561 However, to 
the dismay of Congress and Clinton Administration officials, 
Total SA picked up Conoco's abandoned contract, agreeing to 
develop the Sirri Island oil fields in a $600 million contract. 562 
In enacting a secondary boycott against Iran and Libya, Con-
gress sought to discourage such opportunistic behavior in disre-
gard of U.S. national security concerns. 
In addition to implementing a secondary boycott, the second 
reason Congress passed the 1996 Sanctions Act was to respond 
to two incidents involving terrorists allegedly supported by Iran 
and Libya. The first incident was the July 1996 explosion of a 
Trans World Airlines Boeing 747 jetliner flying from New York 
to Paris which killed all 230 passengers and crew. Despite con-
siderable speculation that a terrorist bomb caused the explo-
sion,56s to date there is no evidence to suggest terrorist involve-
ment . 
... See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995). 
,., See Bushan Bahree, Total of Frana Takes Iran Deal, Ignoring U.S., WALL ST. J. EUR., 
July 14, 1995, at 3 . 
... See H.R. REP. No. 104523(1), at 9-11 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 1296, 
1298-1300; Gary G. Yerkey, EU Files Frmnal Protest with U.S. Over lAw Penaliz.ing Foreign Firms 
with Tia to Iran, Libya, 13 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1315, 1316 (Aug. 14, 1996) . 
.., See Nancy Dunne & Robert Corzine, Politics Sets Tone for Trade BanieTs, FIN. TIMES, 
July 25, 1996, at 4 (noting widespread suspicion in United States that terrorist bomb, possi-
bly oflranian or Middle Eastern origin, involved in 1WAjetliner explosion); Laurie Lande, 
Congress Seeks End to Libya, Iran Ties by Foreign Fmns, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1996, at A16 (ob-
serving that congressional fears about terrorism increased following 1WA explosion, and 
authorities investigated whether terrorists may have caused crash). 
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In retrospect, Congress may have overreacted to the incident. 
Indeed, a Financial Times editorial obsetved that "U.S. assertions 
about Iran's role in· terrorism remain unproven."S64 The &ono-
mist intoned that while Iran is the prime suspect when interna-
tional terrorism is directed· against American interests, evidence 
has yet to be produced.!!& The United States' suspicions re-
garding Iran's part in terrorism remain unproven.S66 In brief, 
the Iranian government may be nasty, but our trading partners 
do not believe that it is the godfather of international terrorism. 
To be sure, article XXI(a) of GATT does not require a WTO 
Member to divulge information that would compromise its 
essential national security interests.367 As the Financial Times 
suggests, however, the United States must prove at least a prima 
facie c~e if it expects its European allies to sign on to the sec-
ondary boycott.!l68 
A second incident that apparently provoked congressional 
reaction was the June 1996 bombing of a Saudi Arabian apart-
ment building that housed U.S. military personnel.369 The 
bombing killed nineteen American service personnel, and it was 
widely thought that Iranian terrorists orchestrated the inci-
dent. 370 Once again, no credible evidence of Iranian involve-
ment exists. To the contrary, the perpetrators may well have 
been Saudi dissidents. 371 
!64 Handling Iran, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at 17. 
,.. See Handling Iran: The West Has to Find Something Mure than LectuTtJ but Less than &(}-
nomic Sanctions, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1996, at 17 (stating that Iran is prime suspect behind 
terrorism). 
566 See Handling Iran, supra note 364, at 17 (asserting that while Iran has participated in 
terrorism in past, United States cannot prove that Iran is engaged in terrorism at present). 
""' See GAIT arL XXI(a). 
068 See Handling Iran, supra note 364, at 17 (stating that United States's assertions of 
Iran's terrorism remain unproven). 
,.. See Bruce Clark, U.S. split on Huw to Handle Iran, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at 8 (re-
porting details about bombings). . 
'
70 See id. (reporting that Iranian terrorists were suspected behind bombing). 
. "' · See M.E. Ahrari & Brigid Starkey, Polarity and Stability in the Post-Cold War Persian Gulf, 
21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 133, 144 (1997) (discussing Saudi government crackdown on 
Shi'i opposition to majority rule following November 1995 and June 1996 bombing inci-
dents in Saudi Arabia). 
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B. Questioning the Wisdom of New Sanctions Against Iran and Libya 
Similar to the Helms-Burton Act, many of America's closest 
military allies and most significant trading partners condemn the 
1996 Sanctions Act precisely because it is a unilateral effort at a 
secondary boycott 572 In their eyes, a secondary boycott gives 
the sanctions an unwarranted, perhaps illegal, extraterritorial ef-
fect.575 Put bluntly, critics of the Act see it as a U.S. attempt to 
bully others into complying with a unilaterally-imposed sanctions 
regime.574 Worse yet, the American secondary boycott is quite 
rightly viewed as hypocritical. The United States balked at the 
Arab countries' attempt to enforce a secondary boycott of Israel; 
indeed, the United States enacted blocking legislation making it 
illegal to comply with the boycott575 Now, however, the United 
States expects compliance with its secondary boycott of Iran and 
Libya. Finally, critics note that the secondary boycott is an anti-
American flag around which Iranian mullahs and Colonel 
Muammar Qaddafi can rally their people,576 as Castro has at-
tempted to do vis-a-vis the Helms-Burton Act.577 Thus, ironical-
ly, the boycott may reinforce the very behavior of the Iranian 
and Libyan govemments that the United States seeks to alter. 
These criticisms raise the practical problem of the efficacy of 
the Act: can it achieve its stated purpose of safeguarding nation-
al security, given intense opposition from America's friends? Two 
572 See Canada Criticizes U.S. /ran-Libya Law as Unsuppurtable E:ctraterritority, 13 lnt'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1316, 1316-17 (Aug. 14, 1996) (reporting EU condemnation of 1996 
Sanctions Act); Yerkey, supra note 362, at 131&.16 (reporting Canadian displeasure with 
Act). 
m See Canada Criticizes U.S. /ran-Libya Law as Unsuppurtable E:ctraterritority, supra note 
372, at 1316-17 (reporting on Canadian and EU challenge to extraterritorial imposition of 
trade policy) . 
574 See id. (relaying European Trade Commissioner's comment that Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 allows one country to dictate foreign policy of other countries). 
575 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (highlighting U.S. legislation in response to 
Arab League secondary boycott of Israel). 
576 See, e.g., Roula Khalaf, U.S. Sanctions Afll GadafF s Gf!latest Fear. Thf!lats to Oil Shales 
Worry the Libyan Leader and Help Him Manipulate opinilm at HOflll!, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996, 
at 4 (noting that sanctions are convenient tool for Qaddafi and have perverse effect of 
bolstering Libyan leader and reinforcing deep resentment of United States). 
577 See U.S. Bids to Help Fund Democracy in Cuba, CARiuBF.AN UPDATE, Mar. 1, 1997 
(reporting Castro referring to HelrrurBurton Act as attempt to enslave Cubans). 
1997] Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law 93 
Congressmen, who voted in favor of the 1996 Sanctions Act, 
neatly summarize the argument that a unilaterally-imposed sec-
ondary boycott cannot work: 
[W]e are concerned that the bill [H.R 3107, ·the initial ver-
sion of the Act] could be counterproductive to the goal of 
increasing multilateral economic and political pressure on 
Iran. 
The sanctions in the bill will penalize foreign firms for 
commercial activity which, though objectionable to us, is legal 
in their home countries. We understand that other govern-
ments are likely to charge that the bill's import and govern-
ment procurement sanctions, at a minimum, violate trade and 
other international agreements to which the United States is 
a party. 
[O]ther governments have already notified us that they 
object to these measures on sovereignty grounds. Past experi-
ence suggests they will take blocking measures. Retaliatory 
measures against U.S. trade, perhaps authorized by interna-
tional adjudicatory bodies, are also possible. 
Our concern here is not that we may offend our allies, for 
we object to their unwillingness to adopt tougher measures to 
isolate Iran [and Libya] economically and politically. Our 
concern is more practical: The United States cannot ade-
quately pressure Iran's. [or Libya's] economy alone. A strong 
adverse reaction by other governments to a U.S. effort to 
penalize their firms will put us at odds with some of our 
closest friends. That could ultimately reduce, rather than 
increase, multilateral cooperation on Iran [and Libya]. 
We believe recent history is instructive. Western efforts to 
confront another dangerous country - the former Soviet 
Union -were set back in 1982 when the United States tried 
to sanction firms participating in the development of a Soviet 
gas pipeline. 
The target of U.S. pressure in 1982 was subsidiaries of U.S. 
firms, yet the reaction in Europe was intense. And U.S. sanc-
tions did not achieve their goal: the sanctions were not sus-
tainable, and the United States ultimately had to lift them. 
The bill before us today would hit foreign firms. We can 
expect at least as strong a response.578 
318 Additional Vzews of the Hmwrable Lee H. Hamillon and the Hmwrable james P. Moran, in 
H.R REP. No. 104-523(1), at 20 (1996), Ttflrinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 1296, 1309; see also 
Toby Roth, New Iranian-Libyan Sanctions WzU Only Hurt U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1996, at 
A14 (arguing that Act will isolate United States from other governments whose help United 
States needs to contain threats from Iran and Libya). 
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Of course, the force motivating some of the critics, particularly 
those in Europe, is economic self-interest. As a European Com-
mission spokesperson admitted, "Europe is energy dependent on 
these nations [Iran and Libya]" and "can't afford to seriously 
hurt our economies because of a [sanctions] strategy that hasn't 
proved to be effective."s79 Iran and Libya supply more than 
20% of the European Union's oil and gas.!ISO Iran is particular-
ly vital as the world's third largest exporter of oil.ss1 Business 
ties between Iran and Germany are close. Iran's leading trading 
partner is Germany, with roughly 170 German companies, in-
cluding Siemens AG and Mannesmann AG, doing business in 
Iran, and Iranian govemmental and private entities owing rough-
ly $8.8 billion to German businesses. ss2 
Despite these economic facts about Iran, as a tactical matter, 
the 1996 Sanctions Act might have been less controversial in 
Europe if it had omitted Libya. Ties between Europe and Libya, 
especially in the petroleum resource industry, are closer than 
between Europe and Iran. sss The only European oil company 
to have significant direct investments in Iran's petroleum re-
source industry is Total.!l84 
Moreover, as of this writing, only Total has challenged the 
Act. In September 1997, Total and its two consortium partners 
- Malaysia's Petronas and Russia's Gazprom - signed a con-
tract with the National Iranian Oil Company. The contract calls 
for the consortium to invest $2 billion to develop part of the 
South Pars natural gas field, located near Iran's maritime border 
with Qatar.ss5 Production is scheduled to start in 200l.S86 The 
'"' Laurie Lande, Congress Seeks End to Libya, Iran Ties fly Foreign Firms, WALL ST. J., July 
24, 1996, at A16. 
""' See Gary G. Yerkey, President Clinton Signs into Law Legislation to Punish Fureign Firms 
Investing in Iran, Libya, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1273, 1274 (Aug. 7, 1996). 
381 See Bruce Clark, U.S. Applauds European Stand on Iran, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at 3. 
'"' See Trading with Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at A12; Greg Steinmetz, EU 
Unlikely to Impose Embargo on Iran, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1997, at A2 (elaborating upon Ira-
nian debt to German companies). 
'"' See Libya's Trans-National Oil System Keeps Expanding, APS REv. DOWNSTREAM TRENDS, 
Aug. 18, 1997, at 4 (reporting on Europe's extensive involvement and investment in Libya). 
'"' See Clark, supra note 381, at 3. 
""' See David Owen & Guy de Jonquie'res, Total to Defj U.S. with $2bn Deal to Develop Iran 
Gas, FIN. nMES, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1. 
... See id. 
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Clinton Administration has threatened to impose sanctions on 
Total under the Act, but France has warned of serious conse-
quences, and the EU has said it will resurrect its complaint in 
the WfO against the Helms-Burton Act if sanctions are im-
posed.587 Quite possibly, the United States will waive sanctions 
if France takes a tougher stance against Iran with respect to 
terrorism and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The 
Total contract should not surprise the Clinton Administration. 
Iran has 15% of the world's proven natural gas reseiVes, second 
only to Russia's reseiVes; thus, foreign companies are anxious to 
develop Iran's reseiVes.588 Further, as the Financial Times point-
ed out, "Total is fast developing a reputation for targeting out-
put from 'outlaw' countries such as Iraq, Libya and Burma -
although [Total] chairman Thierry Desmarest has claimed it is 
just that 'the Lord put the reseiVes in places that are a bit hot 
on political grounds."' 589 
In contrast to the more modest dealings in Iran, several Euro-
pean companies in addition to Total, such as Agip of Italy, 
Repsol of Spain, OMV of Austria, Petrofina of Belgium, . and 
Lasmo of the U.K., either have dealings in Libya's industry or 
have explored Libya's potential reseiVes.890 For Italy in particu-
lar, participating in a secondary boycott of Libya's petroleum re-
source industry would be impossible in the short- or medium-
term because Italy buys 30% of its oil from Libya. 891 Thus, not-
withstanding the Total deal, the 1996 Sanctions Act might have 
been more favorably received in Europe if the Act had omitted 
Libya. 
Leaving Libya out of the Act might also have been in the 
long-term strategic interest of the United States. At present, the 
principal U.S. access to Caspian Sea oil is through Russia.892 
587 See Gerard Baker et al., U.S. Attacks Totals $2bn Iran Deal, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, 
at 1. 
588 See Virginia Marsh, Other Investors Watch and Wait, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at 9. 
389 See Owen & de Jonquie'res, supra note 385, at 1. 
..., See Corzine & Dunne, supra note 363, at 4 (revealing oil companies involved in Lib-
ya). 
"' See Lorraine WoeUert, AUies Complain of "ChiUing Effect, "WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996, 
at AI. 
392 See Robert D. Kaplan, Why the U.S. and Iran Will Be Friends Agnin, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
10, 1997, at A18. 
96 University of California, Davis [Vol. 31:1 
However, Russia has yet to demonstrate it will be a stable demo-
cratic market economy. Iran could provide non-Russian access to 
Caspian sea oil. If Islamic extremists overtook Saudi Arabia, the 
importance of such an alternate access route would increase. 
The Act, however, is not uniformly unilateral in nature. It 
"urges" the President to undertake diplomatic efforts both in 
international fora such as the United Nations and bilaterally 
with U.S. allies "to establish a multilateral sanctions regime 
against Iran," limiting the development of its petroleum resourc-
es and thereby inhibiting its efforts to sponsor acts of interna-
tional terrorism.595 Curiously, there is no comparable provision 
in the Act concerning Libya. The President must report periodi-
cally to Congress regarding the results of these diplomatic ef-
forts.594 The President must also list the countries that have 
and have not agreed to undertake sanctions measures against 
Iran.595 
There is a possible link between diplomatic efforts to establish 
a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran and the unilateral 
sanctions imposed by the United States. The President may 
waive the investment trigger sanction against Iran if a country 
"has agreed to undertake substantial measures, including economic 
sanctions" that will undermine Iran's efforts to support interna-
tional terrorism. 596 Neither the Act nor the legislative history 
explains what constitutes substantial measures. It is a matter left 
to presidential discretion.597 However, substantial measures 
would conceivably include participation in a multilateral sanc-
tions regime arranged as a result of the President's diplomatic 
""' 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multi-
lateral regime) . 
... See id. 
... See id. The President must report to Congress 90 days after August 5, 1996 on wheth-
er and extent to which EU, Korea, Australia, Israel, and japan have imposed sanctions on 
Iran and libya, and the disposition of any GAlT or wro panel decision on such sanc-
tions. See id. Additionally, the President must report to Congress on, inter alia, his efforts to 
persuade other count:nes to pressure Iran ~ (1) cease its support for international terror-
ism and its attempts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and (2) with-
draw diplomats who participated in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. See 
id. (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 10. Reports required). 
396 See id. (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multilateral regime) (emphasis added). The 
President must notifY Congress of the waiver at least 30 days before the waiver takes effecL 
Seeid. 
.., See id. 
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efforts. m If so, then the nationals - the individuals and busi-
nesses from that country - participating in the regime would 
also be eligible for a sanctions waiver. It clearly would be unrea-
sonable for the Act to target nationals in the secondary boycott 
of Iran when their country is participating in multilateral sanc-
tions against Iran. Conversely, an enhanced sanction must be 
imposed on nationals of a country that does not qualify for a 
sanctions waiver. Thus, the failure of a country to participate in 
a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran could cause its na-
tionals to bear a double burden: the denial of a sanctions waiver 
and the imposition of an enhanced sanction. 
In fairness to supporters of new sanctions against Iran and 
Libya, the European governments' passive reaction to terrorism 
is sometimes maddening. In 1992, four Kurdish opposition lead-
ers were killed in a Berlin restaurant named Mykonos.599 In 
April 1997, a Berlin court convicted four perpetrators of the 
Mykonos assassinations.400 In the verdict, Judge Frithjof Kubsch 
declared: "The Iranian political leadership is responsible," 401 
and specifically identified Mr. Ali Fallahian, Iran's chief of for-
eign intelligence, as orchestrating the Mykonos murders.402 Fol-
..,. See id. (stating-that Congress urges President to use diplomatic efforts to establish 
multilateral sanction regime) . 
.,. See EU Igrwm U.S. Request to Take Economic Measum Agninst Iran, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 787, 787 (Apr. 30, 1997) (reporting that German court found Iranian government 
officials conspired to kill four Kurdish opposition leaders). For media accounts of the case 
and its aftermath, see EU Suspends •critical Dialogue• with Iran; Ending Ties Is Weighed, Dutch 
OJJicial Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 706, 706 (Apr. 16, 1997) (asserting that EU sus-
pended dialogue with Iran as result of Iranian authorities' link with assassination of 
Kurdish leaders); Frederick Studemann & Lionel Barber, EU Adopts Toogher Attitude over 
Iran, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1997, at 1 (reporting that United States welcomed Berlin court's 
conviction of Iranian authorities); Frederick Studemann, Germany Puts Dialogue with Iran on 
Hold, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at 5 (declaring that suspension of dialogue with Iran is 
dramatic twist in Germany's foreign policy). 
400 See Robin Allen, Khatami Set to Take Reins in Iran, FIN. TIMES, Aug: 2, 1997, at 2 (re-
porting on convictions). 
401 Greg Steinmetz, Ruling im Killing spurs EU to Curo Links with Iran, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 
11, 1997, at All. 
402 See Allen, supra note 400, at 2; Kurdish opposition Radio Welcomes German Arnst War-
rant fur Minister (BBC radio broadcast, Mar. 20, 1996) (discussing Fallahian's indictment for 
orchestrating bombings of Mykonos cafe in Berlin). Amazingly, Mr. Fallahian visited Bonn 
in October 1993 at the official invitation of Mr. Bernd Schmidbauer, the security advisor to 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and even toured the Munich offices of Germany's intelligence 
services. Later, on March 18, 1996, he was indicted by German prosecutors for having mas-
terminded the murders. He has yet to stand trial on the charge. See Philip Golup, Berlin 
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lowing this verdict, the EU suspended its policy of "critical dia-
log" with Iran, and all EU members (except Greece) recalled 
their ambassadors from Tehran.4011 However, not one European 
country enacted trade sanctions.404 
C. Six New Sanctions 
Because it attacks terrorist activities by limiting the available 
profits that fund such activities, the sanction mechanism in the 
1996 Sanctions Act is predictable. The Act seeks to bar new 
· investment in the Iranian and Libyan petroleum industries above 
. a certain threshold. The Act lays out six specific sanction mea-
sures.405 The President is required to impose two or more of 
these measures on an individual or "sanctioned person" who 
violates the Act. 406 
First, the President may direct the U.S. Export-Import Bank to 
deny approval of any guarantee, extension of credit, or insur-
ance in connection with the export of goods or services to a 
sanctioned person. 407 Second, the President may decline to is-
sue a required license to allow the export of sensitive goods or 
technology to a sanctioned person.408 Third, the President may 
prohibit any U.S. financial institution - either a commercial or 
investment bank or an insurance company409 - from lending 
or providing credits in excess of $10 million in a twelve-month 
period to a sanctioned person unless the funding is to support 
humanitarian activities. 410 
The fourth type of sanction is relevant only if the sanctioned 
person is a financial institution. The sanctioned financial institu-
tion may not be allowed to serve as a repository of U.S. govern-
Courl Ruling Puts EU s 'Critical I>ialtJgue with Iran at JUsk, AsiA TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 9. 
"" See John Lancaster, New Iranian Regime, Arab Neighlxm Shaw Signs of Easing Tense Re/a. 
tions, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1997, at A15; Philip Golup, supra note 402, at 9. 
404 For an excellent discussion of the strains Iran places on the relationship between 
the United States and Germany, see generally Charles Lane, Germany's New Ostpolitik, 74 
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 77 . 
..,. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 6 
Description of Sanctions). 
406 See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions). 
"" See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 6. Description of sanctions). 
408 See id. 
409 See id. (defining "financial institution"). 
410 See id. 
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ment funds - it cannot maintain Treasury tax and loan ac-
counts into which tax revenues are deposited and maintained on 
behalf of the U.S. govemment.411 The Federal Reserve may al-
so disqualify the institution as a primary dealer in U.S. govern-
ment debt instruments; the disqualification means the institution 
cannot participate directly in open market transactions in Trea-
sury bills, notes, and bonds, held through the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York.412 
The fifth sanction applies only to persons that are or seek to 
be U.S. government contractors. The President may bar the U.S. 
government from procuring goods or services from the sanc-
tioned person.415 If the President chooses to impose this sanc-
tion, then the Act requires him to abide by the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Government Procurement. In practice, this means 
that the President will eschew imposing sanctions on "eligible 
products," defined according to the Agreement in U.S. law.414 
Finally, the President may restrict imports from the sanctioned 
person into the United States. In doing so, the President must 
act in accordance with the powers set forth in IEEP A. 415 
Does the differential impact that particular sanctions might 
have suggest a disparity between the aggressive · rhetoric sur-
rounding the Act's purpose and the strength of the Act's mea-
sures used to combat terrorism and its supporters? Given the 
411 See id. 
"' See id. If a financial institution loses its authority to hold Treasury tax and loan 
accounts and its primary dealer status, then for purposes of the President's imposing two 
or more of the six sanctions the financial institution has received not one but two sanc-
tions. A curious point about this fourth sanction is the relationship between the President 
and the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is an independent agency of the U.S. 
government and, in general, does not take orders from the executive branch. See Bernard 
Schwartz, A Decade of Administrntive Law, 32 TulSA LJ. 493, 496 (1997). Yet presumably 
Congress intended the possibility that the President might order the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to deny designation 
to, or revoke the prior designation of, a financial institution as a primary dealer. Surely 
Congress would not have wanted to see the Federal Reserve thwart a sanction the President 
thought appropriate in the interests of national security. 
"' See id. (stating that United States cannot procure goods or services from sanctioned 
person). 
"' See 19 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1994) (listing eligible products pursuant to Agreement); 
H.R REP. No. 104-523(11), at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1316. 
"' See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 6. Description of 
sanctions) (stating that President may act under International Emergency Economic Power 
Act to restrict imports). 
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strong rhetoric, Congress probably did not foresee a limp-wristed 
set of sanctions. To the contrary, it must be inferred that Con-
gress provided the President with discretion to choose two or 
more sanctions so that the President could exploit, or not ex-
ploit, the vulnerabilities unique to a sanctioned person. 
For a large number of companies, the fifth and sixth sanc-
tions are potentially draconian. Designating a company as ineligi-
ble to receive U.S. government procurement contracts or bar-
ring its exports from the U.S. market could cause irreparable 
harm to the company. At the same time, the six sanctions are 
not equally fearsome in every case. For example, a sanctioned 
company might rely on Japanese or European banks for most of 
its funding. Thus, barring U.S. banks from extending credit to 
the company would have little effect on its activities developing 
Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources. Even a company that 
obtains most of its funding from U.S. banks may be able to 
substitute lenders and rely on Japanese or European financing. 
If this substitution occurs with little or no increase in the 
sanctioned company's cost of funds, then the sanction ends up 
hurting only the former U.S. bank lenders who involuntarily 
surrendered the company's business. 
Conversely, because buying and reselling Treasury securities 
can be highly profitable, a sanctioned financial institution that is 
a primary dealer in U.S. government securities could be serious-
ly damaged if the Federal Reserve revoked its primary dealer 
status. As another example, a sanctioned company may rely on a 
U.S. government license to export sensitive high-technology 
equipment to China for the majority of its revenues. Failure to 
receive the requisite export clearance could mean the company 
would go bankrupt if it could not obtain the equipment from a 
non-U.S. source. Accordingly, the President could punish this 
person revoking its lucrative status. It seems implicit in the Act 
that Congress expects the President to investigate thoroughly the 
business situation of a particular person and then choose the 
most appropriate mix of sanctions. · 
Because of the potentially serious damage that sanctions can 
cause, perhaps the most important practice point about the 
1996 Sanctions Act is that clients may seek and rely upon official 
guidance. The Act invites companies to seek an advisory opinion 
from the Secretary of State as to whether a proposed transaction 
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would run afoul of the Act and thereby subject the transactor to 
liability.416 A company relying in good faith on a Secretary of 
State's advisory opinion that determined the proposed transac-
tion to be lawful is free to engage in the transaction and is 
immune from sanctions.417 Of course, the company should take 
care not to deviate in practice from the terms of the transaction 
that it presented to the Secretary of State and which the Secre-
tary approved. 
D. The Long Extraterritorial Reach of the Sanctions 
The secondary boycott imposed by the 1996 Sanctions Act 
against Iran applies to "any person." This term is defined as any 
individual, corporation, partnership, other. business entity, or 
successor entity418 that the President determines has carried 
out one . of several prohibited activities. 419 The word "any" is 
particularly noteworthy, because it implicates non-U.S. pe:rSons, 
thus rendering as extraterritorial the potential scope of the 
secondary boycott sa.11ctions under the Act. 
The extraterritorial scope of the . sanctions is even wider be-
cause of two conditions. First, sanctions may be imposed on a 
parent or subsidiary of a person if the parent or subsidiary en-
gages in a prohibited transaction with actual knowledge.420 Sec-
ond, sanctions may be imposed on an affiliate of a person who 
is controlled in fact by that person and engages in a prohibited 
activity with actual knowledge.421 Thus, the 1996 Sanctions Act 
416 See id. (Iran and libya sanctions, Sec. 7. Advisory opinions). 
417 See id. (stating that those who rely on advisory opinions will not be subject to 
sanctions). With respect to investments in Iran, seeking advice is particularly importanL 
Even though section 5(e) of the Act requires the President to publish in the Federal Register 
a list of all significant publicly tendered Iranian oil and gas projects, "the fact that a project 
does not appear on the list does not indicate that the project is immune from or, ... any 
less vulnerable to, sanction .... • H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 15, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.CAN. at 1317. 
••• See 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions) 
(defining parties to whom Act applies). 
419 See id. (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions). 
420 See id. 
421 See id. The Department of Sta~ guidelines on the implementation of the Act clarify 
that for corporate parents, "engages in" refers to the facilitation and authorization of entry 
into a prohibited contracL For subsidiaries, it refers to actual participation in the 
implementation of the contracL See Additional Information for the Iran and libya 
Sanctions Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067, 66,068 (1996) (defining sanctions on subsidiaries for 
102 University of California, Davis [Vol. 31:1 
is an excellent example, along with the Helms-Burton Act, of 
the long reach of America's claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over unilateral trade actions. 422 
The only caveat to sanctioning the parent and subsidiary is 
the mens rea requirement of actual knowledge.423 The only 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act). 
422 To underscore why this long reach is dramatic and controversial, consider the 
following example. Assume a French corporation, which has a Dutch subsidiary, is owned 
by a holding company incorporated in Bermuda. The holding company, which is a shell 
and in fact is controlled by senior managers of the French corporation, also owns a 
company incorporated in Indonesia. The Indonesian company, in tum, owns a company 
incorporated in Singapore. 
Like the Bermuda holding company, the Indonesian and Singaporean companies are 
controlled in fact by the French corporation. No Americans work for any of the companies. 
Accordingly, the organizational structure is as follows: 
Bermuda Holding Company 
(Parent of French Corporation) 
French Subsidiary 
Corporation 
(Masterminds the 
prohibited activity) 
Dutch Corporation 
(Subsidiary of the 
French Corporation) 
Indonesian Subsidiary 
Corporation 
(Affiliate of the 
French Corporation) 
Singaporean 
Corporation 
(Affiliate of the 
French Corporation) 
Assume the French company engages in a prohibited activity. It masterminds the operation 
and, thus, is sanctioned under the Act. Assume further that all of the other entities 
participate in the prohibited activity, though some in minor respects, with actual 
knowledge. Because they are affiliates of, and controlled in fact by, the French corporation, 
the Indonesian and Singaporean companies also are sanctioned. As the parent of the 
French corporation, the Bermuda holding company is sanctioned. As the subsidiary of the 
French corporation, the Dutch corporation is sanctioned. The names of all of these 
sanctioned entities will be published in the Federal Register. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note 
(Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions) (stating that President requests 
Federal Register to publish names of those sanctioned). 
423 See Marc. C. Hebert, Unilateralism as a Defense Mechanism: An Overview of the Iran and 
Libyan Sanctions Act of 1996, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1997) (proposing knowledge 
that investment enhances development of resources, rather than knowledge that 
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caveat to sanctioning the other affiliates is the mens rea require-
ment plus the control-in-fact requirement.424 In many cases 
arising under the 1996 Sanctions Act, it will be difficult for U.S. 
authorities to satisfy these requirements. Moreover, it is not clear 
whether a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate can have actual knowl-
edge imputed to it if different officials in the parent, subsidiary, 
or affiliate had partial knowledge but no single official had a 
"bird's eye" view of the entire operation. Nor is it clear whether 
a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate can have actual knowledge if it 
is willfully blind to the engagement in the prohibited activi-
ty.425 Despite these uncertainties, however, the possibility of 
sanctions is real and, therefore, it is quite appropriate that for-
eign corporations and their governments are concerned about 
the long arm of the Act. 
E. The Investment Trigger Against Iran 
Several types of transactions will trigger U.S. imposition of two 
or more of the above-discussed sanctions. The 1996 Sanctions 
Act spells out one prohibited direct foreign investment. transac-
tion. The transaction entails (1) an investment worth $40 mil-
lion or more, (2) made on or after August 5, 1996 (the date of 
enactment), (3) with actual knowledge, where ( 4) the invest-
ment "directly and significantly" contributes to the enhancement 
of Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources.426 Engaging 
in this activity triggers sanctions that, absent a waiver, must be 
imposed. 
Examples of direct foreign investment transactions that proba-
bly would violate the Act follow from the definition of "invest-
ment." 427 This definition identifies three categories of illegal 
transactions. The first category covers entry into a contract to 
investment violates Act, is necessary for sanctions) . 
... See id. 
"" There is substantial case law on money laundering regarding both of these 
uncertainties, and possibly U.S. authorities or corporate counsel might seek to analogize to 
this law. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(holding aggregate knowledge of corporate components constitutes corporation's total 
knowledge of particular operation). 
426 See 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Ubya Sanctions, Sec. 5. 
Imposition of sanctions). 
427 See id. (Iran and Ubya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions) (defining "investment"). 
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take responsibility for developing Iranian petroleum resources, 
or a contract to guarantee another company's agreement to 
develop these resources.428 Contracting to build an oil rig or 
pipeline or providing engineering consulting services would also 
surely fall in this category. 
The second category concerns acquisition of an equity interest 
in an Iranian petroleum resources development company.429 
Accordingly, an oil company could violate the Act by purchasing 
shares in another company that, in turn, develops Iranian petro-
leum resources. An example of this violation may have occurred 
when Petronas, Malaysia's state oil company, acquired a 30% 
stake in a $600 million project to develop the Sirn A and E oil 
fields in the Persian Gulf.430 To date, the United States has not 
imposed sanctions in this case. 
Legislative history regarding the second category states that 
portfolio investments are not covered by the sanction mecha-
nism. 4~1 Thus, for example, absent some other applicable pro-
hibition, nothing in the Act bars a mutual fund from investing 
in an oil company's equity or debt securities that itself is in-
volved in the development of Iranian petroleum resources and 
which runs afoul of the Act. What is not clear, however, is the 
test for distinguishing direct from portfolio investments. Does 
the distinction depend on the nature of the investor - an oil 
company versus a mutual fund; the extent of control the inves-
tor has over the company responsible for developing petroleum 
resources; controlling influence over management decisions and 
the right to appoint members of the board of directors; the size 
of the investment; majority versus minority stake? As indicated 
428 See id. (stating first category of illegal investment is contracting to develop Iranian 
petroleum resources). 
429 See id. (stating second category of illegal investment is acquiring interest in such 
development). 
430 See james Kynge, Malaysia Angeml by U.S. Sanctions Threat, FIN. nMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at 
6 (asserting that United States has no right to impose extra-jurisdictional sanctions on 
other countries); U.S. Embassy Denies Sanctions Are Planned Against Malaysian Oil Fmn fur 
Iranian Dealings, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698, 1698 (Nov. 6, 1996) (reporting U.S. 
government denial of intention to impose sanctions). 
'-'' See H.R REP. No. 104-523(11), at 15 (1996), Tt!flrinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1318 
(stating that House Ways and Means Committee does not intend that sanctions would 
extend to portfolio investments made by any other person in sanctioned person). 
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earlier, the safest strategy for dealing with these questions is to 
seek an advisory opinion from the Secretary of State.452 . 
The third class of illegal direct foreign investment transactions 
concerns the receipt of royalties, earnings, or profits from the 
development of Iranian petroleum resources.m As in the previ-
ous category, the precise boundaries of this category are uncer-
tain. Typically, earnings and profits would be received from an 
equity interest in a petroleum resource development project. But 
might this interest be characterized as a portfolio investment? A 
company responsible for a petroleum development project would 
pay royalties for the sale or license of patented techi10logy. 
Presumably, a patent holder must take care not to sell or license 
technology to a company for use in the Iranian petroleum re-
source sector. 
Congress anticipated the possibility that businesses might seek 
to circumvent the $40 million investment trigger sanction by 
structuring a transaction in amounts less than $40 million. Ac-
cordingly, the prohibited activity also includes any combination 
of investments of at least $10 million each, which, in a twelve-
month period, ~dd up to or exceed $40 million.454 
Congress also anticipated the possibility that the investment 
trigger sanction might not induce other countries to develop 
their own sanctions against Iran. Therefore, it included a stick 
- the possibility of an enhanced sanction.455 If a country 
agrees to impose economic sanctions and other substantial mea-
sures to inhibit Iran's efforts to support efforts of international 
terrorism, then the President may waive application of the in-
vestment trigger sanction to individuals and businesses from that 
country.436 However, if a country has not undertaken 
432 See 50 U.S.CA. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 7. Advisory opinions) 
(illustrating issuance of advisory opinions). 
"" See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions) (detailing third class of illegal 
foreign investments). 
,,. See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions) (describing 
imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran). 
'" See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multilateral regime) (allowing President to 
apply enhanced sanctions). The President is required to report to Congress regarding any 
country to which the enhanced sanction is applied. See id. 
'
36 See id. (allowing President to waive sanctions if country agrees to support sanctions 
against Iran). The President must notify Congress of the waiver at least 3o days before the 
waiver takes efiecL See id. 
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substantial measures in this regard, then the President will apply 
a mandatory enhanced sanction to individuals and businesses 
from that country. 437 The enhancement consists of lowering 
the threshold that triggers the sanction. 438 Instead of a $40 
million aggregate limit on petroleum resource investments, the 
limit drops to $20 million.439 Likewise, the $10 million limit 
applicable to combinations of investments drops to $5 million. 
Hence, it becomes illegal to make a combination of investments 
of at least $5 million each that, in a twelve-month period, equal 
or exceed $20 million. 440 
The existence of reasonably specific definitions of the terms 
"investment," "develop," and "petroleum resources," and 
Congress's anticipation of certain problems should not suggest 
that enforcement of the 1996 Sanctions Act is mechanical. To 
the contrary, there are important unresolved issues. For exam-
. pie, the Act does not provide any guidance as to what a "direct 
and significant" contribution to the development of Iran's petro-
leum resources would be. The President, therefore, has 
considerable discretion to impose the mandatory investment 
trigger sanctions. In fact, the President must render a case-by-
case judgment for each suspect investment to determine whether 
it is bo\:h direct and significant in nature. Political considerations 
will almost certainly play some role in these cases. 
For example, in July 1997, the Clinton Administration an-
nounced it had no objections under the Act to the construction 
of a $1.6 billion natural gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan and 
Turkey via lran.441 The pipeline, according to Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright, was "a way to help Turkey and 
Turkmenistan." 442 Turkey, of course, is an important U.S. ally; 
with respect to Turkmenistan, the United States has been "keen 
to wean the former Soviet republics away from their economic 
., See id. 
... See id. 
'"" See id. (noting lower threshold that triggers sanction) . 
... See id . 
.. , See Charles Clover, Azerbaijan Looks to U.S. to End Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 1997, 
at 4 (speculating on United States' shifting view of pipeline politics); Charles Clover & 
Robert Corzine, U.S. Decision sparks a New Round oJPipelim Politics, FIN. TiMES, July 31, 1997, 
at 4 (discussing United States's non-<>pposition to pipeline) . 
... Clover & Corzine, supra note 441, at 4. 
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dependence on Russia." 445 As a legal matter, the decision may 
be defended because the pipeline will not help develop Iranian 
petroleum resources - the pipeline will carry Turkmen, not 
Iranian, natural gas. 444 
To alter the example, suppose a country bordering Iran 
builds a natural gas pipeline up to its border with Iran, and 
· buys natural gas from Iran that will be transported in the new 
pipeline. Does the transaction trigger the investment sanction? 
The question is not hypothetical because Turkey is engaging in 
exactly this sort of transaction. 445 In August 1996, just days af-
ter the Act took effect, a newly-elected Islamic government in 
Turkey signed a twenty-twO-year, $20 billion natural gas contract 
with Iran.446 Under the contract, Iran agreed to sell roughly 
140 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year to Turkey 
beginning in 1998.447 The gas will be delivered in a new 
pipeline consisting of two parts. A 680-mile portion will run 
from the Turkish-Iranian border into Turkey and will cost $1.2 
billion.448 A 170-mile portion will run· from the border into 
Iran and cost $300 million. 449 Turkey is responsible for 
building its portion of the pipeline, while Iran is responsible for 
building the portion on Iranian soil. 450 The Turkish 
government asserts it is not providing any assistance to the 
Iranians to build the pipeline.451 The United States has warned 
Turkey that the transaction could violate the Act,452 but Turkey 
... See id. 
444 See It Will Bum Nicely, Anyway: Turltey and Iran: A Gas Pipeline Across Iran, EcoNOMIST, 
Aug. 2, 1997, at 30 (explaining that in theory, Iran will receive only transit revenues to 
avoid conflict with Act) . 
..., See Steven Erlanger, Turlrey-Iran Gas Deal: A Test of U.S. Law on Tt:TTOr,, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 1996, at A7; Turltey Sets Iran Gas Deal, Says It Doesn't Dt!J Ban, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 
1996, at AI; Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Continues to Study Iran-Turltey Energy Pact to Determine 
WhetMr It Vwlates U.S. Trade Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1353, 1353 (Aug. 21, 1996). 
446 See Turitey Sets Iran Gas Deal, Says It Won't De!J Ban, supra note 445, at A7 . 
.. 
7 See id. There are discrepancies in media accounts of the exact amount of natural gas 
Turkey will purchase each year. Two reports, for example, state that Iran will supply 105 
billion cubic feet beginning in 1999, and the volume will rise to 350 biilion cubic feet by 
2005. See id. 
... See id . 
... See id. . 
450 See james M. Dorsey, Iran-Turltey Gas Deal to Test New U.S. Law, WALL ST.J. EuR., Aug. 
13, 1996, at A2 . 
... See id. 
4.12 See id. 
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has a plausible defense. The contract is nothing more than a 
trade deal - an exchange of natural gas for money - and the 
Act does not prohibit trade deals. Nothing in the contract calls 
for a Turkish investment m Iran's petroleum resource 
development. 
Turkey also has political factors in its favor. The United States 
values Turkey's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization ("NATO") and the continuing use of Turkish military 
bases. Not only did these bases play an important role in the 
Gulf War, but they were also used to enforce the "no-fly" zones 
over Iraq.m Furthermore, the United States is wary of provok-
ing anti-American Islamic extremists in Turkey. Thus, it seems 
quite unlikely that the United States will interpret the Iran in-
vestment trigger language in the Act in such a way as to reach 
Turkey's contract. 
In the end, how the United States treats the transaction may 
not matter because the Turkey-Iran transaction will be difficult 
to complete. The proposed pipeline route traverses rugged ter-
rain and hostile Kurdish territory.454 Moreover, Turkey has 
alternate sources of natural gas, such as Russia, Algeria, Qatar, 
and possibly Egypt if a so-called "peace pipeline" from Egypt 
through Israel, Lebanon, and Syria is built. 455 However, the 
United States will be confronted with several other transactions 
that fall in the "gray" area between investment and trade. One 
probability will be natural gas supply agreements between Iran 
and India, Iran and Pakistan, and Iran and Turkmenistan. 456 
Mter all, Iran has the second largest natural gas resources after 
Russia, and it is eager to develop these resources for export 
purposes.457 Surely the threat of U.S. sanctions will not intimi-
date Iran into halting this development. 
453 See Terry Atlas, U.S. Finds Gulf War Still Isn't Over. Qinton Sends Warning to Hussein 
with Second Volky of Missiles, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1996, at Al. 
,,. See Shushan Bahree, Iran Takes Economic Steps in Response to U.S. Curbs, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 14, 1996, at A3 (discussing Iran's plan to sell natural gas to Europe and Turkey). 
455 See John Barham, Turicey to Crack Down on IUicit Oil Tratk with Iraq, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
1, 1997, at 2 (reporting on other sources of natural gas for Turkey). 
456 See, e.g., Robert Corzine, Turlunenistan Defies U.S. Ovl':f' Iran Gas, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
1997, at 4 (discussing Iran's deal to supply natural gas despite U.S. objections). 
457 See Iran Says Project Dpposed Uy U.S. WiU Earn $45 BiUion, ENERGY ALERT, Oct. 14, 1997, 
at 12. 
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Another gray area is the distinction between an invesbnent 
contract and a service contract. Suppose Turkey had agreed to 
provide routine maintenance on an Iranian natural gas pipeline. 
Would this constitute a prohibited invesbnent? Guidelines on 
the implementation of the Act published by the Deparbnent of 
State suggest five inquiries to pursue to draw the distinction. 458 
First. does the provider of management services put capital at 
risk? Secmid, does the provider receive a share of income or 
profits from the development? Third, does the provider receive 
an equity stake in the petroleum resources? Fourth, does the 
provider receive compensation based on invesbnent perfor-
mance? Finally, does the provider receive a share of the assets 
upon dissolution of the enterprise? An affirmative answer to 
these questions suggests the contract is a prohibited invesbnent. 
However, it is not entirely clear how the U.S. government might 
resolve a case where some, but not all, of the inquiries are an-
swered in the affirmative. 
F. The Investment and Trade Triggers Against Libya 
The 1996 Sanctions Act spells out two prohibited activities 
regarding Libya that would trigger U.S. imposition of two or 
more of the abov~cussed sanctions. The first, an invesbnent 
trigger, is identical in virtually all respe'cts to the invesbnent 
trigger for Iran. It is illegal for any person to (1) make an in-
vesbnent worth $40 million or more, (2) with actual knowledge, 
that (3) directly and significantly contributes to the enhance-
ment of Libya's ability to develop its petroleum resources.459 
The only difference between the Iranian and Libyan invesbnent 
triggers is that no waiver exists for the Libyan trigger and, there-
fore, neither do enhanced sanctions. The President does not 
possess the authority to waive the Libyan invesbnent trigger if a 
country agrees to undertake substantial measures against 
458 &e Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 
66,067, 66068 (1.996) (listing factors that determine whether contract for management 
services is investment rather than service contract); State Deparlmmt Issues Guidance Clariffing 
Iron-Libya Sanctions Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1967, 1967 (Dec. 18, 1996) (discussing 
State Department guidelines for implementing Iran-Libya sanctions). 
459 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. 
Imposition of sanctions). 
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international terrorism.460 That authority applies only to the 
Iranian investment trigger. 461 As a result, the stick to 
encourage other countries to adopt measures against Libya -
the imposition of the enhanced sanction - cannot cause 
financial pain. 
The reason for this distinction between Iran and Libya is not 
apparent from the statute or legislative history. Business reality is 
the most likely explanation. As suggested earlier, European com-
panies have far more extensive dealings in the Libyan than the 
Iranian petroleum industry. As a result, Congress probably real-
ized there was little hope of inducing a multilateral sanctions 
regime against Libya beyond the measures already adopted in 
U.N. resolutions and, therefore, little point in applying the en-
hanced sanction. 
The second prohibited activity concerns trade with Libya in 
sensitive military items. The President must impose two or more 
of the above-discussed sanctions if a person engages in the fol-
lowing transaction: (1) exports or transfers to Libya, (2) with 
actual knowledge, (3) of goods, services, or technology denied 
to Libya under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 748 or 883, 
and ( 4) these exports significantly and materially contribute to 
Libya's ability to develop its petroleum resources, maintain its 
aviation capabilities, acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons or a destabilizing number of advanced conventional 
weapons, or enhance Libya's military capabilities.462 While the 
prohibited transaction mentions petroleum resources and avia-
tion, the clear thrust of the criteria concerns weapons. 463 In 
essence, the trade trigger is a unilateral measure adopted by the 
United States to reinforce the multilateral arms embargo already 
implemented by the United Nations. Neither the Act nor its 
legislative history casts doubt on the sincerity or efficacy of the 
U.N. Security Council measures. However, the very existence of 
the trade trigger sanction must be seen as just that: 
460 See id. (stating that President may waive Iranian investment trigger, with no similar 
provision for libya). 
461 See id. (discussing investment trigger for inhibiting Iranian activities). 
462 See id. (discussing sanctions for prohibited transactions) . 
.., See id. (concluding sanctions were response to Iran's acquisition and threatened use 
of weapons and libya's failure to comply with U.N. resolution mandating reduction of 
weapons). 
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congressional skepticism of the willingness of some countries 
and their nationals to forsake profits and cease arms dealings 
with Libya. Essentially, the trade trigger says to the world: "The 
United States agrees with the multilateral measures against 
Libya, but just to ensure compliance, the United States has its 
own secondary boycott to keep everyone in line." 
As with the investment trigger that contains the flexible but 
undefined language "directly and significantly contribute[s]," 464 
the trade trigger uses the phrase "significantly and material-
ly. "465 Again, this undefined phrase gives the President 
considerable maneuvering room in deciding whether to impose 
sanctions. Likewise, both triggers contain the same mens rea 
requirement of actual knowledge. 466 Thus, the proof problems 
of actual knowledge noted earlier regarding the investment 
trigger are certain to recur in the context of the trade trigger. 
An obvious question is why Congress chose to include a trade 
trigger for Libya, but not for Iran. Mter all, this choice means 
that the secondary boycott of Iran is narrowly tailored to petro-
leum resource investments, whereas the secondary boycott of 
Libya includes these petroleum investments plus exports in a 
wide array of other goods and services. The legislative history 
explains the reason for the differential treatment of the two 
countries. 
In the case of Iran, the [House Ways and Means] Com-
mittee believes that it will be more effective to impose sanc-
tions on companies that invest in Iran's oil and gas resourc-
es ... 
However, the Committee did not believe it was wise to in-
clude a requirement in the bill [H.R 3107, the final version 
of the Act] that the President sanction trade with Iran (the 
so-called "trade trigger") because the cost to U.S. interests of 
imposing such a broadly based secondary boyeott would be too high. 
For example, monitoring international trade with Iran, especiaUy 
in common goods like driU pipe and driU bits, would be a difficult if 
not an unworkable task. The number of trade transactions wiU be 
significantly higher than the number of investment contracts and the 
flow of components impossible to trace. The incidence of sanctions 
required by the trade trigger would be greater. The Committee believes 
... ld. 
... Id. 
... See id. 
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it would be so high as to cause serious damage to our relations with 
trusted aUies. By contrast an invesunent trigger is more work-
able for the President and more potent when applied. 
Equipped with an invesunent sanction the President is in a 
better position to convince countries trading with Iran to join 
the U.S. in denying Iran the opportunity to earn hard cur-
rency from its petroleum resources. 
Libya represents a different case by virtue of multilateraUy agreed 
trade sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security [Council] 
Resolutions, which prohibit trade in weapons, aviation equip-
ment, and oil equipment significant to the refining sector. 
For Libya, the bill establishes a mandatory sanction frame-
work for violations of the internationally agreed regime.467 
In sum, the different economic histories and geopolitical circum-
stances account for the different treatment of Iran and Libya. 
G. Duration and Termination of Sanctions 
Any sanction imposed under the 1996 Sanctions Act must 
remain in effect for at least one year from the date imposed. 468 
In general, the Act establishes a minimum two-year duration for 
sanctions.469 However, the Act also allows for the possibility 
that the President may determine and certify to Congress that 
the sanctioned person is no longer engaging in a prohibited 
transaction and has provided reliable assurances that it will not 
knowingly violate the Act in the future. 470 In this event, the 
President may lift the sanctions, subject to the requirement that 
they remain in effect for at least a year.471 In effect, this re-
quirement ensures the imposition of a minimum penalty and 
prevents a sanctioned person from skirting sanctions by tempo-
rarily ceasing an illegal activity and providing a disingenuous 
assurance of future compliance. 
The Act lays out two further bases for terminating sanctions 
that, unlike the focus on the sanctioned person, allow for termi-
nation if Iran and Libya reform their behavior. First, the 
467 H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 14-15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 1311, 1317 
(emphasis added). 
468 See id. at 18, reprinted at 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 1320. 
469 See 50 U .S.CA § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions; 
Presidential waiver). 
470 See id. 
471 See id. 
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requirement to impose sanctions will cease to exist if the 
President determines and certifies to Congress that Iran no 
longer supports acts of international terrorism, and has 
abandoned its efforts to obtain nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons, and ballistic missiles and launchers. 472 Second, the 
requirement to impose sanctions will terminate if the President 
determines and certifies to Congress that Libya has satisfied the 
requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 
883.473 
If the President refuses to make any of the three aforemen-
tioned determinations and certifications, then the sanctions may 
remain in place for considerably .longer than two years. How 
much longer, however, is not clear. The Act contains a sunset 
provision stating that the Act lapses five years after the date of 
enactment, which was August 5, 1996.474 However, one reading 
of this sunset provision is that it precludes the imposition of 
new sanctions after August 5, 2001, but not the continued en-
forcement of sanctions imposed prior to that date. Thus, at least 
in theory, there is no fixed termination period on sanctions. 
This possibility raises an interesting problem: while a decision 
to impose sanctions is not reviewable by any court, 475 could a 
sanctioned person challenge the sanctions long after the United 
States imposed them if reasonable grounds exist to believe their 
continuation is unwarranted? The answer seemingly depends 
partly upon how a court defines the statutory words "to impose." 
Do they refer narrowly to the initial presidential decision to 
impose sanctions, or do they also encompass a refusal by the 
President to determine and certify that the criteria for terminat-
ing sanctions have been met? 
The presence of a sunset provision should not give false hope 
to critics of the Act that it will become legal history after August 
5, 2001. Congress clarified its reason for the sunset provision in 
the legislative history to the AcL The House Ways and Means 
Committee never intended the Act to be permanenL 476 Even 
.,. See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 8. Tennination of sanctions) . 
., See id. 
474 See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 1!1. Effective date; sunset) . 
.,. See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 11. Detenninations not reviewable). 
476 See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 19 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 
1322. 
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in this sensitive policy area, five years is sufficient time to gauge 
how effectively the Act achieved its objectives. 477 The Commit-
tee believes "it will be important for Congress to revisit the issue 
in five years and to evaluate the behavior of Libya and Iran and 
the effectiveness of this bil1." 478 In other words, a renewal of 
the Act appears to be as likely a scenario as its termination. 
At the same time, the sunset provision should encourage U.S. 
petroleum companies because of the diverse underlying national 
security considerations of the Act. At some undetermined point 
in the future, possibly when new political leaders assume control 
in Iran and Libya, the United States will abolish the sanctions 
because they will no longer be necessary. In the meantime, 
nothing in the Act prevents U.S. petroleum companies from 
maintaining and cultivating business contacts in these countries. 
As long as the Act remains in place, a farsighted U.S. company 
should endeavor, to the extent politically possible, to network in 
Iran and Libya. Indeed, Mobil Oil, Amoco, and Conoco appear 
to be positioning themselves for the inevitable post-sanctions era. 
In May 1997, they sent mid-level officials to an Iranian-sponsored 
energy conference in Isfahan.479 
H. Waiver and Delay of Sanctions 
The 1996 Sanctions Act provides three circumstances under 
which sanctions may be waived. First, the President can waive 
the imposition of sanction if a waiver "is important to the nation-
al interest of the United States." 480 This waiver authority appears 
to be quite broad; it is not limited to a national security inter-
est, but rather can be invoked for any sort of national interest. 
The legislative history indicates that the President might consid-
er use of this waiver authority if the imposition of sanctions 
would threaten U.S. intelligence sources and methods, hinder 
the intemational cooperation and the intemational obligations 
of the United States, or lead to unacceptable costs to U.S. 
477 See id. 
478 /d. 
'"' See Daniel Pearl, U.S. Oil Finns Attend Conf1!J1!'11U in Iran, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1997, at 
All. 
480 See 50 U.S.CA. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions; 
Presidential waiver) (emphasis added). 
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economic interests.481 For example, the President could find 
that imposing sanctions is contrary to national interest because it 
would result in an unacceptably high loss of sales or profits to 
U.S. businesses or cost too many Americans their jobs. 
The only real constraint on the President's national interest 
waiver authority is that he must report to Congress about the 
waiver determination at least thirty days before the waiver takes 
effect. 482 The report must discuss certain specifically listed 
items, such as a description . of the illegal transaction, an 
estimate of the extent to which the transaction helped Iran or 
Libya, and a discussion of how the President would handle a 
repeat offense by the sanctioned person. 483 
Second, the President can waive sanctions if the imposition 
would harm the U.S. govemment;s ability to obtain critical 
goods and services. Regarding defense procurement, the United 
States need not and should not impose sanctions upon a person 
who is a sole source supplier of an essential defense article or 
service if (1) there is no readily or reasonably available alterna-
tive source, or (2) the defense article or service is being provid-
ed under an existing contract and is essential to the national 
security of the United. States.484 Similarly, regarding non-
defense related items, the President can waive sanctions for per-
sons supplying medicines, humanitarian items, spare parts, com-
ponent parts, or information technology essential to U.S. manu-
facturing that provides routine servicing and maintenance on 
products without another readily or reasonably available 
source.485 In short, this waiver of authority ensures that a U.S.-
imposed secondary boycott of Iran or Libya does not eventually 
damage the Pentagon or U.S. manufacturers. 
Finally, as discussed earlier, nationals of a country may escape 
sanctions if their country has "agreed to undertake substantial 
measures, including. economic sanctions, that will inhibit Iran's 
481 See H.R REP. No. 104-523(11}, at 18, nprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 132().21. 
482 See 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions; 
Presidential waiver) . 
... See id. 
484 See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions). 
485 See id. It should be noted that the statute incorrectly numbers the items in sub-
section (f), omitting an item (5). See id. The correct numbering should finish with item 
(6}, which should cover medicines. 
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efforts" to sponsor acts of international terrorism. 486 This waiv-
er possibility does not apply to libya. 
To restate, the President's determination to impose sanctions 
is not reviewable by any court. 487 Consequently, it is impossible 
for a sanctioned person to delay imposition by attempting to 
bog down the President in a lawsuiL However, the Act sets forth 
conditions that are largely under the control of the President 
and the government with primary jurisdiction over the 
sanctioned person, under which imposition may be delayed for 
up to 180 days. By allowing for delayed imposition of sanctions, 
Congress provided an avenue to soften the unilateral blow of 
the Act. 
Specifically, Congress urges the President to consult with the 
government that has primary jurisdiction over a person the 
President determines to be liable under the Act immediately 
after he makes that determination. 488 In order to do so, the 
President can delay implementation of sanctions for up to nine-
ty days. 489 Sanctions need not be imposed if, after consultation, 
the President determines and certifies to Congress that the for-
eign government has taken effective actions to terminate the 
foreign entity's involvement in the illegal transaction.490 The 
President can delay implementing sanctions for a further ninety 
days if he determines and certifies to Congress that the govern-
ment "is in the process of taking" these actions.491 
V. THE PRAGMATIC QUESTION: 
Do NATIONAL SECURI1Y SANCfiONS WoRK? 
Clearly, the United States has not been, and will not be, shy 
about enacting legislation authorizing unilateral trade action 
against another country in the interest of national security. 
These invocations of statutory authority must be judged by more 
488 See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multilateral regime). 
487 See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 11. Determinations not reviewable); H.R REP. 
No. 523(1), at 17 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1306. 
488 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions; 
Presidential waiver). 
489 See id. 
490 See id. 
••• See id. The President must report to Congress on the status of consultations and any 
additional 9Q.day delay. See id. 
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than their appropriateness in the post-Uruguay Round multilat-
eral trading system, and their consistency with the rules of that 
system. Mter all, from this perspective, the judgment is rather 
obvious: the language of GAIT article XXI is not a serious 
constraint on the use of national security sanctions, and only the 
good faith of WTO Members to avoid abusive invocation in the 
interests of the multilateral system provides some measure of a 
GAIT-based constraint. 
Rather, a practical issue emerges from the earlier discussions 
of trade remedies in support of national security aims. The 
United States's use of national security sanctions ultimately must 
be judged by a bottom line question: does unilateral action in 
support of national security aims work? The empirical evidence 
concerning unilateral action pursuant to statutes other than 
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 suggests that such action is 
not nearly as effective as its advocates would hope or believe. 492 
Indeed, unilateral trade action often has a negative effect on the 
U.S. economy. 
One recent study, conducted by the Institute for International 
Economics, examined the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions 
imposed against twenty-six countries, including Cuba, Iran, Lib-
ya, and Burma. 495 It concluded that in 1995, the sanctions cost 
. the United States between $15 and $20 billion as a result of lost 
exports and higher-priced substitute import sources and between 
200,000 and 250,000 lost export-related jobs. 494 These self-in-
flicted wounds are sure to worsen with the tightened unilateral 
ban on new U.S. investment in Burma. 
The day after a prohibition on new U.S. investtnents in 
Burma was announced, the heads of several [non-U.S.] oil 
companies operating in the country sat down to dinner at 
one of Rangoon's new luxury hotels. They were salivating -
but not because of the succulent lobster on offer that eve-
ning . 
... See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing unilateral statutory actions) . 
.., See Robert Corzine & Nancy Dunne, U.S. Business Hits at Use of Unilateral Sanctions, 
FIN. nMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at 10 (discussing Institute of International Economics study). 
494 See id.; see also Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sanctions Against Other Countries Cost &cpurters Up to 
$19 Billion, Study Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 736, 736 (Apr. 23, 1997) (discussing Insti-
tute for International Economics study). 
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Instead, they were discussing how to caiVe up exploration 
rights held by U.S. companies, rights the U.S. companies will 
most likely have to give up under the new rules . . . . 
In the absence of the U.S. companies, "it's all there for 
the taking. No project will not be taken up," says an execu-
tive with a Malaysian conglomerate.495 
Interestingly, the Institute for Intemational Economics study 
triggered the creation of a coalition of 440 U.S. companies and 
trade associations called "USAENGAGE." 496 The mission of 
USAENGAGE is to "fight the imposition of unilateral sanctions 
by the United States." 497 As its chairperson, Donald V. Fites, 
the chief executive officer of Caterpillar, Inc., states, "the evi-
dence is clear ... [that] [t]he proliferation of U.S. unilateral 
sanctions undermines American leadership and competitiveness, 
costs U.S. jobs, and results in significant losses to the econo-
my."498 Recently, USAENGAGE supported congressional legisla-
tion that would curb U.S. use of unilateral sanctions. 499 The 
legislation would require an assessment of the economic impact 
and likelihood of success of such sanctions before they are im-
posed, and authorize the President to waive sanctions if they are 
not in the U.S. national interest. 500 Any sanctions imposed 
would be reviewed annually and lapse after two years unless 
renewed by Congress.501 
A second recent study, conducted by the National Association 
of Manufacturers, reviews sixty-one laws or executive actions 
ordering unilateral U.S. sanctions against thirty-five foreign coun-
tries - including Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Burma.502 Those thir-
ty-five nations represent 42% of the world's population, or 2.3 
billion potential consumers of U.S. goods and services in export 
markets worth $790 billion annually.505 "[I]n only a handful of 
16. 
495 Ted Bardacke, Burma- The Sick Man Gets Sicker, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1997, at 6. 
496 See Yerkey, supra note 494, at 736. 
497 ld. 
498 Id. 
499 See Nancy Dunne, U.S. Industry Tries to Curb Sanctions, FIN. nMES, Oct 24, 1997, at 
500 See Nancy Dunne, U.S. Companies Plan Attack on Sanctions, FIN. nMES, Sept 15, 1997, 
at 4. 
501 See id. 
502 See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Unilateral Sanctions jeopardize U.S. 
Economic and Diplomatic Interests, BARRON'S, Oct 13, 1997, at 70. 
"" See Gary G. Yerkey, Unilateral Sanctions Ta~t $790 BiUion Potential Export Marllet a 
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cases can it be argued that the sanctions changed the behavior 
of the targeted governments." 504 Thus, "[u]nilateral sanctions 
are little more than postage stamps we send to other countries 
at the cost of thousands of American jobs," 505 and they "give 
U.S. companies the 'stigma' of being unreliable trading part-
ners."506 The obvious conclusion is that while these sanctions 
may make some Americans feel good, they do not work. 
Both studies might well have added two other key concluding 
points. First, unilateral trade actions rarely have positive diplo-
matic results to offset the costs they impose on the U.S. econo-
my. To date, for instance, the ruling regimes of Cuba, Iran, 
Libya, and Burma have made no significant changes in their 
policies. Typically, unilateral action turns an already recalcitrant 
regime into an outright defiant that attracts both admiration 
and sympathy from many in the Third World. 
Second, unilateral trade actions have no effect on trade imbal-
ances. To be sure, national security or human rights concerns 
motivate some unilateral actions. But a nagging concern about 
imbalances also plays a role in such actions. The truth that must 
be acknowledged is that macroeconomic factors are the key 
determinant of the direction and size· of the U.S. trade bal-
ance.507 Our chronic trade deficits are caused by variables such 
Year, Study Finds, 14 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 421, 421 (Mar. 5, 1997). 
504 ld. 
"" Yerkey, supra note 503, at 422 (quotingjeny Jasinowski, President, National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers). 
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unilateral sanctions, see PREsiDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, UNilATERAL ECONOMIC SANCilONS: 
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as "relative rates of economic growth, fiscal and monetary choic-
es at home and abroad, tax, savings, investment and exchange 
rate policies made ·individually or collectively around the world, 
and the internal cultures of important U.S. industries." 508 To 
say that unfair trade barriers are not the principal obstacle to 
U.S. exports is an understatement. In fact, "unfair trade practic-
es account for only 5 to 15% of the trade deficit. "509 Suppose 
Japan removed all of its unfair trade barriers. At best, the bilat-
eral U.S. trade deficit with Japan might decline by approximately 
8 to 14%.510 
It is also important to appreciate that a trade deficit also 
results from non-economic factors, such as social and cultural 
attitudes and perceptions of product quality. For instance, many 
Japanese consumers have traditionally been reluctant to buy rice 
from California, in part because they feel it is inappropriate in 
sushi and other Japanese cuisine. During the heated 1995 auto 
parts dispute, some Japanese officials remarked that U.S. car 
manufacturers did not make right-hand drive vehicles for the 
Japanese market and were generally of inferior quality to Japa-
nese cars.511 A unilateral trade action cannot alter foreign ob-
ance). Bayard and Elliott elaborate on their reasoning: 
ld. 
[T]rade policy cannot correct trade imbalances. For instance, if resources in an 
economy are fully employed, export promotion may affect the composition of a 
country's exports but is not likely to increase the level of exports. If Country 
A's economy is not at full employment, or if trade barriers in Country B raise 
that country's level of saving or reduce its domestic investment, trade policy 
may raise the level of Country A's exports. But with floating exchange rates, 
again there will be little impact on the trade balance because Country A's cur-
rency will appreciate, causing exports to decrease and imports to increase. 
Fundamentally, the trade balance is a macroeconomic phenomenon, deter-
mined by the balance between saving and investment by government, industry, 
and citizens, and it is usually not significantly affected by trade policy .... 
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setvations and attitudes regarding American goods. Finally, ac-
cording to evidence from USAENGAGE, America's unilateral 
economic sanctions contribute to the U.S. trade deficit simply by 
virtue of foregone export opportunities.512 
In sum, unilateral trade action persists despite considerable 
evidence demonstrating it is ineffective, and often counterpro-
ductive. Nevertheless, this evidence has not prodded U.S. trade 
policy officials or jurists to rethink their fidelity to unilateral 
trade actions and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. 
CONCLUSION 
National security and international trade law are inextricably 
linked. By virtue of GAlT article XXI, the link is written into 
the constitution of modem international trade law. However, the 
link is not one between two equal forces. Article XXI provides 
little effective restraint on WTO Members from enacting nation-
al security sanctions legislation. Put bluntly, even in the interna-
tional trade law constitution, international trade law is subordi-
nated to national security. 
The United States is exploiting this subordinate relationship. 
In the post-Soviet Union, post-Red China era, it is threatened by 
new groups of bad guys - drug kingpins, rogue dictators, and 
state-sponsored terrorists - who are less monolithic and more 
diffuse than the old bad guys. The United States is confronting 
this threat by deploying international trade law measures, includ-
ing secondary boycotts, as a weapon. Unfortunately, America's 
companies, allies, and trade partners are being hit by friendly 
fire. The weapon is neither outrageous nor splendid. Neither 
supporters nor critics of the weapon are entirely on target with 
their arguments. But it does not appear to be particularly effec-
tive. Because its operation causes so much controversy and its 
results are modest at best, the burden now falls on U.S. trade 
policy makers to modify or scuttle the weapon. 
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